State v. Greyeagle

• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Bratvold, Judge
• Decision Date: 24 August 2020
• Docket Number: A19-1550
• Citation: State v. Greyeagle, A19-1550 (Minn. App. Aug 24, 2020)
• Parties: State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Danielle Elizabeth Greyeagle, Appellant.

State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Danielle Elizabeth Greyeagle, Appellant.

A19-1550

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS

August 24, 2020

This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

Affirmed

Bratvold, Judge

Redwood County District Court

File No. 64-CR-18-790

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Jenna M. Peterson, Redwood County Attorney, Redwood Falls, Minnesota; and

Travis J. Smith, Special Assistant County Attorney, Slayton, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rachel F. Bond, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and Bjorkman, Judge.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

BRATVOLD, Judge

Appellant seeks review of a final judgment of conviction for second-degree assault, arguing that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant assaulted another using her vehicle as a dangerous weapon. After reviewing the record evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support appellant's conviction. Thus, we affirm.

FACTS

On May 15, 2019, a jury found appellant Danielle Elizabeth Greyeagle guilty of second-degree assault based on her conduct with A.C. (victim). The facts are summarized from evidence received during trial.

Greyeagle and the victim have known each other for "a few years." Greyeagle dated a female friend of the victim, but they broke up. Greyeagle began dating someone else, and, on May 30, 2018, Greyeagle's new boyfriend and the victim "agreed to [] fight" and "had a little scuffle." A few hours after the fight, Greyeagle entered the bar where the victim was working at a casino in Morton. Greyeagle "chased and swung" at the victim, who ran into the kitchen. Greyeagle "kicked the [kitchen] door open and was screaming" until a manager told her to leave. The manager mailed Greyeagle a trespass notice, warning her that she was excluded for one year from the casino and the nearby Cenex Gas Station (C-store), which shares a parking lot with the casino.

On June 4, the victim parked his car behind the C-store and went inside to make a purchase and talk to his significant other, who worked at the C-store. As the victim exited the store and walked to his car, he saw Greyeagle "staring at [him]" from her black sports utility vehicle (SUV) parked "right in front" of the C-store. The victim entered his white 2014 four-door sedan "right away and started to pull out." The victim testified that he sawGreyeagle "flying in front" of the C-store and she "sped up like she was gonna come hit [him] with her truck."

Different cameras captured surveillance video of the two vehicles. The videos were received into evidence and played for the jury. One video recorded the encounter from the casino's hotel roof (rooftop video). The rooftop video shows the back of the C-store, a parking lot in front of the C-store, and a driveway that connects the C-store front parking lot to a larger parking lot shared with the casino.

The rooftop video shows that the victim pulled out of his parking spot located behind the C-store and then drove through the parking lot. Greyeagle's SUV drove towards the victim's sedan by going around the front of the C-store. The victim's sedan and Greyeagle's SUV approached a parking-lot exit from two different angles, with the sedan just slightly ahead. Greyeagle's SUV then drove directly towards the passenger side of the victim's sedan. At about the same time, Greyeagle's SUV slowed and the victim's sedan swerved and continued towards the exit. The two vehicles did not make contact. During trial, a police sergeant testified that if the vehicles had connected, the "front of the black SUV" would have hit "the passenger door of the white vehicle."

The victim testified that the SUV did not hit him because he "cranked [his] wheel all the way to the left and [he] floored [his] gas." The victim also testified that after Greyeagle "almost hit [him]," she followed him "like cat and mouse through the [casino] parking lot." Greyeagle did not follow the victim after he exited the casino parking lot.

On October 17, 2018, respondent State of Minnesota charged Greyeagle with second-degree assault under Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2016) (dangerous weapon)(count one), fifth-degree assault under Minn. Stat. § 609.224, subd. 1(1) (2016) (intent to cause fear of immediate bodily harm or death) (count two), fifth-degree assault under Minn. Stat. § 609.224, subd. 1(2) (2016) (intent to inflict or attempt to inflict bodily harm) (count three), and trespass under Minn. Stat. § 609.605, subd. 1(b)(8) (2016) (return to property of another within one year after being excluded) (count four). Greyeagle pleaded not guilty.

