State v. Goulet

• Decision Date: 16 June 2011
• Docket Number: No. 2009–140–C.A.,2009–140–C.A.
• Citation: 21 A.3d 302
• Parties: STATEv.Edgar GOULET.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

21 A.3d 302

STATE

v.Edgar GOULET.

No. 2009–140–C.A.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 16, 2011.

Christopher R. Bush, Department of Attorney General, for State.Thomas M. Dickinson, Esq., Woonsocket, for Defendant.Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.

OPINION

Justice FLAHERTY, for the Court.

“He said a dog that doesn't listen is no good.” ¹ The defendant, Edgar Goulet, was serious when he uttered those words, because shortly after saying them on May 1, 2006, he used a .22–caliber rifle to kill his dog, Sparky. After an investigation, the State of Rhode Island charged the defendant with one count of malicious killing of an animal and one count of possession of a sawed-off shotgun. On May 12, 2008, after a four-day jury trial, Mr. Goulet was convicted on both counts. The defendant appealed, alleging numerous errors-including (1) the trial justice's failure to suppress evidence seized in the course of Fourth Amendment violations and (2) an improper denial of relief from prejudicial joinder resulting in an unfair trial. The matter came before us for oral argument on May 3, 2011. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

Facts and Procedural History

On May 1, 2006, Heidi Eklund was doing yard work at the home that she shared with her mother. Sparky, a pit bull mix that was one of several dogs owned by defendant, her next door neighbor, wandered onto the Eklund property and began sniffing and running around the yard.² The defendant followed into the yard and apparently was exasperated that the animal would not come to him. After defendant made what Ms. Eklund considered to be a threat against the dog, she became concerned that he was about to harm it and said, “please don't kill him. It's not his fault.” However, according to Ms. Eklund, defendant merely reiterated that “a dog that doesn't listen is no good to me.” He then returned to his property.

Shortly thereafter, Ms. Eklund heard the sound of an engine starting up and then a gunshot. Alarmed, the young woman dashed into the family home. Her mother, Sari Eklund, seeing her frightened daughter, and also having heard the gunshot, immediately called 911. The subsequent response and investigation by the South Kingstown Police Department resulted in the unearthing of Sparky's corpse from a shallow grave located next to a small backhoe excavator and the discovery of an illegal, sawed-off shotgun.

Exactly one year later, on May 1, 2007, the State of Rhode Island, by way of criminal information, filed charges against defendant. Count 1 charged that defendant, “on or about the 1st day of May, 2006, at South Kingstown in the County of Washington, did maliciously shoot, wound or kill an animal, to wit, a domestic canine, in violation of § 4–1–5 of the General Laws of Rhode Island, 1956, as amended (Reenactment of 2002).” ³ Count 2 charged that defendant “did have in his possession or under his control, a sawed off shotgun, in violation of § 11–47–8(b) of the General Laws of Rhode Island, 1956, as amended (Reenactment of 2002).” ⁴

Before trial, defendant filed various motions.⁵ First, defendant filed a motion to dismiss count 1 on the theory that G.L.1956 § 4–13–18 controlled, and that, as such, dismissal was proper as a matter of law. ⁶ Second, defendant moved to suppress any and all results of a warrantless search of his property. Third, defendant moved for the suppression of any and all results from a subsequent search of the premises conducted pursuant to a warrant, because the warrant itself was supported by evidence “obtained illegally by a prior illegal search,” and therefore should have been excluded under the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).

The defendant later filed a motion to sever the two counts of the information under Rule 14 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, which says in pertinent part:

“If it appears that a defendant or the State is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment, information, or complaint or by such joinder for trial together, the court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires.”

In advancing the motion to sever, defendant argued that:

“[T]he prejudice displayed in this particular case is that Defendant needs to testify because he has at the very least an affirmative defense under 4–13–18 of the General Laws of the State of Rhode Island, as to Count 1. In doing so he exposes himself to filling in the gaps of the State's case in Count 2.”

