State v. Green
| Decision Date | 17 December 2015 |
| Docket Number | NO. 2015 KA 0308,2015 KA 0308 |
| Parties | STATE OF LOUISIANA v. THAYER GREEN |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
Appealed from the 19th Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge State of Louisiana
Case No. 07-12-0447
The Honorable Richard "Chip" Moore, Judge Presiding
Sherry Watters
New Orleans, Louisiana
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
Thayer Green
Hillar C. Moore, III
District Attorney
Cristopher J. M. Casler
Assistant District Attorney
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Counsel for Appellee
State of Louisiana
BEFORE: McDONALD, McCLENDON, AND THERIOT, JJ.
The defendant, Thayer Green, was charged by bill of information with home invasion, a violation of La. R.S. 14:62.8 (count 1); armed robbery, a violation of La. R.S. 14:64 (count 2); and aggravated battery, a violation of La. R.S. 14:34 (count 3). The defendant pled not guilty to the charges and, following a jury trial, was found guilty as charged on count 1 (home invasion). On count 2, he was found guilty of the responsive offense of simple robbery, a violation of La. R.S. 14:65; on count 3, he was found guilty of the responsive offense of second degree battery, a violation of La. R.S. 14:34.1. The defendant filed a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal, which was denied. For the home invasion conviction, the defendant was sentenced to ten years imprisonment at hard labor; for the simple robbery conviction, he was sentenced to four years imprisonment at hard labor; and, for the second degree battery conviction, he was sentenced to four years imprisonment at hard labor. The sentences were ordered to run consecutively. The State, seeking to enhance the sentence for the home invasion conviction, filed a habitual offender bill of information; a hearing was held on the matter and the defendant was adjudicated a third-felony habitual offender. The court resentenced the defendant to imprisonment at hard labor for the remainder of his natural life without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The other two sentences for the simple robbery conviction and second degree battery conviction remained in effect. The defendant filed a motion to reconsider the life sentence, which was denied. The defendant now appeals, designating four assignments of error. We affirm the convictions, habitual offender adjudication, and sentences. We also vacate the original ten-year sentence for the home invasion conviction.
Seventeen-year-old K.L.1 and the defendant had at one time been in a relationship and had a child together, but were no longer dating at the time of the criminal incident. However just prior to the incident, they had been communicating with one another through cell phone text messaging. On July 10, 2012, at about 4:30 a.m., K.L. was talking to a male friend of hers, sitting with him in his car. They were in the parking lot of Bent Tree Apartments off of Plank Road on the north side of Baton Rouge, Louisiana. K.L. was staying with her cousin, Jessica Williams, who lived in a second floor apartment. Ms. Williams's younger sister, eleven-year-old R.W., was also staying with her.
While K.L. was sitting in the car in the parking lot, she saw the defendant circle around the apartment complex twice in his mother's car, a green Toyota Camry. In order to avoid a confrontation, K.L. got out of her friend's car and ran up the stairs toward Ms. Williams's apartment. The defendant parked his car in the complex's parking area, left the vehicle running as he exited the vehicle, and pursued K.L. Once inside the apartment, K.L. tried to shut the front door, but the defendant began pushing against the door from the outside. K.L. continued to struggle to shut the door, but the defendant overpowered her and pushed the door open, knocking K.L. to the floor. She tried to crawl away, but the defendant grabbed her by the hair and started punching her. K.L. began screaming and telling R.W., who had been sleeping on the couch, to call the police. Ms. Williams, who was asleep in her bedroom, was awakened by the screaming. Not yet fully aware of what was happening, Ms. Williams grabbed her cellphone and hid in her closet while she called 911.2 The defendant continued to attack K.L., punching, kicking, and choking her. The defendant then grabbed a metal candlestick holder that was nearby and began striking K.L. on the head and in the face with it.