On the first day of trial, before jury selection, the state dismissed count three. During trial, the state offered testimony from the victim, a casino manager, a C-store employee, and a police sergeant who investigated the incident. Besides the facts summarized above, the victim testified that during the June 4 parking-lot incident he was "nervous" and "fearful" because he "was about to get hit with a truck." The C-store employee testified that, after the victim left the store, she saw Greyeagle drive "through the parking lot of the C-store" at an estimated speed of "over ten [] miles an hour." The employee did not see Greyeagle's SUV approach the victim's sedan.

Greyeagle waived her right to remain silent, and testified that, while driving on June 4, she "happened to see" the victim in the C-store parking lot. She testified that she wanted to "talk to him and tell him to leave [her and her boyfriend] alone." Greyeagle testified that she "[d]rove around the back" of the store "with a little speed," but that the victim "saw [her] and he got in his car." Greyeagle testified that it "wasn't [her] intention to hit him with [her] car," and she denied trying to scare him. She testified that she followed him hoping he would stop and talk to her.

During deliberations, the jury asked to watch the surveillance videos and the district court granted the request. The jury found Greyeagle guilty of second-degree assault(count one) and fifth-degree assault (count two), and acquitted Greyeagle of trespass (count four). On a special verdict form, the jury found that Greyeagle was "in possession of or using" a dangerous weapon during the assault. In July 2019, the district court convicted Greyeagle on count one and imposed an executed sentence, committing her to the commissioner of corrections for 18 months. Greyeagle appeals.

DECISION

A. Standard of Review

To begin with, the parties dispute the applicable standard of review. Greyeagle argues that the issue presented is a question of statutory interpretation that this court should review de novo because "her conduct does not violate the charged statute." The state disagrees, arguing that Greyeagle's brief has not articulated an issue about "the meaning" of the statute; instead, the state argues that Greyeagle disputes "the application" of the statute to the facts. The state contends that this court should review Greyeagle's conviction for sufficiency of the evidence.

We agree with the state.¹ In her brief to this court, Greyeagle does not contend that we must interpret statutory language, nor does she argue what that interpretation shouldbe. Greyeagle relies on State v. Henderson, 907 N.W.2d 623 (Minn. 2018) and State v. Coauette, 601 N.W.2d 443 (Minn. App. 1999), review denied (Minn. Dec. 14, 1999), to argue that de novo review is appropriate.

It is true that both cases involve the interpretation of statutes. In Henderson, the supreme court interpreted "operating" in the criminal-vehicular-operation statute, Minn. Stat. § 609.2113, subd. 1 (2016), to mean "any act that causes a motor vehicle to function or controls the functioning of the motor vehicle." 907 N.W.2d at 628. The supreme court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support appellant's conviction because he manipulated the steering wheel of the moving vehicle, which was "operating" the vehicle under the statute. Id. In Coauette, this court reviewed a second-degree assault conviction and interpreted "firearm" in the definition of "dangerous weapon," as found in Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 6 (1998). 601 N.W.2d at 447. We concluded that a paintball gun was not "inherently" a dangerous weapon. Id. We also determined that the paintball gun was not "transformed into a dangerous weapon" under the facts in that case because there was "no evidence that appellant used the gun in a manner calculated to cause great bodily harm." Id. at 447-48.

But the courts in Henderson and Coauette applied de novo review to questions of statutory interpretation. Henderson, 907 N.W.2d at 625 ("[W]e are presented with a question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo."); Coauette, 601 N.W.2d at 445 ("This case turns, in its entirety, on statutory interpretation . . . which we review denovo."). In contrast, Greyeagle's brief to this court does not articulate a question of statutory interpretation.

Rather, Greyeagle exclusively argues that "her conduct does not violate the charged statute" because the evidence does not sufficiently prove that she used her SUV as a dangerous weapon. This issue does not require statutory interpretation. An object may be "convert[ed]" into a dangerous weapon based on the facts and circumstances established during trial. State v. Basting, 572 N.W.2d 281, 282 (Minn. 1997) (holding that a defendant's professional boxing training and experience was not sufficient evidence to "convert" his fist into a dangerous weapon under the second-degree assault statute). Determining whether the evidence is sufficient to prove that Greyeagle's conduct violated the second-degree assault statute asks this court to apply the law to the...