State v. Graves, 83-523

• Decision Date: 14 December 1984
• Docket Number: No. 83-523,83-523
• Citation: 487 A.2d 157,145 Vt. 271
• Parties: STATE of Vermont v. Kim A. GRAVES.
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Page 157

487 A.2d 157

145 Vt. 271

STATE of Vermont v. Kim A. GRAVES.

No. 83-523.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

Dec. 14, 1984.

Dena Monahan, Chittenden County Deputy State's Atty., Burlington, for plaintiff-appellee.

Jerry L. Schwarz, Public Defender, Burlington, for defendant-appellant.

Before HILL, UNDERWOOD, PECK and GIBSON, JJ., and BARNEY, C.J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned.

PECK, Justice.

Defendant Kim A. Graves appeals her conviction, after trial by court, of giving false information to a police officer in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 1754(a). The sole issue presented for our review is defendant's contention that the lower court erred in denying her pretrial motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a claimed illegal stop of her motor vehicle. We disagree with defendant's claim of error and affirm.

The following facts are disclosed by the record before us. In the early morning of March 1, 1983, certain officers of the Burlington police department were dispatched to investigate a breaking and entering reportedly taking place at a residence on Marshall Drive in Burlington. The police arrived at the site at approximately 2:50 a.m. and commenced their investigation. In checking the house, one of the officers noted that footprints in the snow led away from the scene in an easterly direction towards a parking lot at the nearby Gosse Court Armory.

The officer followed the footprints and, as he approached the armory, observed a Chevrolet station wagon being driven away from the armory area; it was the only vehicle in sight. He stopped the vehicle in connection with his investigation and discovered four occupants, including the defendant who was the driver. She identified herself falsely as Kim LaFrance.

Based on the officer's observations of defendant's condition at the stop site, she was taken to the police station and processed for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor (23 V.S.A. § 1201) and was thereafter charged with that offense. As noted above, she was also charged with giving false information, based on the fictitious name she gave as her own.

Following the hearing on her preliminary motion to suppress, the court held that the officer was reasonable in suspecting that the occupants of defendant's vehicle might be connected with the reported breaking and entering in progress, and denied the motion. Following the subsequent trial on the merits, the court acquitted defendant of driving under the influence, but convicted her on the false information charge. This appeal followed.

In her brief, and during oral argument, defendant urged that the standard of review in matters such as the case before us is that police may stop a car and briefly question its occupant(s) if they have an articulable and reasonable suspicion that the occupants have violated the law. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1401, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); State v. Phillips, 140 Vt. 210, 215, 436 A.2d 746, 749 (1981). Defendant further contends that the stop must meet the test of reasonableness, United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2578, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975), in order to satisfy Fourth Amendment guarantees against unreasonable search and seizure, and the officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. Terry v. Ohio, ...