State v. Greenwood, 20100632.

• Decision Date: 10 August 2012
• Docket Number: No. 20100632.,20100632.
• Parties: STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Petitioner, v. Jamie Lynn GREENWOOD, Defendant and Respondent.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

297 P.3d 556

714 Utah Adv. Rep. 40

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Petitioner,

v.Jamie Lynn GREENWOOD, Defendant and Respondent.

No. 20100632.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Aug. 10, 2012.

Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Christine F. Soltis, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for petitioner.

Scott L. Wiggins, Salt Lake City, for respondent.

Justice PARRISH, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶ 1 We granted the State's petition for interlocutory review to address whether a court may grant a criminal defendant's request to waive a jury trial over the prosecution's objection. The district court granted Jamie Lynn Greenwood's request to waive a jury trial in favor of a bench trial because of the court's perceived “due process concerns.” On appeal, the State argues that the district court erred because it disregarded the clear provisions of rule 17(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure that require the consent of the prosecution before a defendant may waive a jury trial. We hold that under rule 17(c), Ms. Greenwood may not waive a jury trial without the State's consent. Additionally, we hold that Ms. Greenwood's due process rights were not implicated in this case. We therefore reverse and remand for a jury trial.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Ms. Greenwood has not been convicted of any crime and the facts are only alleged. Nevertheless, the allegations are relevant because the district court concluded that no jury could fairly preside over the case due to the inflammatory nature of the alleged facts.

¶ 3 In March 2010, Jamie Lynn Greenwood was charged with five felonies: two counts of rape, two counts of forcible sodomy, and one count of forcible sexual abuse. The information alleged that Ms. Greenwood, who was forty and forty-one at the time, had been engaged in an eleven-month sexual relationship with her son's friend, A.B., who was fifteen and sixteen at the time of the relationship. Ms. Greenwood pled not guilty to all charges. Ms. Greenwood acknowledges that she had a sexual relationship with the teenager but claims the relationship was consensual and that A.B. actually “threatened and intimidated” her into engaging in sexual conduct. The State alleges that Ms. Greenwood gave A.B. gifts and cash in exchange for sexual favors. The State also claims that Ms. Greenwood threatened to call A.B.'s mother if he did not do what she requested.

¶ 4 The morning her jury trial was scheduled to begin but before the jury had been selected, Ms. Greenwood requested a bench trial. She reasoned that, due to A.B.'s alleged consent and other age-based issues, a bench trial would be more appropriate to evaluate the charges against her. Specifically, she argued that “an analytical and legal pre-trained mind looking [at] and weighing the factors [would] give her a much more objective decision than trying to, in a short time, explain and try to articulate to a jury the fine lines between ... rape and unlawful sexual activity or unlawful sexual conduct with a minor.” Additionally, Ms. Greenwood argued that the jury pool may be tainted due to the pretrial publicity the case had received.

¶ 5 The State objected, refused to consent to the waiver, and argued that under rule 17(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, a defendant in a felony case cannot waive a jury trial without the prosecution's consent. Ms. Greenwood argued that the court has discretion to waive a jury trial in certain circumstances. She claimed that the circumstances of this case justified an exception to rule 17(c) because of the fine line between the offenses charged and potential lesser offenses, the issue of consent, and the media attention the case had received. The State argued that while there was some limited media interest in the case initially, only one reporter still showed an interest in the case, and the court could ensure an impartial jury by using additional safeguards, such as a pretrial juror questionnaire.

¶ 6 The district court approved Ms. Greenwood's waiver of a jury trial over the State's objection. The district court judge noted that he was concerned that rule 17(c) gave the State an unfair ability to control the case and this control put a “tremendous burden” on the defense, which implicated Ms. Greenwood's due process rights. He then concluded that this case qualified for an exception to rule 17(c) because, given the charges of sexual abuse, there was a “fine line” between the actual charges and possible lesser charges due to the defendant's allegation of consent and the age of the alleged victim, and because the case had received some pretrial publicity.

