State v. Gregoire, 48112

• Decision Date: 07 November 1966
• Docket Number: No. 48112,48112
• Citation: 249 La. 890,192 So.2d 114
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Robert Joseph GREGOIRE.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Page 114

192 So.2d 114

249 La. 890

STATE of Louisiana v. Robert Joseph GREGOIRE.

No. 48112.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 7, 1966.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 12, 1966.

Grover L. Covington, Kentwood, Joseph H. Simpson, Schilling & Simpson, Amite, for defendant-appellant.

Jack P. F. Gremillion, Atty. Gen., William P. Schuler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Duncan S. Kemp, Dist. Atty., W. M. Dawkins, Asst. Dist. Atty., Leonard E. Yokum, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.

HAMLIN, Justice:

Defendant was indicted for the murder of Mrs. Blanche Ozment in Tangipahoa Parish (a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:30), tried, convicted, and sentenced to death. He appeals to this Court from his conviction and sentence and presents for consideration ten bills of exceptions reserved to the rulings of the trial court.

Bill of Exceptions No. 1 was reserved to the ruling of the trial court which held and found that the accused was presently sane to the extent that he was able to aid and assist his counsel and to communicate and cooperate during the course of his trial.

The record reflects that the trial court, on application of counsel for the defendant, signed orders directing that the defendant be examined with respect to his present sanity and his sanity at the time of the commission of the instant crime. The orders appointing the examining doctors or Lunacy Commission were signed with the consent of the State and counsel for the accused, and a sanity hearing was held on March 5, 1964, with defendant personally present in open court accompanied by his attorneys.

Dr. John Trice, a physician and psychiatrist, and a former Director of the Phrenetic Psychiatrist Center at the East Louisiana State Hospital, testified he examined the defendant as to his present sanity. It was his opinion that the defendant was able to fully understand the nature of the proceedings against him, and that he could assist, cooperate, and communicate with counsel in his defense.

The record discloses that defendant had a record of seizures and had been a patient at the East Louisiana State Hospital prior to his examination by Dr. Trice. The doctor stated that the defendant had an organic brain impairment that could have effect on his ability to calculate and remember, but that in his opinion the defendant was not particularly handicapped in his memory.

Dr. Trice further testified, 'Mr. Gregoire spent most of his time in I would say in the last fifteen years in institutions, either one or the other, and it is just related to his psychopathic personality, being in trouble.' When asked whether defendant's history of being incarcerated in mental institutions altered his ability to assist his counsel, Dr. Trice replied, 'Not one bit, no sir.'

Dr. Joseph Robert Butler, a professor of Psychology at Louisiana State University, a Clinical Psychologist, and a Consultant in Phrenetic Psychology at the Phrenetic Psychiatrist Unit of the East Louisiana State Hospital, testified he examined the defendant. He said he administered the Bender and Gastelt tests and found pronounced evidence that the defendant had organic brain damage. Dr. Butler was of the opinion that the defendant could assist counsel in his defense despite the facts set forth in his medical record.

Dr. Luther Ricks, a physician, and Coroner for the Parish of Tangipahoa, testified he examined the defendant in January 1964, and that in his opinion the defendant was able to help in his defense at that time.

In a clinical report of May 14, 1963, addressed to Judge Ben N. Tucker, Dr. Victor J. Weiss, Clinical Director of the East Louisiana State Hospital, said, 'These statements seem to fully cover my opinion, but I would like to add that this man's organic brain impairment does limit his capacity to calculate and remember.' Counsel for the defendant contends that because of the foregoing statement the trial judge abused his discretion (LSA-R.S. 15:267) in ruling that defendant was presently sane and able to assist his counsel.

Counsel for the defendant has taken the statement of Dr. Weiss, supra, out of context. A reading of the entire report reflects that Dr. Weiss was of the opinion that the accused knew right from wrong and was of sufficient intelligence to understand the nature of the proceedings against him and cooperate in his defense.¹ Counsel for the defendant further contends that the trial judge abused his discretion in ruling the defendant presently sane because the testimony of Drs. Trice and Butler with respect to defendant's brain impairment shows that defendant is not sane.

It is true that the doctors testified that defendant has a brain impairment, but, they likewise testified that they were of the opinion that he could assist counsel in his defense.

'The jurisprudence of this State is settled that the law presumes every man is sane. State v. Augustine, 241 La. 761, 131 So.2d 56, * * * The law places the burden upon the accused to establish by a clear preponderance of the evidence that he is so mentally deficient that he lacks capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him and to assist in conducting his defense in a rational manner. * * *' State v. Scott, 243 La. 1, 141 So.2d 389.

