State v. Gray

• Decision Date: 22 October 2019
• Docket Number: ED 104743-01
• Citation: State v. Gray, 591 S.W.3d 65 (Mo. App. 2019)
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Richard D. GRAY, Defendant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

591 S.W.3d 65

STATE of Missouri, Respondent,

v.Richard D. GRAY, Defendant.

ED 104743-01

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, DIVISION FIVE.

Filed: October 22, 2019

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied November 25, 2019

Application for Transfer Denied February 4, 2020

Daniel N. McPherson, Assistant Attorney General, P.O. Box 899, Jefferson City, MO 65102, for respondent.

Carol D. Jansen, Woodrail Centre, 1000 W. Nifong, Bldg. 7, Suite 100, Columbia, MO 65203, for appellant.

OPINION

Lisa P. Page, Judge

Richard D. Gray ("Defendant") appeals the judgment entered upon his conviction of first-degree involuntary manslaughter in violation of Section 565.024 RSMo (Cum. Sup. 2008) and second-degree assault in violation of Section 565.060 RSMo (Cum Supp. 2006). Defendant asserts multiple points on appeal relating to alleged errors at trial. Defendant also filed a supplemental point on appeal challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion for new trial following an evidentiary hearing to consider newly discovered evidence as mandated by this court upon remand. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

On the evening of January 16, 2013, Defendant, Kasey Stevens ("Stevens"), her brother Michael Petty ("Petty"), her boyfriend Robert Radford ("Radford"), and Radford’s friend Dale Ingram ("Ingram") spent the evening drinking. When Radford passed out, Stevens took the keys to his van so she, Ingram, and Defendant could buy drugs. As they were driving, the van skidded through a curve and rolled over. Some unknown time later, in the early morning of January 17, Missouri Highway Patrol Corporal Andrew Woods ("Corporal Woods") was dispatched to the single-vehicle accident scene. Upon arrival he observed the van upside down with Ingram trapped inside. Defendant and Stevens were unconscious and bleeding outside the van. They were ultimately transported via helicopter to a trauma center in St. Louis County where Stevens died from her injuries. At the scene, Ingram informed Corporal Woods that Defendant was driving and lost control of the van.

Defendant was charged with first-degree involuntary manslaughter and second-degree assault. He was released to the St. Francois County jail after a lengthy stay in a rehabilitation center. Corporal Woods met Defendant at the jail where he gave conflicting reports about whether he was driving. Initially, Defendant told Corporal Woods that Petty was driving the van. He also stated, "It wasn't me. I ain't going to lie to you. I got nothing to hide." However, he later said, "I think maybe I might have drove. I don't know. I might be going nuts." According to Corporal Woods, Defendant seemed incoherent and confused.

At trial, the defense strongly disputed that Defendant was, in fact, driving the van the night of the accident. There was significant testimony presented, including accident reconstructionists for both the State and Defendant, as well as other fact witnesses who testified about potential evidence that Petty was actually driving that night. A jury convicted Defendant of both counts and he was sentenced to fifteen years in prison for each count, to be served concurrently. Defendant appealed his conviction.

Defendant asserted three points in his initial June 9, 2017 brief. He claimed the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because blood drawn while he was unconscious at the hospital - absent a warrant - violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Defendant also claimed the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress statements he made to Trooper Woods while Defendant was in jail following the accident because the State failed to establish Defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to remain silent. Finally, Defendant argued the trial court erred in sustaining the State’s objection excluding the testimony of Robert Fucetola, M.D. ("Dr. Fucetola") regarding Defendant’s general intelligence.

While his appeal was pending, Defendant filed a motion to remand the case to the trial court to consider newly discovered evidence. He alleged that in May 2017, after the time available to file a motion for new trial, he learned of a witness named Jill Johnson who claimed she overheard a conversation in which Petty, Steven’s brother, admitted he was driving the van the night of the accident. On October 5, 2017, we granted the motion and remanded the cause to the trial court to conduct a hearing "on whether the newly discovered evidence warrants a new trial."

