State v. Grenier
Decision Date | 04 September 2001 |
Docket Number | (SC 16248) |
Citation | 257 Conn. 797,778 A.2d 159 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DAVID GRENIER |
Norcott, Katz, Palmer, Sullivan and Dunnell, Js. Moira L. Buckley, deputy assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).
Lawrence J. Tytla, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Kevin Kane, state's attorney, and John P. Gravalec-Pannone, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
A jury found the defendant, David Grenier, guilty of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 53a-70 (a) (2)1 and risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 53-21.2 The trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the jury's guilty verdict, from which the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. State v. Grenier, 55 Conn. App. 630, 655, 739 A.2d 751 (1999). We granted the defendant's petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: "Whether the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that the improperly admitted expert testimony regarding the ultimate issue in the case was harmless error?" State v. Grenier, 252 Conn. 931, 746 A.2d 794 (2000). We conclude that the improperly admitted testimony was not harmless and, consequently, the defendant is entitled to a new trial. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the facts that the jury reasonably could have found. "The victim, S, was born on November 11, 1989. In 1993, the defendant lived with his mother, who is S's maternal grandmother. The defendant is the half-brother of S's mother. Also living with the defendant and his mother were S's great-grandmother and great-aunt. The defendant occupied two rooms in the house, one upstairs and one downstairs. In a downstairs room, known as `David's room,' the defendant kept expensive electronic equipment and did not permit S's cousins of similar age in the room. S, however, was allowed into the defendant's room.
The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court improperly had permitted two of the state's witnesses, Herwerth and McGeehan, to testify regarding their belief that S's accusations against the defendant were credible.5 The Appellate Court agreed with the defendant that the challenged testimony had been improperly admitted, but concluded that the error was harmless. Id., 641, 643. On appeal to this court, the defendant renews his claim that the trial court improperly permitted Herwerth and McGeehan to testify regarding S's credibility and maintains that the admission of the improper testimony constituted harmful error. We agree with the defendant.6
The following additional relevant facts are set forth in the opinion of the Appellate Court. "On direct examination by the state, Herwerth testified that she was a certified child counselor, advocate and interviewer who specialized in child sexual abuse. Herwerth stated that she had received extensive training in the areas of child sexual abuse, interviewing techniques and child development issues. She further testified that she had treated more than 900 children who complained of being victims of sexual assault or abuse.
8 Id., 634-36.
At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court instructed the jury as follows, notwithstanding its decision to overrule defense counsel's objections to the testimony of Herwerth and McGeehan:
9
The state agrees with the defendant that the Appellate Court properly concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion by allowing the state to elicit the challenged testimony. See State v. Grenier, supra, 55 Conn. App. 641, 643. We repeatedly have stated that an expert may not testify regarding the...
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State v. James G.
...jury is presumed to follow the court's curative instructions in the absence of some indication to the contrary"; State v. Grenier, 257 Conn. 797, 810, 778 A.2d 159 (2001); State v. McIntyre, 250 Conn. 526, 533, 737 A.2d 392 (1999) ("[i]t is to be presumed that the jury followed the court's ......
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State v. Favoccia
...that [the complainant] hadtestified truthfully.'" (Citation omitted.) Id., 23-24; see State v. Iban C., supra, 636; State v. Grenier, 257 Conn. 797, 806, 778 A.2d 159 (2001). Relying on our analysis in State v. Grenier, supra, 257 Conn. 807-808, which, like this case, depended entirely on t......
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State v. Fernando V.
..."entirely on the credibility of the complainant" as "not particularly strong" [internal quotation marks omitted] ); State v. Grenier , 257 Conn. 797, 808, 778 A.2d 159 (2001) (noting that "the state's case was not particularly strong" because child victim's "version of the events provided t......
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State v. IBAN C.
...the ultimate issue in a case can serve inappropriately to validate the truthfulness of a victim's testimony. See State v. Grenier, 257 Conn. 797, 806, 778 A.2d 159(2001). Finally, in cases in which an expert witness reaches a conclusion on the ultimate issue in part based upon statements ma......
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2001 Connecticut Appellate Review
...Conn. 456, 778 A.2d 61 (2001) (fact-intensive discussion of whether trial court determined what "fine furniture" was); State v. Grenier, 257 Conn. 797, 778 A.2d 159 (2001) (trial court abused its discretion in allowing when to testify about credibility of victim); State v. Lipscomb, 258 Con......