Herein, counsel for the defendant consented to the appointment of the doctors selected by the trial judge to serve on the Lunacy Commission. Counsel presented no independent evidence at the Lunacy Hearing. The testimony of the doctors preponderated to the effect that defendant could understand the proceedings against him and assist in his defense.

The testimony attached to Bill of Exceptions No. 1 convinces us that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion (LSA-R.S. 15:267) in ruling that defendant is presently sane. His ruling was predicated upon the tests set forth in the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure and enunciated in the jurisprudence wherein insanity was pleaded. State v. Chinn, 229 La. 984, 87 So.2d 315; State v. Jenkins, 236 La. 256, 107 So.2d 632; State v. Collins. 242 La. 704, 138 So.2d 546.

Bill of Exceptions No. 1 is without merit.

Bill of Exceptions No. 2 has been abandoned.

Bills of Exceptions Nos. 3, 4, and 5 will be treated together.

Bill of Exceptions No. 3 was reserved to the ruling of the trial judge that an alleged verbal declaration made by defendant to Deputy Sheriff Oswald Johnson and Chief of Police Edward S. Tucker was of a free and voluntary nature.

Bill of Exceptions No. 4 was reserved to the ruling of the trial judge that an alleged verbal declaration made by defendant in the presence of Chief of Police Edward S. Tucker was free and voluntary.

Bill of Exceptions No. 5 was reserved to the ruling of the trial judge that an alleged verbal declaration made by defendant in the presence of Deputy Sheriff Oswald Johnson was free and voluntary.

The testimony attached to these three bills of exceptions, taken outside the presence of the jury and in its presence, reflects that defendant, who had allegedly abandoned the car he allegedly drove away from the scene of the crime, and who had allegedly hidden the body of the victim in the bushes near the car, was arrested at a private residence in Marrero, Louisiana, by Deputy Sheriff Harry Joynton and Deputy Sheriff Oswald Johnson of Tangipahoa Parish and a Jefferson Parish detective on the day following the commission of the instant crime. Chief of Police Edward S. Tucker of Pontchatoula, Louisiana, who had separately travelled to Jefferson Parish, joined the arresting officers and defendant. Tucker, Johnson and the defendant sat on the back seat of the car--a Jefferson Parish Unit--with Joynton and others seated in the front of the car. They drove to the Gretna Courthouse and Jail, and during this drive the controversial verbal declaration was allegedly made by defendant.

The testimony of the officers is unanimous and affirmative to the effect that no force, duress, or coercion was exercised upon defendant during the drive. Their testimony is also unanimous and affirmative that the defendant was offered no reward, and that neither leniency was offered nor promises made to him. Their testimony is affirmative to the effect that defendant was not abused, threatened, shoved, hit, pushed or intimidated.

Deputy Johnson emphatically denied that during the drive he made a statement to the defendant to the effect that they should stop the car and hang him.

Outside the presence of the jury and in its presence, in substantially the same words, Chief of Police Tucker testified:

'One question he wanted to know was what we had him for and I said, 'I think you know what we have you for' and he said, 'I ain't done nothing,' and I said 'Well, how did you get in that house out there? Did you jerk the hook off the screen, or how did you get in there?' and he said, 'Naw, I didn't jerk no hook off the screen, she let me in,' and I said 'Who do you have reference to?' and he said 'Mrs. Ozment.' I said, 'Why did she let you in the house?' He said, 'Well, she knew me. She knew who I was. I lived out there for a long time.' I said, 'Well, Buster, why did you do what you done?' and he said, 'I don't know.' I said, 'Did you do it?' and he said, 'Yeah but I don't know why.' I said, 'Why did you do it?' and he said, 'I don't know."

Deputy Johnson, seated next to the defendant, testified affirmatively the defendant made the foregoing statement in his presence, and that he heard the defendant answer the questions propounded by Chief of Police Tucker. Deputy Joynton, seated in the front of the car, did not hear the discussion between Chief of Police Tucker and the defendant and did not hear the declarations of defendant.

Outside the presence of the jury, the defendant gave the following testimony:

'* * * We took off for the Gretna jail and by the time we took off like, Mr. Tucker said--well I said, 'What you got me for, I didn't do nothing.' He hit me in the ribs about three times and he said, 'You know what I am talking...