State v. Grant

• Decision Date: 22 February 2013
• Docket Number: 38326,Nos. 38325,38327.,s. 38325
• Citation: State v. Grant, 154 Idaho 281, 297 P.3d 244 (Idaho 2013)
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Woodrow John GRANT, Defendant–Appellant.

154 Idaho 281

297 P.3d 244

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Respondent,

v.Woodrow John GRANT, Defendant–Appellant.

Nos. 38325

38326

38327.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, January 2013 Term.

Feb. 22, 2013.

Sara B. Thomas, Idaho Appellate Public Defender, Boise, attorneys for Appellant. Shawn F. Wilkerson argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, attorneys for Respondent. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.

W. JONES, Justice.

I. NATURE OF THE CASE

In 2006, Woodrow John Grant pleaded guilty to aggravated battery; he successfully completed a period of retained jurisdiction and was placed on probation. In 2009, Grant was charged with possession of methamphetamine, domestic battery, aggravated assault, and unlawful possession of a firearm. Grant's appointed counsel moved to withdraw, stating that Grant had reneged on an agreed-upon plea bargain and that communications between them had broken down. The district court denied the motion. Later, Grant pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance and domestic battery, and admitted to violating the terms of his probation. The district court considered a letter and live testimony from the victim of Grant's domestic battery, in which the victim expressed her opinions on Grant's crime, character, and the sentence that would be proper for him. Thereafter, the district court sentenced Grant to five years fixed and five years indeterminate for domestic battery, to be served concurrently with a sentence of two years fixed and three years indeterminate for possession of methamphetamine. The district court also revoked Grant's probation and executed his previously suspended sentence of four years fixed and six years indeterminate. The two new sentences were to be served consecutively to the reinstated 2006 sentence. Therefore, Grant was sentenced to a total of nine years fixed and eleven years indeterminate—far less than the thirty-two year maximum combined sentence for his three crimes. Grant requested leniency in three I.C.R. 35 motions, which the district court denied. Grant appeals, arguing that the district court erred by refusing to allow his counsel to withdraw, by considering the victim's impact statements in their entirety, and by refusing his requests for leniency.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In early 2006, Grant pleaded guilty to aggravated battery.¹ THE CHARGE WAS BASed on an incident in which grant fired a bulLet into the ground in the middle of a fight; the bullet ricocheted and injured one of the combatants. The Sixth District Court for Bannock County sentenced Grant to a prison term of four years fixed and six years indeterminate, but retained jurisdiction. At the end of the period of retained jurisdiction, the court suspended Grant's sentence and placed him on four years of probation. Unfortunately, Grant badly failed to comply with the terms of his probation. As he later admitted, he was in arrears on his court-imposed financial obligations and had repeatedly used methamphetamine.

In November of 2009, the State charged Grant with possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine).² In December of 2009, the State charged Grant with domestic battery,³ aggravated assault, and unlawful possession of a firearm. These latter three charges arose from a separate incident in which Grant burned his then-girlfriend's face with a lighted cigarette and allegedly threatened to kill her while holding a gun to her head.

In February of 2010, Grant's appointed counsel, Douglas K. Dykman, filed a Motion to Withdraw pursuant to I.C.R. 44.1. Dykman claimed that Grant had tentatively agreed to a plea bargain, but rescinded his acceptance after the State refused to make the agreement binding on the district court. Dykman stated that he had talked "at length" with Grant about whether to accept the nonbinding plea bargain, but that they had a "fundamental disagreement" on that issue, and, as a result, their communications had broken down. He further stated that, if he were allowed to withdraw and substitute counsel were appointed for Grant, the new attorney might be able to "give another insight" into the plea negotiations. The State did not object to Dykman's Motion to Withdraw. Nonetheless, the district court denied the motion. The Court reasoned that, because the disagreement between Grant and Dykman centered on Grant's desire to take his case to trial, the key question was whether Dykman could competently represent Grant at trial despite their disagreement regarding the plea bargain. The court then asked Dykman: "You're able to represent [Grant's] best interest and proceed to trial if you need to, aren't you?" Dykman responded by simply stating: "If the Court denies my motion, I would ask the Court to set it for trial." In other words, Dykman gave the court reason to believe that the disagreement regarding the plea deal had not tainted the attorney-client relationship so badly as to prevent him from competently representing Grant.

