State v. Greer

Docket NumberED 111273
Decision Date21 November 2023
Citation679 S.W.3d 531
PartiesSTATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Latori GREER, Appellant.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Pike County, Honorable Milan C. Berry, Judge

For Appellant: Katharine P. Curry, 1000 W. Nifong Blvd., Bldg. 7, Ste. 100, Columbia, MO 65203.

For Respondent: Alex G. Ellison, 115 W. Main St., Bowling Green, MO 63334.

KURT S. ODENWALD, Presiding Judge

Introduction

Latori Greer ("Greer") appeals from the trial court’s judgment following jury trial convictions on second-degree harassment and first-degree sexual misconduct arising out of an incident during his incarceration. In his sole point on appeal, Greer argues the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the State to introduce evidence of prior uncharged bad acts during his incarceration because the evidence was more prejudicial than probative and made it more likely than not that the jury convicted him based on improper propensity reasoning. Because the evidence was relevant to a requisite element of the sexual-misconduct offense and not so prejudicial as to impact the outcome of the trial, we deny the point. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Factual and Procedural History

The charges arose out of an incident that occurred in November 2019 at the Department of Corrections ("DOC") where Greer was an inmate. Greer pressed the call light to take a shower, which prompted the Corrections Officer to open the door to the shower for him. After the Corrections Officer let Greer into the shower, he pressed the call light several more times, prompting her to check on him. When she arrived, Greer was looking at her while stroking his bare penis.

The Corrections Officer then directed Greer to return to the housing unit and informed him that security cameras had recorded the incident. Greer asked her whether it would have been okay if it had not been on camera, and the Corrections Officer replied no. The Corrections Officer documented the incident in a report. The Corrections Officer noted she had largely had positive interactions with Greer prior to this incident, and his actions took her aback and made her feel disrespected. The Corrections Officer explained that she had prior experience with this kind of incident, which she stated was not usually criminally prosecuted, and was "shocked that finally something is happening."

The State initiated criminal charges against Greer with one count of harassment in the second degree and one count of sexual misconduct in the first degree. For the harassment count, the State alleged that Greer, without good cause, openly masturbated in front of a corrections officer with the purpose to cause emotional distress. For the sexual-misconduct count, the State alleged that Greer exposed his genitals under circumstances in which he knew that such conduct was likely to cause affront or alarm.

The case proceeded to a jury trial. Prior to trial, the State indicated it intended to introduce business-record evidence that Greer had committed prior similar conduct violations at the DOC via a report (the "Report"), otherwise known as an institutional violation summary. The Report was prepared by a DOC Officer, and it enumerated thirteen additional conduct violations committed by Greer over the course of approximately three years for "self-touching of one’s sexual parts" or "expos[ing] one’s sexual parts." The Report also referenced the incident underlying the present charges and listed multiple non-sexual violations that were redacted for trial.

Greer opposed admitting the Report into evidence through a motion in limine, arguing that the prior conduct violations constituted inadmissible evidence of uncharged prior bad acts that did not fall under any exception. The State countered that the Report was probative of the mental state of first-degree sexual misconduct, specifically that Greer knew his actions during the incident were likely to cause affront or alarm. Greer responded that he did not intend to put that element at issue during trial. The trial court overruled Greer’s motion and deemed the Report admissible.

At trial, the State called the Corrections Officer and the DOC Officer. The State introduced the Report during the DOC Officer’s testimony. Greer renewed his objection and sought a continuing objection on the same grounds as his motion in limine, which the trial court acknowledged and overruled. The State asked the DOC Officer to read aloud each violation listed in the Report—to which Greer objected on the grounds of cumulative evidence and was overruled—and the DOC Officer read as follows:

10/5/2019, 15.2 self-touching—[.]

8/24/2018, 15.3, exposing one’s sexual parts.

5/3/2018, 15.2, self-touching of one’s sexual parts.

2/19/2018, 15.2, self-touching of one’s sexual parts.

11/9/2017, 15.2, self-touching of one’s sexual parts.

10/19/2017, 15.2, self-touching of one’s sexual part.

9/21/2017, 15.2, self-touching of one’s sexual parts.

2/27/2017, 15.2, self-touching of one’s sexual parts.