¶ 7 The district court granted the defendant's waiver of a jury trial and ordered a bench trial to begin the following day. This court granted the State's petition for an emergency stay and interlocutory review. We have jurisdiction under section 78A-3-102(3)(h) of the Utah Code.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 8 “The interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law that we review for correctness.” State v. Bosh, 2011 UT 60, ¶ 5, 266 P.3d 788 (alteration omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, the district court reasoned that denying Ms. Greenwood's request for a bench trial based on the State's objection “would implicate [her] due process rights.” “Because the issue of constitutionality presents a question of law, we review the district court's ruling for correctness and accord it no particular deference.” Ryan v. Gold Cross Servs., Inc., 903 P.2d 423, 424 (Utah 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). Ultimately, “an appellate court decides [questions of law] for itself and does not defer in any degree to the district court's determination because it is the primary role of the appellate courts to say what the law is and ensure that it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction.” State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2, ¶ 18, 40 P.3d 611.¹

ANALYSIS

I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY GRANTING MS. GREENWOOD'S REQUEST FOR A BENCH TRIAL OVER THE STATE'S OBJECTION

¶ 9 The district court granted Ms. Greenwood's request for a bench trial over the State's objection based on the court's perceived “due process concerns.” On appeal, the State argues that the district court erred as a matter of law because its decision disregarded rule 17(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which clearly requires the consent of the prosecution before a criminal defendant may waive a jury trial. Ms. Greenwood responds that if the district court had forced Ms. Greenwood to undergo a jury trial because of the State's objection, it would have implicated her due process rights. We hold that the district court erred when it failed to enforce the provisions of rule 17(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and that Ms. Greenwood's due process rights have not been implicated at this stage of the case.

A. The District Court Erred in Refusing to Enforce Rule 17(c)

¶ 10 The district court granted Ms. Greenwood's request for a bench trial over the State's objection, noting that it “underst[ood] rule 17(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and the [applicable] case law” but that it “believe[d] that upon a propershowing a defendant should be able to waive his or her right to a jury trial.” The State argues that the district court erred because its ruling disregarded the clear language of rule 17(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. We agree with the State.

¶ 11 The Utah Constitution guarantees that “[i]n criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to ... have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury.” Utah Const. art. I, § 12. Under rule 17(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, “[a]ll felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the defendant waives a jury in open court with the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution.” Utah R. Crim. P. 17(c). We have held that a criminal defendant does not have a constitutionally based right to receive a bench trial. State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771, 772 (Utah 1985). Rather, “the right to have a case tried by a judge is founded only in [rule 17(c) ] and its federal counterpart.” Id.

¶ 12 The U.S. Supreme Court also has held that there is no constitutional right to a bench trial. In Singer v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court analyzed a criminal defendant's right to a bench trial over the prosecution's objection under rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which is the federal analogue to Utah's rule 17(c).²380 U.S. 24, 34–38, 85 S.Ct. 783, 13 L.Ed.2d 630 (1965). There, the defendant requested a bench trial, the prosecution objected, and the defendant was subsequently tried and convicted by a jury. Id. at 25, 85 S.Ct. 783. The Singer Court held that while the Sixth Amendment confers the constitutional right to a jury trial, “the Constitution neither confers nor recognizes a right of criminal defendants to have their cases tried before a judge alone.” Id. at 26, 85 S.Ct. 783. The Court reasoned that “[t]he ability to waive a constitutional right does not ordinarily carry with it the right to insist upon the opposite of that right.” Id. at 34–35, 85 S.Ct. 783. “Moreover, it has long been accepted that the waiver of constitutional rights can be subjected to reasonable procedural regulations....” Id. at 35, 85 S.Ct. 783. The Court ultimately determined that rule 23(a) was a reasonable procedural regulation of a criminal defendant's waiver of his constitutional right to a jury trial. See id. at 35–38, 85 S.Ct. 783. “Thus,” the Court concluded, “there is no federally recognized right to a criminal trial before a judge sitting alone....” Id. at 34, 85 S.Ct. 783.

¶ 13 Similarly, we have held that while “an accused is guaranteed a right [to] trial by jury, neither the state nor the federal constitution guarantees him a right to ‘waive’ a jury trial.” State v. Studham, 655 P.2d 669, 671 (Utah 1982) (per curiam). This is because “the right to have a case tried by a judge is founded only in [rule 17(c) ] and its federal counterpart ... [and...