State v. Gravel, 89-283

Citation135 N.H. 172,601 A.2d 678
Decision Date31 December 1991
Docket NumberNo. 89-283,89-283
PartiesThe STATE of New Hampshire v. Raymond GRAVEL.
CourtSupreme Court of New Hampshire

John P. Arnold, Atty. Gen. (Tina Schneider, Asst. Atty. Gen., on brief and orally), for State.

W. Kirk Abbott, Jr., Asst. Appellate Defender, Concord, by brief and orally, for defendant.

BATCHELDER, Justice.

The defendant, Raymond Gravel, appeals his jury conviction for possession of cocaine, claiming that the Trial Court (Dunn, J.) committed error in refusing to grant his pre-trial motion seeking to have suppressed at trial certain statements he made after his arrest and all physical evidence obtained as a result of those statements. In addition, he claims that inadmissible hearsay was repeatedly placed before the jury, and that his requests for a mistrial on that basis were erroneously denied. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.

The facts, as they relate to this appeal, are as follows. During the mid-afternoon of July 18, 1988, the defendant, driving a late model Cadillac, sped past New Hampshire State Police Trooper Robert Quinn, who was parked on Route I-95 near Seabrook, talking with a hitchhiker. Trooper Quinn immediately pursued the speeding vehicle and came upon it stopped in the breakdown lane. Because he recognized the driver of the automobile, Ronald Fernald, as having been the passenger only moments earlier, Trooper Quinn concluded that the defendant, now in the passenger seat, had been driving the car at the time it went by. Having made this determination, Trooper Quinn, who smelled alcohol on the defendant's breath, administered three field sobriety tests, which the defendant was unable to perform satisfactorily. The defendant was placed under arrest, charged with driving while intoxicated, and transported to the Hampton police station.

Upon arrival at the station, the defendant was given the standard warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). He was then "processed" and given a test to determine his blood alcohol content. The results of the blood test showed a blood alcohol content of .16 percent. At this time, the police also learned that his driver's license had been revoked and that active bench warrants for his arrest for an unrelated offense were outstanding. Because the Hampton police station could not hold him overnight, the defendant eventually was transported to the Rockingham County Jail.

Trooper Quinn testified that the following conversation took place en route to the jail.

Defendant: "Is there a doctor at the jail?"

Trooper: "Well, do you want to go to the hospital?"

Defendant: "No. But I am going to need to see somebody."

Trooper: "Why?"

Defendant: "Well, I am going to be coming down in a few hours, and I am going to need something."

Trooper: "Well, what are you coming down from?"

Defendant: "Coke. What do you think?"

Trooper Quinn then asked the defendant how much cocaine he had ingested. The defendant responded by saying that he had "freebased" an "eightball" (eighth of an ounce) of cocaine earlier in the day. The conversation continued:

Trooper: "Oh.... Well, do you have any more drugs on you?"

Defendant: "No. I am not stupid enough to get caught carrying it."

Trooper: "Well, where do you do your drugs?"

Defendant: "I do everything in my bedroom."

The defendant went on to say that he had used the drugs that day in his bedroom.

The police used information garnered from this conversation to obtain a warrant to search the defendant's bedroom. The fruits of the subsequent search included, among other things, a mirror, a razor blade, and trace amounts of what was later determined to be cocaine. The defendant was subsequently charged with possession of cocaine.

Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the statements he made during his transport to the jail, as well as all physical evidence gathered as a result of those statements. Citing both the State and Federal Constitutions, the defendant asserted that the information about his drug use was obtained in violation of Miranda, as he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that, therefore, the information could not be used to establish the requisite probable cause for issuance of a search warrant. He claimed that, absent the allegedly tainted information, there was insufficient independent information to establish probable cause, making the search illegal and the fruits of that search inadmissible at trial. The State, on the other hand, argued that the defendant had initiated the conversation, that Trooper Quinn simply followed up on information volunteered by the defendant, and that Miranda did not apply.

The trial court agreed with the State's position and denied the defendant's motion to suppress, noting that the "defendant cannot claim a violation of Miranda when he is not being interrogated, he himself initiates the conversation with the police and voluntarily makes inculpatory statements." The trial court found "that [Trooper] Quinn was not obligated to readminister Miranda rights to the defendant during transport to the jail since the relevant testimony show[ed] that the defendant was fully aware of his constitutional rights at all times." Finally, the trial court determined "beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant waived his constitutional rights."

On appeal the defendant reiterates his references to both the State and Federal Constitutions in arguing that the statements were both inadmissible and an invalid basis for finding probable cause to search. Consistent with our holding in State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 471 A.2d 347 (1983), we first consider the defendant's claims under part I, article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution, "us[ing] federal case law only as an aid to our analysis. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 3476, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983)." State v. Plante, 134 N.H. 585, ----, 594 A.2d 165, 166 (1991).

We begin our analysis by recognizing that this court will not reverse a decision of the trial court unless, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the decision is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. State v. Torres, 130 N.H. 340, 344, 540 A.2d 1217, 1220 (1988); State v. Lewis, 129 N.H. 787, 791, 533 A.2d 358, 361 (1987) (citations omitted). Having thoroughly reviewed the record before us and the relevant case law, however, we conclude that the trial court's decision in this case cannot stand. The defendant was indeed subjected to custodial interrogation at the time he uttered the inculpatory statements; therefore, the mandates of the Miranda decision were applicable. We further conclude that the Miranda requirements were not satisfied here, as the defendant did not expressly waive his constitutional rights, and the State failed to present any credible evidence of waiver. The State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, as it was required to do under our State law, that the defendant knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights. We also hold that the search warrant was tainted by the Miranda violation and, as no independent evidence existed to establish probable cause, the search of the defendant's bedroom was illegal and the evidence thereby seized inadmissible at trial.

I. Miranda Analysis

The threshold issue is whether, at the time the defendant made the inculpatory statements, he was entitled to Miranda protections. It is well settled that the "Miranda safeguards apply only to situations involving a custodial interrogation." State v. Sheila Portigue, 125 N.H. 338, 343, 480 A.2d 896, 900 (1984); State v. Lewis, 129 N.H. at 796, 533 A.2d at 364. Custodial interrogation means "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. Although there is no dispute that the defendant was in custody at the time he made the inculpatory statements, the State contends that he was not being questioned, as he in fact initiated the conversation and volunteered the incriminating comments.

"[T]he Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). Any "practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect ... amounts to interrogation." Id. at 301, 100 S.Ct. at 1690. In this case, although the defendant initiated the conversation "in the ordinary dictionary sense of that word," Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 2835, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983), Trooper Quinn extended it with express questions of his own, see United States v. Montgomery, 714 F.2d 201, 202 (1st Cir.1983). The defendant clearly opened the dialogue by asking if there would be a doctor at the jail, but it was Trooper Quinn who shifted the direction and altered the character of the conversation. While the officer's initial queries into the type of drug used, the method employed, and the amount ingested were follow-up questions germane to determining whether medical care would be required, his subsequent questions pertaining to the location where the drug was used sought only to elicit incriminating evidence and, thus, constituted interrogation. See State v. Dellorfano, 128 N.H. 628, 634, 517 A.2d 1163, 1167 (1986).

In fact, Trooper Quinn admitted as much when he testified that although he "started asking the questions for medical reasons," once the defendant "started talking about his drug use, ... a red light went off and said: there may be more drugs in his bedroom." He further conceded that the fact that the defendant used drugs in place A versus place B had nothing to do...

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