State v. Greco
| Decision Date | 27 February 2013 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 39618,2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 376 |
| Parties | STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMY FAYE GRECO, Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, State of Idaho, Canyon County. Hon. Renae J. Hoff, District Judge.
Order granting motion to suppress, reversed; case remanded for further proceedings.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for appellant. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.
Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Diane M. Walker, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for respondent. Diane M. Walker argued.
The State appeals from the district court's order granting Amy Faye Greco's motion to suppress evidence obtained through the execution of a search warrant. We reverse.
Greco was charged with possession of a controlled substance, Idaho Code § 37-2732(c)(1), and injury to a child, I.C. § 18-1501(1). Prior to Greco's arrest, police officers obtained information from one of Greco's relatives regarding drug-related activities occurring in Greco's residence. Officers also obtained information from Greco's eleven-year-old son regarding his own drug activities inside the residence. Police officers went to Greco's residence and asked Greco if they could search her son's bedroom. Greco consented. Officers then asked if they could search the entire house. Greco told the officers that she needed to ask her grandmother for consent to search the house. Greco turned and walked inside the house and theofficers followed her. Once inside the house, Greco walked into her bedroom and closed the door. Officers then heard the sound of clanging glass and suspected that Greco was destroying evidence. The officers asked Greco to exit her bedroom, and she eventually complied. The officers then entered the bedroom and saw a security video camera monitor displaying the outside of the house.
The officers applied for a search warrant for the house. The magistrate issued a search warrant and the residence was searched. Officers found methamphetamine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia.
Prior to trial, Greco moved the district court to suppress the evidence found during the execution of the search warrant, contending that there had been an unlawful, warrantless entry prior to obtaining the warrant. The district court granted the motion and suppressed the evidence. The State appeals.
The State claims that police officers were allowed to enter the residence because Greco consented to the search of her son's bedroom. Further, the State argues that even if the evidence found as a result of the entrance were to be excluded from the search warrant application, the remaining evidence was sufficient to support a finding of probable cause. The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).
There were three searches in this case: (1) the initial entry into the residence; (2) the search of Greco's bedroom pursuant to the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement; and (3) the search of the entire residence pursuant to the search warrant. The State contends that all three searches were lawful. The district court disagreed and found that the initial entry into the residence was unlawful because there was no consent to enter, that thesearch of Greco's bedroom was unlawful because the officers relied on a police-created exigency, and that the search of the entire residence was unlawful because the search warrant lacked probable cause. For the following reasons, we conclude that all three searches were lawful.
The State argues that Greco's consent to search her son's bedroom allowed officers to enter the house because "[a] typical, reasonable person would have understood that this would involve entry into the house." The district court found that because "neither [Greco] nor her grandmother consented to the search of the entire home," the entry was unlawful. Although a warrantless entry or search of a residence is generally illegal and violative of the Fourth Amendment, such an entry or search may be rendered reasonable by an individual's consent. State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 522, 716 P.2d 1288, 1294 (1986); State v. Abeyta, 131 Idaho 704, 707, 963 P.2d 387, 390 (Ct. App. 1998). In such instances, the State has the burden of demonstrating consent by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Kilby, 130 Idaho 747, 749, 947 P.2d 420, 422 (Ct. App. 1997). The State must show that consent was not the result of duress or coercion, either direct or implied. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973); State v. Whiteley, 124 Idaho 261, 264, 858 P.2d 800, 803 (Ct. App. 1993). The voluntariness of an individual's consent is evaluated in light of all the circumstances. Whiteley, 124 Idaho at 264, 858 P.2d at 803. Consent to search may be in the form of words, gestures, or conduct. State v. Knapp, 120 Idaho 343, 348, 815 P.2d 1083, 1088 (Ct. App. 1991). Whether consent was granted voluntarily, or was a product of coercion, is a question of fact to be determined by all the surrounding circumstances. State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796, 69 P.3d 1052, 1057 (2003).
In this case, the district court found that Greco gave officers consent to search her son's bedroom. Greco did not revoke or limit the consent to search her son's bedroom. Nonetheless, Greco asserts that the scope of consent did not allow officers to enter the residence when she retreated back into the home. The district court found that when Greco retreated, "she neither verbally nor by gesture invited the officer to accompany her." The question before us, then, is whether it is reasonable for an officer to consider consent to search a bedroom to also include consent to enter the house. We determine that it is reasonable.
The standard for measuring the scope of consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of objective reasonableness, "what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect." State v. Staatz, 132 Idaho 693, 696, 978 P.2d 881, 884 (Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991)). The record demonstrates that the son's room was located within the house. Therefore, in order to search his room, the officers would necessarily have to enter the house. It would be unreasonable for the officers to receive consent to search the bedroom, and then be required to receive separate consent to enter the house in order to carry out the search. There is no requirement for the officers to receive an "invitation" to enter after consent to search a part of the house is attained. Therefore, we determine that a reasonable person would have understood the consent to search the bedroom to also include consent to enter the house.
Greco asserts that the lack of consent to search the entire house precluded the officers from entering regardless of the previously granted consent to search the bedroom. Greco argues that our decision in Abeyta is persuasive on this point. In that case, police officers went to Abeyta's residence and spoke with him from the doorstep. During the course of the conversation, Abeyta left the doorstep and went inside. Once Abeyta turned his back and walked away from the door, the officers entered his home uninvited. We held that the initial entry into the house was without consent and was therefore an illegal entry. Abeyta, 131 Idaho at 707, 963 P.3d at 390. However, Abeyta is factually distinguishable from the instant case. In this case, the officers "unequivocally" received consent to search the son's bedroom. In Abeyta, the officers never received consent to search any portion of the house prior to their entry into the house. Since the issue in this case turns on the scope of consent rather than the lack of consent, we determine that Abeyta is not apposite.
Once inside the residence, the State claims that exigent circumstances provided grounds for the officers to exceed the scope of the consent and make a limited entry into Greco's bedroom. The district court, having found the initial entry illegal, held that the officers "created the exigency by their uninvited entry" into the house, and therefore the exigent circumstances exception did not apply. "One well-recognized exception [to the warrant requirement] applies when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Kentucky v. King,_U.S. _, _, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011).1 "The need to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence has long been recognized as a sufficient justification for a warrantless search." Id.; Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).
In this case, we determine that it was reasonable for the officers to enter Greco's bedroom to ensure that evidence was not being destroyed. First, we have already concluded that the officers entered the home lawfully. Once inside, Greco displayed acts consistent with the acts of someone endeavoring to destroy evidence. First, Greco immediately went inside her bedroom and...
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