State v. Green

Docket Number20190336
Decision Date01 June 2023
PartiesState of Utah, Appellee, v. Torrey Jordan Green, Appellant.
CourtUtah Supreme Court

Heard October 5, 2022

On Direct Appeal

First District, Brigham City The Honorable Brian G. Cannell No 181100491

Sean D. Reyes, Att'y Gen., Nathan Jack, David A. Simpson Asst. Solics. Gen., Salt Lake City, Barbara K. Lachmar, Cache County, for appellee

Emily Adams, Freyja Johnson, Cherise Bacalski, Bountiful, for appellant

Chief Justice Durrant authored the opinion of the Court, in which Associate Chief Justice Pearce, Justice Petersen, Justice Hagen, and Justice Pohlman joined.

OPINION

Durrant, Chief Justice

Introduction

¶1 Torrey Green was charged with sexually assaulting seven women. On his lawyer's motion, six of the seven cases were consolidated for trial.[1] A jury convicted Mr. Green of charges for each of these six victims.

¶2 Mr. Green seeks a reversal of his convictions, arguing that he did not receive a fair trial. He advances four main arguments on appeal. First, he argues that under the Utah Rules of Evidence- specifically, rules 404(b) and 403-and the doctrine of chances, the district court erred in allowing the State to use evidence of conduct unrelated to a particular victim's case (other-acts evidence) to show that he sexually assaulted that victim. Relatedly, both he and the State ask us to overturn our doctrine-of-chances precedent. Second, Mr. Green asserts that the district court admitted hearsay statements that are prohibited by the Utah Rules of Evidence. Third, he offers several ways in which he claims his counsel rendered ineffective assistance at trial. Finally, he maintains that the cumulative error doctrine requires us to reverse his convictions.

¶3 Upon review of the parties' arguments concerning the doctrine of chances, we are persuaded that the doctrine should be abandoned in favor of a plain-text reading of rules 402, 403, and 404(b). Because of this change in course, we analyze whether the district court erred in admitting the other-acts evidence in Mr. Green's case under the rules of evidence (without any reference to the doctrine of chances). Under this standard, we find no error in the district court's other-acts evidence determination.

¶4 As to Mr. Green's hearsay claims, we conclude that most of the statements at issue were properly admitted consistent with exemptions to the hearsay rule. And because the evidence against Mr. Green was overwhelming, we conclude that the district court's errors in admitting those few statements that should have been excluded as hearsay were harmless.

¶5 We further conclude that Mr. Green's ineffective assistance of counsel arguments fail. None of these arguments satisfies the standard articulated for such cases by the United States Supreme Court and our caselaw.

¶6 Finally, based on our analysis of Mr. Green's other challenges, his cumulative error argument also fails. We accordingly affirm each of Mr. Green's convictions.

Background[2]

¶7 The State charged Mr. Green with the sexual assault and rape of M.H., L.P., C.H., C.D., A.P., and V.S. Each of these six women identified Mr. Green as her assailant, and the State filed charges against him for each alleged crime.

¶8 Based on the similarities among the six accounts, the State relied on rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence and the doctrine of chances to introduce the testimony of all six women with respect to each of the charges, seeking to demonstrate that the six women were not fabricating their claims, as alleged by Mr. Green. The testimony was admitted for each of the six victims. Upon admission of this evidence Mr. Green's attorney moved to consolidate the six cases, and the motion was granted.

¶9 During the trial, defense counsel stipulated to a summary of three Salt Lake Tribune articles (Tribune Articles) that described the alleged sexual assaults of several of the women. The written summary and stipulation were admitted into evidence as an exhibit (Tribune Stipulation), which the jury was permitted to possess during its deliberations.

¶10 After a ten-day trial, Mr. Green was convicted of raping M.H., C.H., C.D., V.S., and A.P. He was also convicted of the object rape and forcible sexual abuse of V.S. and of the sexual battery of L.P. The jury acquitted Mr. Green of four charges: the kidnapping of L.P., the forcible sexual abuse of L.P., the object rape of C.H., and the forcible sexual abuse of C.H.

