State v. Green
| Decision Date | 17 June 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 80,80 |
| Citation | 826 A.2d 486,375 Md. 595 |
| Parties | STATE of Maryland v. Richard Brandon GREEN. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Kathryn Grill Graeff, Deputy Chief (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., on brief), Baltimore, for petitioner.
Nancy S. Forster, Deputy Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on brief), Baltimore, for respondent.
Argued before BELL, C.J., ELDRIDGE, RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, JJ.
The issue in this case is whether the Respondent, Richard Brandon Green, voluntarily consented to a police search of his vehicle after the completion of a routine traffic stop. During that search, the police officer discovered cocaine and marijuana, and Green later was convicted of possessing those substances in violation of Maryland Code, Article 27, § 286 (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 2000 Supp.) and Maryland Code, Article 27, § 287 (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.). The Court of Special Appeals reversed Green's convictions, concluding that the drugs were discovered pursuant to an illegal police search. We now reverse that court's judgment and reinstate Green's convictions, holding that Green voluntarily consented to the police search that uncovered the evidence of marijuana and cocaine in his car.
On March 26, 2000, at around 7:30 p.m., while on "stationary uniform patrol," Deputy Mark Meil of the Queen Anne's County Sheriff's Office noticed a 1999 model black Mercury that appeared to be traveling above the posted speed limit of 50 miles per hour on Route 302 in Queen Anne's County. Deputy Meil measured the car's speed with a radar device and determined that it was traveling at 65 miles per hour. Based on this excessive speed, the deputy activated his emergency lights and stopped the car, which was driven by Green. Deputy Meil approached Green, advised him that he had been stopped for speeding, requested to see his license and registration, and asked him "if he had any points on his license." Green responded that he did have points and handed over the documents. Deputy Meil then returned to the police car where he ran a check of Green's license and a "criminal check for any caution codes for officers' safety." He learned from "dispatch" that Green's license was valid, so the officer began walking back to Green's car to issue him a warning citation. As he was walking, police "communications" radioed to Deputy Meil that Green had "prior caution codes for armed and dangerous and... drugs."
When he arrived at Green's car, Deputy Meil issued the warning citation and returned the driver's license and registration. Deputy Meil then stated to Green that he was "free to go." After Green had received all of his documents and learned that he was free to leave, Deputy Meil asked Green if he would mind answering a few questions before leaving. Green replied, "Sure." Based on this positive response, Deputy Meil asked Green "if he had any guns, drugs or alcohol in the vehicle." Green answered, "No." He then asked Green "if he would consent to a search of his person and vehicle." Green responded,
To ensure his safety, Deputy Meil requested that Green step out of the car. The officer explained that, based on what he had learned from the criminal check that Green could be armed and dangerous, he was not sure "whether there might be a hand gun in the vehicle." Also to ensure his safety, as he asked Green to step out of the car, Deputy Meil called for another officer to assist him by watching Green during the car search. Deputy Meil was concerned that, by himself, he would not be able to search the car and watch Green at the same time. He was concerned especially because of the "area," "it was extremely dark out," and Green was physically much larger than he with a "history of violence with hand guns."
While the deputy waited for the other officer to arrive, Green stepped out of the car. Deputy Meil frisked him for weapons, found none, and then scanned the open areas of the car that were "in plain view" and saw no weapons or drugs. Green and the deputy walked to the front of Green's car and engaged in a "casual conversation." At this point, Deputy Meil explained to Green the reasons he had called for another officer. Deputy Meil stated that he was concerned for his safety because of the location and because he would be unable to search the car and watch Green simultaneously. The deputy further explained that the wait was taking so long because it was hard to find an available backup unit when the office was "short staffed."