2/5/2017, 15.2, self-touching of one’s sexual part[s]. 15.3, exposing of one’s sexual parts.

12/8/2016, 15.2, self-touching of one’s sexual parts and 21.1, [subjecting another person to] abuse [or] obscene language or gestures.

1/26/2016, 15.2, self-touching of one’s sexual parts.

8/21/2016, 15.2, self-touching of one’s sexual parts.

8/18/2016, 15.2, self-touching of one’s sexual parts.

Aside from confirming that the Report was Greer’s institutional violation summary and not anyone else’s, the State asked no further questions about the Report. On cross-examination, the DOC Officer testified that, while preparing the Report, she did not interview the Corrections Officer or Greer, and that her role is to "check behavior patterns, print out the documents and forward them on."

The State also introduced photographs from the DOC security cameras. Greer did not testify in his own defense or put on evidence. At the close of the State’s evidence and the close of all evidence, Greer moved for an acquittal, which the trial court denied.

The jury found Greer guilty on both counts. Greer moved for a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial on grounds including those alleged in the point relied on. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced Greer to thirty days in jail on each count. This appeal follows. The State declined to file a respondent’s brief.

Points on Appeal

In his sole point on appeal, Greer contends the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the Report because the evidence of uncharged prior bad acts was inadmissible propensity evidence that was vastly more prejudicial than probative. Specifically, Greer argued the Report prejudiced the outcome of his trial because, aside from the Report, the State’s case rested largely on the credibility of the Corrections Officer’s testimony.

Standard of Review

[1–4] "A trial court has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence at trial." State v. Madrigal, 652 S.W.3d 758, 771-72 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022) (citing State v. Buechting, 633 S.W.3d 367, 376 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021)). "We therefore review preserved claims of error in evidentiary rulings for whether the trial court abused its discretion." Id. (citing Buechting, 633 S.W.3d at 376). "This standard gives the trial court broad leeway in choosing to admit evidence; therefore, an exercise of this discretion will not be disturbed unless it is clearly against the logic of the circumstances." State v. Primm, 347 S.W.3d 66, 70 (Mo. banc 2011) (internal quotation omitted). "We review an appeal from an evidentiary ruling ‘for prejudice, not mere error, and the trial court’s decision will be reversed only if the error was sufficiently prejudicial that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial.’" Madrigal, 652 S.W.3d at 772 (quoting Buechting, 633 S.W.3d at 376).

Discussion

[5–8] Missouri law generally recognizes that evidence of uncharged prior bad acts is inadmissible to show the propensity of the defendant to commit the charged offense. Id. (quoting State v. Winfrey, 337 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Mo. banc 2011)). "This prohibition is rooted in the principle ‘that an accused may not be found guilty or punished for a crime other than the one on trial.’" Id. (quoting State v. Conley, 873 S.W.2d 233, 236 (Mo. banc 1994)). The exclusion of prior uncharged bad acts is intended to prevent the jury from using such evidence to infer the defendant has "a general criminal disposition, a bad character, or propensity or proclivity to commit the type of crime charged, and in turn, basing a finding of guilt on the uncharged crime." Id. (internal quotations omitted). However, it is also well established that Missouri law recognizes that evidence of prior bad acts is admissible for other permissible purposes. Id. (quoting Winfrey, 337 S.W.3d at 11). Specifically, "Much evidence may be admissible if it tends to establish (1) motive; (2) intent; (8) the absence of mistake or accident; (4) a common scheme or plan …; or (5) the identity of the person charged[.]" Primm, 347 S.W.3d at 70 (internal citation omitted).

[9–11] "If evidence of uncharged crimes, wrongs, or acts tends to prove something other than the defendant’s propensity to commit the crimes for which he is charged, then the question becomes whether the evidence is legally relevant." State v. Jackson, 636 S.W.3d 908, 921 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (internal citation omitted). "Evidence is legally relevant if its probative value outweighs its costs—‘unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, waste of time, or cumulativeness.’" Id. (internal quotation omitted). "In balancing the probative value of evidence against its potential prejudicial effect on the jury, ‘the trial court must carefully consider that the inevitable tendency of such evidence is to raise a legally spurious presumption of guilt in the minds of the...

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