Ms. Williams came out of her bedroom and told the defendant she was calling the police. R.W. had just begun to call her mother on her cell phone. The defendant took R.W.'s cell phone from her hand and left the apartment. A description of the defendant's car was sent out, and the police stopped and arrested the defendant several blocks away.
In his first assignment of error, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support any of the convictions. Specifically, the defendant contends that the State failed to prove the entry into the apartment was without invitation or that the entry was with intent to use force or violence; the State failed to prove R.W.'s cell phone was taken by threat or force; and the State failed to prove the battery upon K.L. was intended to cause "great bodily harm or that it did permanent disfigurement."
A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand as it violates Due Process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. I, § 2. The standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence to uphold a conviction is whether or not, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). See La. Code Crim. P. art. 821(B); State v. Ordodi, 2006-0207 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So.2d 654,660; State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1308-09 (La. 1988). The Jackson standard of review, incorporated in Article 821 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, is an objective standard for testing the overall evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt. When analyzing circumstantial evidence, La. R.S. 15:438 provides that, in order to convict, the factfinder must be satisfied that the overall evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. See State v. Patorno, 2001-2585 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/21/02), 822 So.2d 141, 144.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:62.8(A) defines home invasion as follows:
[T]he unauthorized entering of any inhabited dwelling, or other structure belonging to another and used in whole or in part as a home or place of abode by a person, where a person is present, with the intent to use force or violence upon the person of another or to vandalize, deface, or damage the property of another.
To convict the defendant of home invasion, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the following elements: (1) the defendant entered the apartment without permission or authorization; (2) that the place he entered was an inhabited dwelling or a place used in whole or in part as a home by another person; (3) that a person was present in the home when the defendant made entry; and (4) the defendant had the intent to use force or violence against a person in the home or to vandalize, deface, or damage the property. See State v. Smith, 2013-0143 (La. App. 4th Cir. 5/21/14), 141 So.3d 853, 859, writ denied, 2014-1470 (La. 5/15/15), 170 So.3d 155.
The defendant argues in brief that he was invited to the apartment and that he did not have the intent to use force or violence against K.L. when he entered the apartment. The other elements of La. R.S. 14:62.8 are notcontested. Regarding the element of entering the apartment without permission or authorization, the defendant asserts in brief that K.L. invited him over by text message.
On direct examination K.L. explained that her "invitation" to the defendant was in jest, and that she was being sarcastic in her text messages to him. On cross-examination, K.L. testified that earlier that same day, she and the defendant had been arguing over the phone. She told the defendant that she did not "want him" anymore, to leave her alone, and for him to go on with his life and she was going to go on with her life. K.L. made it clear at trial that she had no intention of having the defendant come to Ms. Williams's apartment at 4:30 in the morning, and that her texts were not meant to be taken seriously.
Moreover, Ms. Williams testified that the defendant was not welcome in her house, and the defendant knew this. She further testified that she had been in the process of obtaining a temporary restraining order against the defendant regarding a prior incident. It is very clear from both K.L.'s and RW.'s testimony that K.L. had attempted to keep the door closed on the defendant, but that he overpowered her, opening the door with enough force to throw K.L. to the floor. Regardless of what the defendant may have thought hours before when he was texting with K.L., their actions when he arrived at the apartment indicated he was not invited into the apartment and that he, in fact, entered the apartment without permission or authorization.
The defendant suggests in brief that his entry into the apartment was not unauthorized because the door was not locked and there was no forced entry. Both of these issues have no bearing on the sufficiency analysis and are not elements of the crime. Moreover, the door was unlocked becauseK.L. was still outside at the time she ran back up to the apartment; and, as already noted, the defendant forced his way into the apartment.
The defendant also argues the State did not prove he had intent to use force or violence on K.L. Specific intent can be formed in an instant. See State v. Cousan, 94-2503 (La. 11/25/96), 684 So.2d 382, 390. See State v. Collier, 2013-189 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 10/9/13), 161 So.3d 653, 655-56, writ denied...
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