State v. Grant
| Decision Date | 21 December 1971 |
| Citation | 284 A.2d 674 |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Maine v. Betty GRANT. |
Peter T. Dawson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Augusta, Edward Gaulin, Asst. County Atty., Alfred, for plaintiff.
Gerald Nason, Biddeford, Roger Flaherty, Basil L. Kellis, Sanford, for defendant.
Before DUFRESNE, C. J., and WEBBER, WEATHERBEE, POMEROY, WERNICK and ARCHIBALD, JJ.
Defendant here appeals from a conviction of the crime of murder. But three issues are presented for review.
A police officer serving as the State's first witness testified that in company with another officer he responded to a call; that in response to a knock on the door of the premises to which the officers had been directed, the door was unlocked and opened by the defendant; and that as she opened At this point an objection was offered on the ground that the corpus delicti had not as yet been established. The Justice below sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard the answer of the witness. He further instructed the witness not to relate any conversation with the defendant. At an ensuing bench conference the State urged that only the order of proof was involved and that the defendant's statement might properly be shown subject to the requirement that the corpus delicti be later shown. The Court then ruled that defendant's statements would be excluded until such time as the corpus delicti was established. He further suggested that the State's witnesses be cautioned accordingly. Although no issue is presented for our determination as a result of this ruling, we take this occasion to note that the course adopted by the presiding Justice with respect to order of proof accords with what we deem to be the better practice, a practice which was adopted as a rule of evidence in State v. McPhee (1955) 151 Me. 62, 65, 115 A.2d 498, 499. The State is in no way prejudiced by a procedural requirement that it proceed to establish the corpus delicti before seeking to offer evidence of inculpatory admissions or confessions of the defendant.
the door the defendant said, 'Joey, I killed my aunt.' 1
In compliance with this ruling by the Court, the State proceeded with the introduction of voluminous evidence bearing on the existence of the corpus delicti, at the close of which the first witness was recalled for the purpose of relating the above quoted statement made by the defendant. The defendant promptly renewed her objection on the same ground. The objection was overruled and the witness was permitted to answer, again quoting the defendant as saying, 'Joey, I killed my aunt.' The defendant contends that the admission of this damaging statement into evidence for consideration by the jury was prejudicial error. The theory of defendant's counsel apparently is that the State's evidence was still inadequate to establish the corpus delicti so as to make the defendant's statement admissible in evidence. We find the argument offered in support of this theory confusing. Defense counsel does not appear to perceive or apply the important distinction between the quantum of proof required to establish the corpus delicti and the quantum of proof required to establish guilt upon the whole evidence. The corpus delicti rule stems from judicial experience and a resulting unwillingness to rest proof of guilt exclusively upon uncorroborated confessions and admissions. The role of corpus delicti evidence is to corroborate and support the confession or admission and thus avoid the possibility of conviction of a crime not committed by anybody. To this end the requisite quantum of proof with respect to the corpus delicti has been clearly defined. In State v. Wardwell (1962) 158 Me. 307, 320, 183 A.2d 896, 904 we carefully reviewed our case law and concluded:
'It appears from these decisions that it is not necessary to prove the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt before extra-judicial confessions are admissible. Although the opinions 2 use different language, we do not consider that there is any essential difference in the term 'in all probability' as used in the Hoffses and the Woodworth cases and in the words 'substantial belief' as used in the McPhee and Jones cases. However, in order to prevent any confusion we rule that it is a sufficient foundation for the admission of a confession or statement This is essentially a procedural determination to be made by the trial court. If there is then in the case credible evidence which, if believed, would create in the mind of a reasonable man, not a mere surmise or suspicion, but rather a really substantial belief that a crime had been committed by somebody, a ruling of the trial court admitting a voluntary confession or admission will not be reversed. So here there was adequate credible evidence to create a substantial belief that the victim of this homicide had died as the result of manual strangulation, not self-inflicted, and there was therefore no error in admitting defendant's statement at the time it was admitted.
by the accused if the State at that time has presented such credible evidence as will create a really substantial belief that the crime charged has actually been committed by...
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