However, the trial court failed to conduct the mandated hearing by denying Defendant’s motion to continue for additional time to produce Johnson. The court then denied his supplemental motion for new trial. Defendant filed a supplemental brief, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for continuance to allow him to present newly discovered evidence. We granted Defendant’s point and reversed the trial court’s decision to deny his motion for continuance in contravention to our October 5, 2017 mandate. State v. Gray , ––– S.W. ––––, 2018 WL 5538761 (2018).

Upon remand, the trial court heard the testimony of Jill Johnson and denied the motion. Defendant filed a supplemental point on appeal, in addition to the three points initially asserted, challenging the trial court’s decision to deny his motion for new trial based on the newly discovered evidence.

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

Defendant’s initial points one and two on appeal concern the trial court’s denial of his motions to suppress and the admission of certain evidence at trial. We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress to determine whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence. State v. Fortner , 451 S.W.3d 746, 750-51 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014). We reverse the ruling only if it is clearly erroneous. Id. at 751. We consider both the evidence presented at the pre-trial hearing and any additional evidence presented at trial. Id. We defer to the factual findings and credibility determinations of the trial court. Id.

Moreover, the trial court has broad discretion in its decision to admit or exclude evidence at trial. State v. Jordan , 181 S.W.3d 588, 594 (Mo. App. E.D. 2005). The trial court abuses its discretion if the decision is clearly against the logic of the circumstances and so unreasonable or arbitrary as to shock the sense of justice and indicate lack of careful consideration. Id.

Analysis

In his first point on appeal, Defendant claims the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the results of his blood test from a warrantless blood draw while he was unconscious at the hospital the night of the accident. Defendant argues the Missouri Implied Consent law does not authorize such warrantless blood draws absent exigent circumstances and the State did not prove any exigency existed.

After Defendant filed his appeal, the United States Supreme Court addressed this issue in Mitchell v. Wisconsin , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S.Ct. 2525, 204 L.Ed.2d 1040 (2019). The Court noted that while the Fourth Amendment guards the rights of an individual against unreasonable searches, a search without a warrant can be reasonable. Id. at 2534. The court specifically stated in the context of an unconscious driver, the need for a blood test is compelling and may leave no time for an officer to seek a warrant. Id. at 2535. The Court noted blood alcohol concentration ("BAC") tests are needed to enforce laws that save lives, and because the evidence sought to be obtained for testing naturally dissipates, the testing must be done promptly. Id. When a breath test is unavailable, particularly in the context of an unconscious driver, "a blood test becomes essential." Id. Thus, the Court held where police have probable cause to believe a suspect committed a drunk-driving offense and an unconscious driver must be taken to a hospital, or similar facility, before a breath test can be administered, police may almost always order a warrantless blood test to measure the driver’s BAC without violating his Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 2539.

Here, Defendant was discovered unconscious and bleeding outside the van involved in a single car accident. He was taken to the hospital and his blood was drawn while he remained unconscious. Corporal Woods observed a "very strong odor" of intoxicants on Defendant. Ingram, who was still in the van at the scene, informed Corporal Woods that Defendant was driving and lost control. Ingram also stated Defendant consumed four or five beers in addition to using methamphetamine that evening.

Based upon these circumstances, there was probable cause for Corporal Woods to believe Defendant was driving while intoxicated. Thus, the rationale of Mitchell applies, and the warrantless blood test while Defendant was unconscious did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. Mitchell , 139 S.Ct. at 2539. As a result, the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of the blood test taken while Defendant was unconscious. Point one is denied.

In his second point, Defendant argues the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his statements to Corporal Andrew Woods three months after the accident because he had significant cognitive impairment from the traumatic brain injury he sustained in the accident, and the State failed to establish Defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination.

In Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court determined a suspect being arrested was entitled to be warned he has the right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has the right to an attorney. The privilege against self-incrimination can be waived if such waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Id.

Defendant contends he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to be free from self-incrimination at the time he was questioned by Corporal...