State v. Griffin
| Decision Date | 14 October 2015 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 2014–KP–1214,2014–KP–1238.,s. 2014–KP–1214 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. Jessie M. GRIFFIN, II. |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
180 So.3d 1262
STATE of Louisiana
v.
Jessie M. GRIFFIN, II.
Nos. 2014–KP–1214
2014–KP–1238.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Oct. 14, 2015.
CRICHTON, J.
We granted the writ application in this case to determine whether La.C.Cr.P. art. 887(A) and La.C.Cr.P. art. 895.1(B) permit the district attorney and sheriff to impose costs of prosecution and costs of investigation on convicted criminal defendants where those costs are not extraordinary or special costs unique to a particular case. For the reasons that follow, we find that these articles do permit the recovery of such costs, and further find that the costs imposed by the district court were fair, reasonable, and not excessive.
BACKGROUND
On October 8, 2004, the State of Louisiana, through the office of the district attorney of the Third Judicial District Court, filed an Omnibus Motion for Costs of Prosecution, which lists in detail the tasks which the district attorney's office performs in every misdemeanor case received by his office. In the motion, the State avers that the minimum costs incurred by the district attorney of the 3rd JDC in connection with the successful prosecution of each misdemeanor defendant exceeds $100.00, and requested that each misdemeanor defendant be ordered to pay at least $100.00. The motion was filed with the Clerk of Court, and is available for review, inspection, and copying by anyone who requests it. Likewise, in 2006, the judges of the 3rd JDC, by en banc order signed by the Clerk of Court, authorized the imposition of costs of investigation of $100.00 for each misdemeanor conviction, noting that $100 is "fair and reasonable" and "in line with cost[s] incurred in any misdemeanor case sentenced."1
On July 12, 2011, while driving in Union Parish, the defendant in this case, Jessie M. Griffin, II, was stopped by Union Parish Sheriff's Office deputies and arrested. The district attorney later charged Griffin by bill of information with driving while intoxicated, first offense, as defined by La. R.S. 14:98. Griffin pleaded guilty on September 12, 2012, and was sentenced to serve 150 days in the parish jail and to
"pay a fine of $600 and all costs of these proceedings." The jail sentence was suspended, and defendant was placed on supervised probation for one year subject to certain conditions. These conditions included the payment of a $600 fine, costs of court, $100 costs of prosecution, and $100 costs of investigation. Although he objected to the costs of prosecution and costs of investigation, the defendant signed the written sentence, certifying that he had read, understood, and agreed to abide by the conditions of probation. The defendant paid both $100 fees assessed as costs of prosecution and costs of investigation, as well as fines and court costs.
On October 15, 2012, the defendant filed a motion in the trial court to reconsider the sentence and the conditions of probation, specifically objecting to the imposition of costs of prosecution and costs of investigation. The defendant argued that La.C.Cr.P. arts. 887(A) and 895.1(B) only permit recoupment of expenses not associated with the "ordinary operation" of the district attorney's and sheriff's offices. Rather, the defendant posited that recovery under these articles is limited to special or extraordinary expenses unique to a specific case, such as expert witness fees and travel expenses. In the defendant's view, the district attorney and the sheriff wanted to be paid "simply for doing their jobs." The defendant also argued that "not one iota of evidence" was presented by the district attorney or the sheriff to justify any expenses incurred in the prosecution or investigation.
The State objected to the motion, noting that the $100 costs imposed under article 887(A) were "not only reasonable, but highly conservative, and supported by the omnibus Motion for Costs of Prosecution filed for the record on October 8, 2004." The State further advised the trial court that such costs had been "uniformly assessed against convicted defendants" in the 3rd JDC since October 2004. The sheriff's office filed a similar objection, noting that the $100 cost is "specifically authorized" by article 895.1, and that the law does not require the sheriff to prove "dollar-for-dollar expenditures or to submit an itemization of costs in every criminal case." The sheriff argued that the law permits the judicial district to set standard costs in the interest of judicial efficiency.
