State v. Graydon
| Decision Date | 30 April 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 69252,69252 |
| Parties | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 211 STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Marvin GRAYDON, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and John W. Tiedemann, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for petitioner.
Martha Ann Lott, Gainesville, for respondent.
This is a petition to review Graydon v. State, 492 So.2d 723 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), in which the district court held that section 843.01, Florida Statutes (1985), relating to resisting an officer with violence, does not include state correctional officers. On the state's suggestion, the court certified the following question:
Is section 843.01, Florida Statutes, violated when a state correctional officer is resisted while such officer is in the lawful execution of a legal duty?
492 So.2d at 724. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We answer the certified question in the negative and approve the First District Court of Appeal's decisions in this cause and in Amaker v. State, 492 So.2d 419 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
In the instant case, the appellant, Marvin Graydon, a Union Correctional Institution inmate, had a physical encounter with a state corrections officer. Graydon was charged with battery of a law enforcement officer under section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1985), and with resisting an officer with violence under section 843.01, Florida Statutes (1985). He was found guilty of both offenses. The only issue before us is whether section 843.01 includes state Department of Correction officers within its provisions. That statute reads as follows:
843.01 Resisting officer with violence to his person.--Whoever knowingly and willfully resists, obstructs, or opposes any sheriff, deputy sheriff, officer of the Florida Highway Patrol, municipal police officer, county or municipal correctional officer, beverage enforcement agent, officer of the Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission, officer of the Department of Natural Resources, weight and safety officer of the Department of Transportation, member of the Florida Parole and Probation Commission or any administrative aide or supervisor employed by said commission, parole and probation supervisor or parole and probation officer employed by the Department of Corrections, county probation officer, personnel or representative of the Department of Law Enforcement, or other person legally authorized to execute process in the execution of legal process or in the lawful execution of any legal duty, by offering or doing violence to the person of such officer or legally authorized person, is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
The district court ruled that state correctional officers are not covered by this statute. As stated by the First District in Amaker, this statutory section ...
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