State v. Grajales

Decision Date01 May 2018
Docket NumberAC 39140
Citation186 A.3d 1189,181 Conn.App. 440
CourtConnecticut Court of Appeals
Parties STATE of Connecticut v. Luis A. GRAJALES

Daniel J. Krisch, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

Kathryn W. Bare, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Patrick J. Griffin, state's attorney, Brian K. Sibley, Sr., senior assistant state's attorney, and Karen A. Roberg, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Lavine, Keller and Pellegrino, Js.

KELLER, J.

The defendant, Luis A. Grajales, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of one count of assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–59(a)(5)1 and one count of carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of General Statutes § 29–35.2

He claims that the court improperly instructed the jury on consciousness of guilt because the evidence does not reasonably support a finding of flight. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On the basis of the evidence presented at trial, the jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On August 22, 2014, Luis Perez (Perez) returned home from work to his apartment at Station Court in New Haven around 5 p.m. Perez lived with his wife, Jessica Rivera, and their four children—Chrystal Perez, Shelanie Perez, K, and L. On the evening of the incident, Perez and Rivera were joined by Grenda Camacho, a family friend, and her son, I.3 Together, they ate dinner and sat outside their first floor apartment and watched their children play. Meanwhile, Chrystal studied inside the family apartment.

At the time of the incident, the defendant lived less than one mile away from Station Court at an apartment on Wilson Street. The defendant's former wife, Iris Figueroa, resided at Station Court in a second story apartment above the Perez residence. On August 22, 2014, the defendant went to Station Court to visit his children. Late in the evening hours of August 22, Perez began to argue with the defendant and his family. When the argument initially began, Perez stood outside his apartment in the courtyard and the defendant and his family were on the balcony of Figueroa's apartment overlooking the courtyard. At some point, Perez retrieved a ceramic ball from his apartment, which he threw toward the defendant. The ball did not make contact with anyone and landed harmlessly on the balcony. The defendant's daughter, Shakira Grajales, threw the ball back at Perez, but also did not hit anyone with it. The defendant came down from the balcony to the courtyard and the argument between the defendant and Perez intensified. K interrupted Chrystal from her studies to inform her that their father was outside arguing with the defendant and his family. Chrystal grabbed two baseball bats and placed them inside by the door in case any member of her family needed them for protection. She then went outside to the courtyard where she was approached by Shakira. Chrystal, fearing that Shakira intended to attack her, punched Shakira in the face. The two girls began fighting in the courtyard. Rivera attempted to break up the fight. When Rivera attempted to do so, Figueroa pulled Rivera to the ground by her hair and began hitting her.

The defendant and Perez were not involved in the physical fight in the courtyard. As the melee in the courtyard continued, the defendant went upstairs to Figueroa's apartment and retrieved a .22 caliber pistol. The defendant came back downstairs with the gun hidden behind his back. Camacho pleaded with the defendant not to shoot Perez because "the children were inside the [Perez] apartment." The defendant ignored her plea and entered the Perez residence. Inside, the defendant shot Perez in the neck.

Camacho ran outside screaming that the defendant had shot Perez. Chrystal entered the apartment and found her father on the floor covered in blood, struggling to stand up. K called 911 and handed the phone to Chrystal, who received instructions from the operator to apply pressure to the wound using a towel, which she did until paramedics arrived. After neighbors broke up the fight between Figueroa and Rivera, Rivera entered the apartment and found Perez lying on the floor. At this point, Rivera broke a glass bottle and grabbed one of the baseball bats that Chrystal had placed behind the door in order to protect her family from the defendant and his family.

After shooting Perez, the defendant left the scene at Station Court in Figueroa's Dodge Magnum. On the drive back to his Wilson Street apartment, the defendant got "scared," and removed the ammunition clip from the gun. Back at his apartment, the defendant locked himself in a basement bedroom, placed his gun in a bedside dresser, and went to sleep.

The gunshot fractured Perez' C7 vertebrae. He likely will never walk again.

The state charged the defendant with one count of assault in the first degree, one count of carrying a pistol without a permit, and three counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53–21.4 At trial, the defendant's theory of defense was one of justification in defense of others, claiming that he shot Perez in order to protect Rivera and Shakira. The jury found the defendant guilty of assault in the first degree and possession of a pistol without a permit. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty on the three counts of risk of injury to a child. The court sentenced the defendant to a total effective sentence of twenty-five years incarceration, execution suspended after twenty-three years, followed by five years of probation.5 This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth in our analysis of the defendant's claim.

The defendant's sole claim is that the court improperly instructed the jury on consciousness of guilt because the evidence does not reasonably support a finding of flight.