¶11 Mr. Green filed a timely appeal, challenging the district court's decision to admit the other-acts testimony under the Utah Rules of Evidence and the doctrine of chances. He also challenges the district court's admission of hearsay evidence and its decision to allow certain documentary exhibits (including the Tribune Stipulation) to accompany the jury into its deliberations. Mr. Green further argues that his counsel was ineffective in moving to consolidate the six cases, agreeing to the Tribune Stipulation and permitting it and other exhibits to accompany the jury in its deliberations, not objecting to the State's admission of hearsay evidence, and failing to object to the "improper racial theme" allegedly created by the State at trial. Mr. Green also argues that, when viewed cumulatively, the district court's errors require us to reverse his convictions.

¶12 Because analyzing these issues requires a basic understanding of the underlying case, we begin by outlining Mr. Green's history at Utah State University (USU) and the publication of the Tribune Articles. Next, we analyze the testimony of the six victims as well as the associated hearsay testimony provided by their colleagues to rebut a claim of recent fabrication. Then, we discuss the alleged racial theme created at trial. And finally, we describe the procedural history of the case.

A. Mr. Green's Football Career and the Publication of the Tribune Articles

¶13 Mr. Green began studying at USU in 2011. He chose to attend USU because the university recruited him to play football, which he did collegiately from 2011 to 2016. On March 5, 2016, Mr. Green left USU to begin training camp with the National Football League and was subsequently drafted by the Atlanta Falcons.

¶14 Soon thereafter, on July 21, 2016, the Salt Lake Tribune printed an article reporting that an unnamed male who attended USU had been accused of committing several sexual assaults. The article discussed V.S.'s and A.P.'s allegations and included details of their alleged rapes. On August 4, 2016, the Salt Lake Tribune published a second article, this time identifying Mr. Green as the unnamed male. After the second article was published, the Atlanta Falcons cut Mr. Green from the team. On October 9, 2016, the Salt Lake Tribune printed a third article, which repeated the allegations of V.S. and A.P. and reported further allegations by M.H. and L.P. Not long after the publication of the third Tribune Article, the State brought charges against Mr. Green.

B. The Rape of M.H.

¶15 At Mr. Green's trial, M.H. testified that in November 2013, Mr. Green raped her. She met Mr. Green on Tinder, a dating app, and he invited her to his apartment for dinner. After dinner, Mr. Green offered to give her a massage, to which she agreed. During the massage, he tried to take her clothes off, but she resisted, telling him to stop. Eventually, Mr. Green forced her clothes off, stating, "[Y]ou'll like it. It's going to be fun." Mr. Green then proceeded to rape her. After it was over, M.H. drove herself home.

¶16 To support M.H.'s allegations, the State called four other witnesses-M.H.'s on-again-off-again boyfriend, A.W., A.W.'s cousin (A.W.'s Cousin), and two of M.H.'s friends, A.H. and N.M. All four individuals testified concerning what they had heard about the rape. In support of its case, the State also submitted into evidence a poem that M.H. wrote about the rape shortly after it occurred.

¶17 A.W. stated that M.H. came to his house in November or December 2013 to talk. He testified that she told him "she had been with [Mr. Green], and that they had sex, but she didn't want to, that he had forced it on her and . . . that she said no." Defense counsel did not object to A.W.'s testimony.

¶18 A.W.'s Cousin subsequently testified that in November or December 2013, A.W. told him that he had heard that M.H. "had been raped by a USU athlete." Defense counsel did not object to A.W.'s Cousin's testimony. Finally, both A.H. and N.M. testified that in the summer of 2016, M.H. told both of them that Mr. Green had raped her. Defense counsel also did not object to A.H.'s or N.M.'s testimony.

¶19 The State submitted a poem that M.H. wrote "right after" the rape, which she posted on social media approximately ten days later. The poem used explicit language describing what occurred and its effect on M.H. Defense counsel objected to the poem's admission. The court overruled the objection and allowed the poem into evidence under the present sense impression exception in rule 803 and the residual exception in rule 807 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

C. The Sexual Battery of L.P.

¶20 L.P. testified that in October 2014, Mr. Green sexually assaulted her with her clothes on. She explained that she met Mr. Green on Tinder, and he invited her to his apartment to watch a movie. Mr. Green tried to hold her hand, cuddle with her, and kiss her, but she rebuffed his advances, telling him that she did not want to do those things. After Mr. Green continued to make advances, she attempted to leave, but he cornered her, made comments about her body, and then grabbed her and simulated sex by rubbing his body against hers. She continued to resist, and eventually Mr. Green stopped and took her home.

¶21 To support L.P.'s allegations, the State...

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