The trial justice conducted hearings on the various motions over the course of several days. He ruled that (1) the motion to dismiss count 1 based on § 4–13–18 was withdrawn by defendant,⁷ (2) the motion to suppress evidence that had been obtained as a result of the warrantless search was denied based on the exigent and/or emergency search and plain-view exceptions to the warrant requirement, (3) the motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the warrant search was denied because the court ruled that the initial warrantless search was proper, and that the evidence secured by that search served as probable cause to issue the warrant, and (4) the motion to sever was denied. ⁸

A jury trial held in May 2008 resulted in the conviction of defendant on both count 1 and count 2. The defendant's oral motion for new trial was denied on July 18, 2008. On that same date, the Superior Court sentenced defendant to two years imprisonment to serve on count 1, and a concurrent sentence of ten years imprisonment, two to serve, eight years suspended with probation on count 2.⁹ The trial court also imposed monetary fines, ordered that the firearms owned by defendant be forfeited, ordered that defendant complete 500 hours of community service after release from incarceration and undergo mental-health and anger-management counseling. Furthermore, because he found that Mr. Goulet was a danger to the community and a flight risk, the trial justice denied defendant's motion for bail pending appeal of the convictions. The defendant appealed.

Before this Court, defendant raised the following issues: (1) a defense predicated on § 4–13–16,¹⁰ (2) a defense predicated on § 4–13–19, ¹¹ (3) an argument that the search warrant was defective because the application for the warrant was based on evidence that had been illegally seized, (4) an argument that “malice” must be directed at the owner of an animal and not to the animal itself, (5) an assertion that a dog is chattel and as such is subject to disposal as property at the absolute discretion of the owner, (6) a contention that he had a constitutional right to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution, (7) an invocation of the antique firearm statute at G.L.1956 § 11–47–25,¹² (8) the contention that § 4–13–18 controls the case, (9) an argument that the trial justice erred in failing to suppress evidence garnered as a result of the warrantless search of defendant's property, (10) a claim that the trial justice erred in failing to suppress evidence (specifically, the sawed-off shotgun) procured during a subsequent warrant search of the inside of defendant's home, and (11) an assertion that the trial justice erred when he denied defendant's motion to sever, resulting in a “crippling” effect on defendant's “ability to offer his defense of justification.”

Discussion

AIssues Waived

Our review of the record reveals that defendant raised several issues before this Court that either were not raised in the lower court proceedings or were not properly preserved for appeal. “It is an established rule in Rhode Island that this Court will not review issues that are raised for the first time on appeal.” State v. Briggs, 934 A.2d 811, 815 (R.I.2007) (quoting Union Station Associates v. Rossi, 862 A.2d 185, 192 (R.I.2004)). Our “well-settled ‘raise-or-waive’ rule precludes us from considering at the appellate level issues not properly presented before the trial court.” State v. Merida, 960 A.2d 228, 236 (R.I.2008); accord State v. Gomes, 881 A.2d 97, 113 (R.I.2005); State v. Mohapatra, 880 A.2d 802, 810 (R.I.2005). Moreover, under our “raise-or-waive” rule, an issue not preserved by specific objection at trial, may not be subsequently considered on appeal.¹³ State v. Pacheco, 763 A.2d 971, 976 (R.I.2001); see also State v. Grant, 840 A.2d 541, 546 (R.I.2004).

It is clear to us that defendant failed to first raise before the Superior Court arguments pertaining to (1) § 4–13–16, (2) § 4–13–19, (3) the alleged technical defects in the warrant, (4) the common-law concept that “malice” must be directed at the owner of the animal rather than to the animal itself, (5) the common-law notion of a dog as chattel, and (6) the constitutional right to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment. We are further satisfied that there are two arguments that were raised in the proceedings below but were not preserved for appeal and therefore are waived. Those arguments are (7) the invocation of the antique firearm statute at § 11–47–25, and (8) the contention that § 4–13–18 controls the case. We therefore conclude that the only issues properly before us are the denial of the motion to sever and the Fourth Amendment claims relating to the searches of the yard and home.

BThe Motion to Sever

The defendant does not contend that the state's joinder of the charge for malicious killing of an animal brought under G.L.1956 § 4–1–5 with the charge for possession of a sawed-off shotgun brought under § 11–47–8(b) was improper.¹⁴ However, he correctly points out that even when joinder under Rule 8 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure is proper, a defendant may nonetheless be prejudiced to such an extent that relief from joinder is appropriate under Rule 14...