In a written ruling, the trial court denied the defendant's motion to reconsider sentence, determining that the costs imposed "appear to be fair, reasonable, and not excessive," and that "both the costs of prosecution and the costs to the sheriff are allowed." The trial court pointed out that the assessment was made according to a schedule that was signed by all divisions of the 3rd JDC, and that the defendant was informed of the costs at sentencing and given several months to pay the costs.
The court of appeal reversed, holding that the expenses incurred by the district attorney in the prosecution of the case, and the sheriff in the investigation of the case, were not properly assessed to the defendant. Specifically, the court of appeal held that article 887(A) and article 895.1(B)"do not allow recovery for the ordinary operating expenses of the district attorney's office or the sheriff's department. Rather, the district attorney and the sheriff can only receive reimbursement for the costs they actually ‘incurred’ in connection with a particular case." State v. Griffin, 48–580, p. 11 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/14/14), 139 So.3d 14, 21.
The State (through the district attorney) and the Union Parish Sheriff filed separate writ applications, which we granted and consolidated to determine whether the court of appeal erred in reversing the trial court's determination that costs of prosecution and costs of investigation were legally
imposed on this defendant pursuant to La.C.Cr.P. art. 887(A) and La.C.Cr.P. art. 895.1(B). We now hold that the court of appeal erred in striking down the costs in this case, given the lack of support in the language of the statute for its finding that only special, itemized, or extraordinary costs are recoverable. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Second Circuit Court of Appeal and reinstate the judgment of the trial court.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
This case before us presents an issue of statutory interpretation: Do La.C.Cr.P. art. 887(A) and La.C.Cr.P. art. 895.1(B) permit the imposition of costs of prosecution and costs of investigation in criminal cases, even when those costs are not considered to be "special" or "extraordinary" to the case at hand?
Legislation is the solemn expression of legislative will; thus, the interpretation of legislation is primarily the search for the legislative intent. Cat's Meow, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 98–0601, p. 15 (La.10/20/98), 720 So.2d 1186, 1198 ; La. Safety Ass'n of Timbermen Self–Insurers Fund v. La. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 2009–0023, p. 8 (La.6/26/09), 17 So.3d 350, 355–56. When a law is clear and unambiguous, and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, it shall be applied as written, with no further interpretation made in search of the legislative intent. See La. C.C. art. 9.2 The starting point for interpretation of any statute is the language of the statute itself. See, e.g., Cat's Meow, 98–0601, p. 15, 720 So.2d at 1198 ; Timbermen, 2009–0023, p. 8, 17 So.3d at 356.
As an initial matter, we note that the court of appeal inadequately applied these maxims and failed to analyze the provisions at issue in accordance with our civilian tradition. Rather than starting with an analysis of whether the law is "clear and unambiguous" and therefore "shall be applied as written," La. C.C. art. 9, the court of appeal instead dove directly into analyzing the relevant provisions along with other, unrelated provisions.3 48–580, pp. 5–6, 139 So.3d at 18–19. We now begin, as we must, with the language of the relevant articles.
La.C.Cr.P. art. 887(A), titled "Defendant's liability for costs" states, in pertinent part:
A defendant who is convicted of an offense ... shall be liable for all costs of the prosecution or proceeding, whether or not costs are assessed by the court, and such costs are recoverable by the party or parties who incurred the expense. However, such defendant or person shall not be liable for costs if acquitted or if the prosecution or proceeding is dismissed....
This provision is clear and free of ambiguity. The Legislature clearly states that convicted defendants are "liable for all costs of the prosecution or proceeding." Id. (emphasis added). On its face, it is clear that this article does not limit the imposition of costs of prosecution to special, extraordinary, or itemized costs, as interpreted by the court of appeal.
Likewise, La.C.Cr.P. art. 895.1(B) titled "Probation; restitution; judgment for restitution; fees" states, in pertinent part:
When a court suspends the imposition or the execution of a sentence and places the...
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