State v. Greer
| Decision Date | 01 February 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. ED 83662.,ED 83662. |
| Citation | 159 S.W.3d 451 |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Vincent GREER, Appellant. |
Craig Johnston, Columbia, MO, for appellant.
Deborah Daniels, Linda Lemke (co-counsel), Jefferson City, MO, for respondents.
Application for Transfer to Supreme Court Denied March 23, 2005.
Vincent Greer appeals the judgment entered on his convictions for murder in the first degree, assault in the first degree and two counts of armed criminal action. We affirm.
One morning shortly after his fifteenth birthday, Greer hid behind a sofa in the basement. When his father came into the room, Greer shot him with a semi-automatic rifle, causing him serious injury. As Greer's mother started to come downstairs, his father yelled for her to go back upstairs and call 911. Greer chased after her, still holding the gun. When he got to the top of the stairs, the door was locked. He ran back down the steps, out the garage door and up onto the deck — stopping to dislodge a bullet that had jammed the gun — and then broke the glass on the back door. Greer walked into the kitchen, saw his mother was hiding behind a bar stool and shot her in the back of the head. She later died from the wound. Greer's father came upstairs, got the gun from Greer and held him down until police arrived.
Greer was arrested, provided a Miranda warning1 and transported to the juvenile detention center. Greer's uncle was brought in and was present when the deputy juvenile officer again advised Greer of his rights under Miranda and of his rights under the state juvenile code. Greer waived his rights and confessed to shooting both of his parents. After Greer was certified to stand trial as an adult, Greer again waived his rights and made similar statements. Greer's pre-trial motion to suppress all of these statements was denied, as were his objections to their admission at trial.
The jury found Greer guilty and assessed punishment as follows: life imprisonment without probation or parole for his mother's murder; life imprisonment on the armed criminal action count associated with the murder; ten years' imprisonment for assaulting his father; and three years' imprisonment on the armed criminal action count associated with the assault. The court sentenced Greer to these terms of imprisonment, ordering the sentence on the first armed criminal action count to run consecutively to the sentence for murder. The sentences for the assault and associated armed criminal action count were ordered to run concurrently with the other sentences. After an earlier trial on these charges, the court had ordered the sentences on all four counts to run concurrently.2 The court noted that its decision to run the sentences the way it had after this re-trial was based on the fact that the second jury had imposed "a considerably greater sentence" on the first armed criminal action count than had the first jury — life imprisonment versus twenty years' imprisonment — and "a considerably lesser sentence" on the second armed criminal action count.3
Greer argues that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of all of the evidence because the State failed to prove that he deliberated about killing his mother. We disagree.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, this Court does not act as a "super juror" with veto powers. State v. Chaney, 967 S.W.2d 47, 52 (Mo. banc 1998). We give great deference to the jury and do not ask ourselves whether we believe that the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Cartwright, 17 S.W.3d 149, 152 (Mo.App. E.D.2000). Instead, the question is whether "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Chaney, 967 S.W.2d at 52. In answering that question, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, give the State the benefit of all reasonable favorable inferences and disregard all contrary evidence and inferences. State v. Grim, 854 S.W.2d 403, 405 (Mo. banc 1993).
Murder in the first degree requires proof of deliberation. Section 565.020.1 RSMo 1994.4 "Deliberation" is "cool reflection for any length of time no matter how brief." Section 565.002(3). Ordinarily, deliberation is proved by the circumstances surrounding the crime; it may be inferred, but must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Glass, 136 S.W.3d 496, 514 (Mo. banc 2004). "Proof of deliberation does not require proof that the defendant contemplated his actions over a long period of time, only that the killer had ample opportunity to terminate the attack once it began." State v. Johnston, 957 S.W.2d 734, 747 (Mo. banc 1997) (internal citations omitted).
The evidence to support the jury's finding of deliberation was substantial. First, Greer encountered several roadblocks as he chased after his mother, which provided him ample opportunity to terminate the attack. The basement door was locked, so he went outside and around to the back of the house. His gun was jammed, but he dislodged the bullet and continued on into the kitchen. The mere fact that it took some amount of time for Greer to reach his mother before he shot her supports the reasonable inference that he reflected for at least that time. See State v. Clemmons, 753 S.W.2d 901, 906 (Mo. banc 1988) (evidence that defendant took a few steps toward victim before stabbing victim gave rise to reasonable inference that defendant reflected for at least the amount of time it took to reach victim).
Second, Greer's statements to the police supported a finding that he had deliberated about the murder. Greer claimed at various points during the interview that he did not know what made him shoot his parents, that he was not thinking anything when he shot his mother, that he "just snapped" and that he could not remember everything that happened. But he also stated that he thought about running after he shot his father, "[b]ut then I got inside and I was like I should get them before they call the cops." Greer also admitted that he had thought about shooting his parents before:
The State is entitled to the reasonable inference that by "it" Greer meant killing his parents.
Greer argues that there is other evidence that supports a finding that Greer did not deliberate. He points to two psychologists' conclusions that Greer could not have deliberated on this murder and to his father's testimony that when he came into the kitchen after Greer's mother had been shot, Greer "looked like he was in a world of his own" and had a "glazed look." The jury was free to disbelieve this testimony, however, and to the extent this evidence is contrary to the jury's verdict, we are to disregard it in our review of the sufficiency of the evidence. See State v. Porter, 640 S.W.2d 125, 127 (Mo. banc 1982); Grim, 854 S.W.2d at 405.
Contrary to Greer's contentions, we need not resort to speculation to find sufficient evidence of deliberation in this case. The trial court did not err in overruling his motion for judgment of acquittal. Point denied.
Greer argues that the court plainly erred5 in denying his motion to suppress and admitting at trial his pre-certification confession because the statements were involuntary and the waiver of his rights to counsel and to remain silent was not knowing or intelligent. We disagree.
After an individual has been advised of his rights in accordance with Miranda, no statement he makes may be used against him unless he makes a knowing, intelligent, understanding and voluntary waiver of those rights. State v. Pierce, 749 S.W.2d 397, 402 (Mo. banc 1988). The State carries the burden of proving that the confession was voluntary. State v. Jones, 699 S.W.2d 525, 527 (Mo.App. E.D.1985). We view the evidence pertaining to the admissibility of the confession in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. State v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d 165, 173 (Mo. banc 1997). Conflicts in the evidence are for the trial court to resolve, and this Court defers to the trial court's superior position from which to assess credibility. Id.
Whether a confession is voluntary depends on "whether the totality of the circumstances created a physical or psychological coercion sufficient to deprive the defendant of a free choice to admit, deny or refuse to answer the examiner's questions." Id. There is no evidence of physical coercion in this case. In determining whether a confession resulted from improper mental coercion, we consider the defendant's age, experience, intelligence, gender, education and any infirmity or unusual...
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