Corporal Tim Riggleman responded to Deputy Meil's call for backup and arrived at the scene of the traffic stop approximately 15-20 minutes after being called. After parking his vehicle behind Deputy Meil's, Corporal Riggleman, who was armed and in uniform, got out of the car and approached Green and the deputy near the front of Green's car. He then watched Green while Deputy Meil searched the interior of Green's car. When Deputy Meil began his search, he immediately was directed to the center console by the driver's seat because of a faint odor of marijuana emanating from it. Opening the console, he discovered a "black zipper bag" with two pockets. Inside the top zippered portion, Deputy Meil found "two bags of green leafy substance, which [he] identified ... as marijuana." Deputy Meil then walked back to Green and Corporal Riggleman and arrested Green. Corporal Riggleman, after patting down Green, placed him in the back seat of Deputy Meil's vehicle. Meanwhile, Deputy Meil returned to Green's car to continue the search of the black bag, where, in another pocket, he found approximately 110 zipper bags and a "white rock-like substance of suspected cocaine."
In the Circuit Court for Queen Anne's County, Green was charged with possession of cocaine and marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of Maryland Code, Article 27, § 286 (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 2000 Supp.),1 and possession of cocaine and marijuana in violation of Maryland Code, Article 27, § 287 .2 Green filed a motion to suppress evidence of the cocaine and marijuana, claiming in part that it was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. On September 28, 2000, a hearing was held on the motion, during which the court heard testimony from Deputy Meil, Corporal Riggleman, and Green. The officers' testimony and most of Green's testimony recounted the facts as they have been presented.
Green, however, disputed that he had received his warning citation, license, and registration before Deputy Meil asked him for consent to search the car. He also claimed that, when he was asked for consent, he refused, and then the officer stated, "You have to step out of the vehicle, sir." According to Green, Deputy Meil searched his person, searched his car, and only then called for backup. Green stated that he did not feel free to leave during the encounter because the officer maintained possession of his license and registration. Green, though, acknowledged in his testimony, that he never told Deputy Meil that he wanted to leave and that, in fact, he offered to open the trunk of his car for the officer during the search.
Following the testimony, the State argued that Green consented to the search of his car and, therefore, the subsequent seizure of the marijuana and cocaine did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Green responded that the police officer had illegally searched the car because he neither had valid consent to search nor reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity. The court, nonetheless, specifically found that Green had consented to the search. In orally issuing his ruling, the judge expressed doubt about the veracity of Green's version of the events that led to the discovery of the drugs, querying why, for example, Green would have offered to open the trunk of his car if "he had not consented [to the search] in the first place." His conclusion that Green consented to the search was "reinforced" by the fact that Green is "significantly larger in both height and build than the ... police officer" and "is not, as his testimony indicated, a bashful type." Rather, the judge found:
He is fully aware of himself and where he is. That is, he gives an indication of great presence and it is very difficult for me to believe that all this, in fact it's impossible for me to believe that the situation could have occurred as [Green described] and at the same time he offered to use the trunk. So therefore, I'm compelled to conclude and I find as a fact that consent was actually given.
The court further stated that, "the State's Attorney is correct that ... consent ... was ... never withdrawn" because Green "was quite aware that he could leave ... and didn't seem to be terribly threatened by the situation and he seemed to be very interested in assisting the police in what they were doing." Concluding that there was no illegal search, the judge denied the motion to suppress.
Green proceeded to trial on March 15, 2001. During the trial, Green and the State entered into an agreement under which the State would drop the cocaine distribution charge in exchange for Green allowing the court to decide his guilt based on an agreed statement of facts. Green was found guilty of possession of cocaine and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute for which Green was sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment of two years and four years, respectively.
A divided panel of the Court of Special Appeals reversed the convictions in Green v. State, 145 Md.App. 360, 802 A.2d 1130 (2002). The court held that the search of Green's car did not emanate from a consensual encounter but, rather, from an unlawful seizure. Id. at 398, 802 A.2d at 1152. Analytically, the court divided the entire episode into three separate components: (1) the initial traffic stop, (2) a...
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