The record reflects that on October 13, 2015, the court held a charge conference in its chambers. Thereafter, the court stated on the record: "I just want to review with counsel on the record.... We met in my chambers today, [October 13, 2015,] around 9 [a.m.] and we had a charge conference in chambers.... On Thursday, [October 8, 2015,] I had sent to counsel a proposed jury charge. They received another ... installment correcting some of the original rough drafts on Friday, [October 9, 2015]. This weekend was Columbus Day weekend. I encouraged counsel to review the proposed charge, spend time on it, and give the court any suggestion, or recommendations, or request to charge. Both counsel have taken the court up on that and over the weekend I did receive first from—[defense counsel] two comments .... I will do that....

From the state's standpoint as I understand it, the state is requesting a consciousness of guilt charge specifically concerning an evidentiary issue of flight from the scene. Is that correct, [prosecutor]?

"[The Prosecutor:] Yes, Judge.

"Court: And, [defense counsel], as I understand it you object to that charge?

"[Defense counsel:] I do, your Honor ... [the defendant's] response ... is a natural response to somebody in that particular situation. I don't think it rises to the level of consciousness of guilt...."

The court noted the defendant's exception. During closing argument neither party offered arguments concerning the defendant's flight or consciousness of guilt. The court, during its jury charge, instructed the jury as follows: "I want to talk to you about consciousness of guilt. In any criminal trial it is permissible for the state to show that conduct or statements made by a defendant after the time of the alleged offense may have been influenced by the criminal act, that is, the conduct or statements show a consciousness of guilt. For example, flight, when unexplained, may indicate consciousness of guilt if the facts and the circumstances support it. Such facts do not, however, raise a presumption of guilt. If you find the evidence proved and also find that the acts were influenced by the criminal act and not by any other reason you may, but are not required to infer from this evidence, that the defendant was acting from a guilty conscience.

"The state claims that the following conduct is evidence of consciousness of guilt. The defendant's flight from ... Station Court, New Haven, on August [22], 2014. It is up to you as judges of the facts to decide whether the defendant's acts if proved reflect a consciousness of guilt, and to consider such in your deliberations and conform with these instructions."6

The following evidence pertaining to flight was introduced at trial. The state introduced a videotape of Detective Gary Hammill interviewing the defendant on the morning after the shooting. During this interview, the defendant stated that, after he shot Perez, he left Station Court in Figueroa's car, a white Dodge Magnum. The defendant said he travelled to his Wilson Street apartment, parked the car there, and immediately went inside to go to sleep. He said he heard the police searching at Wilson Street that night, but he did not reveal himself to the police and they did not find him in the basement. He stated that although the police entered the basement, they did not find him because they did not enter the room behind the green door. He also heard Figueroa's car being towed from the driveway. During the interview, the defendant repeatedly asserted that his actions after leaving Station Court were because he was afraid.

Police officers testified that when they arrived at Station Court on the night of the incident, the defendant was no longer present. Officer Eric Pesino testified that he went to Station Court because of a report of shots fired. Upon arriving at a chaotic scene, he learned that the defendant "took off" after shooting Perez. Detective Ann Mays testified that police officers, shortly after arriving at Station Court on the night of the incident, learned that the defendant may be at his Wilson Street apartment....

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4 cases
  • State v. Hazard
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • October 27, 2020
    ...upon all the facts and circumstances and is a question of fact for the jury." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Grajales , 181 Conn. App. 440, 448–49, 186 A.3d 1189, cert. denied, 329 Conn. 910, 186 A.3d 707 (2018). In the present case, the driver of a vehicle, which was similar ......
  • State v. Marrero
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • June 16, 2020
    ...the basis for a [jury] charge on the inference of consciousness of guilt." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Grajales , 181 Conn. App. 440, 448, 186 A.3d 1189, cert. denied, 329 Conn. 910, 186 A.3d 707 (2018)."Undisputed evidence that a defendant acted because of consciousness of......
  • State v. Grajales
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • June 20, 2018
    ...Court of Connecticut.Decided June 20, 2018The defendant's petition for certification to appeal from the Appellate Court, 181 Conn.App. 440, ___ A.3d ___ (2018), is ...
  • State v. Grajales
    • United States
    • Connecticut Superior Court
    • January 22, 2019
1 books & journal articles
  • A Survey of Criminal Law Opinions
    • United States
    • Connecticut Bar Association Connecticut Bar Journal No. 93, 2021
    • Invalid date
    ...549 U.S. 840 (2006). [450] Id. [451] State v. Elliott, 177 Conn. 1, 7, 411 A.2d 3 (1979). [452] Campbell, 328 Conn. at 534. [453] 181 Conn. App. 440, 186 A.3d 1189, cert, denied, 329 Conn. 910, 186 A.3d 707 (2018). [454] Id. at 451-52. [455] Id. at 452. [456] 184 Conn. App. 24, 194 A.3d 846......

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