During the hearing, the district court never specifically asked Grant to describe his relationship with his attorney. Grant did respond affirmatively when asked whether he wanted the court to appoint new counsel. However, at the conclusion of the hearing, Grant stated that he had no questions regarding the proceeding.

Grant pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance. In a guilty plea questionnaire, Grant circled "YES" in response to the question "Do you feel you have had sufficient time to discuss your case with your attorney?" He also circled "YES" in response to the question "Have you told your attorney everything you know about the crime." He responded "NO" to the question "Is there anything you have requested your attorney to do that has not been done?" and, as one would expect, left blank lines beneath that question in which he could have explained anything that his counsel failed to do. Finally, Grant verified that he reviewed evidence provided to his counsel during discovery and that he had told his counsel about any possible exculpatory witnesses. Grant also pled guilty to domestic battery. In an identical questionnaire, Grant gave the same responses to the questions listed above.

Grant also discussed Dykman's representation with the court in his plea colloquy. The court asked: "Are you satisfied with [Dykman's] representation of you?" Grant responded "Very happy with it." The court then pressed Grant further, asking: "do you have any complaints with regard to how he has been representing you?" Grant replied: "No, sir, Your Honor."

In June of 2010, Grant moved to strike a letter that the victim of his domestic violence had submitted in connection with his sentencing. The district court denied the motion and admitted the statement in its entirety. In the letter, the victim offered numerous opinions on Grant's character, including that he will "sabotage" anything that "is going well" and that he is "like a snake" in attempting to evade responsibility. The victim also stated that, if Grant were sentenced to only ten years in prison, he would be "getting a pretty good deal." Similarly, in her oral statement at Grant's sentencing hearing, the victim opined on Grant's character, stating that he "is a mixed up, angry person" who "somehow ... thinks it's okay for everyone to suffer his wrath." She also opined on his proper sentence, stating: "I believe that a life sentence would be more than fair for him knowing what he has done to me and other people in his life through physical and emotional harm, it is more than fair—at least the maximum penalty, give or take."

The district court then sentenced Grant to two years fixed and three years indeterminate for possession of a controlled substance, and five years fixed and five years indeterminate for domestic battery. The district court further found that Grant had "demonstrated an inability to conform his conduct to the requirements necessary to successfully complete the term of probation," and therefore executed Grant's suspended sentence. The two new sentences were to be served concurrently with each other but consecutively to Grant's reinstated 2006 sentence for aggravated battery.

In the sentencing hearing, the court detailed its reasoning for the duration of imprisonment that it imposed. While acknowledging that Grant had behaved admirably while in jail, the court worried that he might have done so merely to reduce his sentence, rather than out of a genuine desire to reform his character. The court also recognized that it was obliged to consider the societal goals of deterrence and punishment. In particular, the court expressed concern about the fact that Grant had twice put others' lives at risk, and that he continued to abuse drugs and commit dangerous felonies while on probation. The court reasoned that, if he were not incarcerated, Grant likely would continue to commit serious crimes. Furthermore, a lighter sentence would "depreciate the significance" of Grant's crimes, thereby subverting the goal of general deterrence.

Grant timely filed substantially identical I.C.R. 35 motions in each of the three cases, arguing that his sentences were excessive. In response to Grant's Rule 35 motions, the district court concluded that Grant would pose a continuing risk to society if he were sentenced to a shorter prison term, in light of the fact that he continued to commit serious crimes despite having been given a chance to reform himself while on probation for his 2006 aggravated battery sentence. The district court also noted that Grant's behavior had placed his victim in great peril. Therefore, the district court denied Grant's Rule 35 motions.

III. ISSUES ON APPEAL

A. Should Grant's guilty pleas to possession of a controlled substance and domestic battery be vacated on the grounds that the district court abused its discretion in denying Dykman's Motion to Withdraw, or, in the alternative, because the district court failed to conduct a sufficient inquiry in response to the Motion?

B.

...