State v. Griffin

• Decision Date: 27 May 1948
• Docket Number: 28391.
• Citation: 79 N.E.2d 537,226 Ind. 279
• Parties: STATE v. GRIFFIN.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

79 N.E.2d 537

226 Ind. 279

STATE v. GRIFFIN.

No. 28391.

Supreme Court of Indiana

May 27, 1948

Appeal from Lawrence Circuit Court; Chester A. Davis, Judge.

Cleon H. Foust, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Coughlin, First Deputy Atty Gen., Harold V. Whitelock, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Thos. H Shrout, Pros. Atty. of Bedford, for appellant.

Mellen & Mellen of Bedford for appellee.

GILKISON Judge.

In the above entitled case the appellee was charged in the Lawrence Circuit Court by affidavit which, omitting caption, signature and verification is as follows: 'Lester W. Hayes, being duly sworn, on oath, on information, and belief, says that at and in the county of Lawrence and State of Indiana, on the 2nd day of August, 1947, one Bert Griffin, late of said County, being a male person, did then and there visit a gambling house, then and there being contrary to the form of the statutes in such cases made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Indiana.'

Appellee filed a motion to quash this affidavit, which motion, omitting caption and signature is as follows: 'The defendant, Bert Griffin, moves the court to quash the affidavit herein on each of the following grounds: 1. The facts stated in said affidavit do not constitute a public offense. 2. Said affidavit does not state the offense charged with sufficient certainty.'

The motion to quash was sustained by the court, and the state declining to plead further, judgment was rendered discharging the defendant, from which judgment this appeal is taken.

The statute defining the offense upon which the affidavit is based and fixing the penalty, is as follows: 'Whoever, being a male person, frequents or visits a house or houses of ill fame or of assignation, except as a physician to treat a patient or patients, or associates with women known or reputed as prostitutes, or frequents or visits a gambling house or houses, or is engaged in or about a house of prostitution, shall, on conviction, be fined not less than ten dollars nor more than one hundred dollars, and shall be imprisoned in the county jail not less than ten days nor more than sixty days.' Burns' 1942 Repl. § 10-4219, Acts 1905, § 470, ch. 169, p. 693.

Appellee's motion to quash is based wholly upon cause 1, that the facts stated in the affidavit do not constitute a public offense. Cause 2 that the affidavit does not state the facts with sufficient certainty, is dependant wholly upon cause 1

The affidavit is fully within the statute aforequoted and if the statute is not unconstitutional the affidavit is good. It is appellee's contention that the statute is unconstitutional and void, for the following reasons:

(1) That it violates the following provisions of the Indiana Constitution, to wit: (a) § 19, art. 4; (b) § 23, art. 1; (c) § 22, art. 4; (b) § 23, art. 4.

(2) That it violates § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.

We shall consider these objections in the order named, and in so doing we are bound by the rule that a statute must be reasonably and fairly interpreted so as to give it efficient operation, and to give effect if possible to the expressed intent of the legislature. It should not be wantonly narrowed, limited or emasculated and rendered ineffective, absurd or nugatory. If possible it should be allowed to perform its intended mission as shown by the existing evils intended to be remedied. Balzer v. Waring, 1911, 176 Ind. 585, 590, 95 N.E. 257, 48 L.R.A.,N.S., 834. Walters v. Bank of America, 1937, 9 Cal.2d 46, 52, 69 P.2d 839, 110 A.L.R. 1259, 1264. DeTarr v. State, 1906, 37 Ind.App. 323, 327, 76 N.E. 897. Perry Township v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 1946, 224 Ind. 59, 69, 64 N.E.2d 296. Davis Coal Co. v. Polland, 1902, 158 Ind. 607, 617, 62 N.E. 492, 92 Am.St.Rep. 319. Smith v. Indianapolis St. R. Co., 1902, 158 Ind. 425, 427, 63 N.E. 849.

1(a). Section 19 of Article 4 of the Indiana Constitution provides as follows: 'Every act shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith; which subject shall be expressed in the title. But if any subject shall be embraced in an act, which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be expressed in the title.'

It has been repeatedly held by this court that this section aims only at titles narrower than the enactment. The unnecessary breadth of the title ordinarily is no objection to it. 'The generality of a title is no objection to it so long at it is not made a cover to legislation incongruous in itself, and which by no fair intendment can be considered as having a necessary or proper connection.' If the title covers a general subject it need not go further and mention all matters that are germane to the subject nor mention details. Crabbs v. State, 1923, 193 Ind. 248, 254, 255, 139 N.E. 180. The title to this act is: 'An Act concerning public offenses'--a very general title. The purpose of the title of an act is to give fair notice of its contents so as not to mislead those to be bound by its provisions. 'The criterion is this: If the title fairly gives such notice, so as to reasonably lead to an inquiry into the body of the bill, it is all that is necessary.' State v. Arnold et al., 1894, 140 Ind. 628, 632, 38 N.E. 820, 821. Board Etc. v. Scanlan, 1912, 178 Ind. 142, 145, 146, 147, 98 N.E. 801. Draper v. Zebec, 1941, 219 Ind. 362, 379, 380, 37 N.E.2d 952, 38 N.E.2d 995. State ex rel. Taylor v. Greene Circuit Court, 1945, 223 Ind. 562, 63 N.E.2d 287. The title of this act meets all the tests and is a sufficient title for each of the offenses defined in § 470, ch. 169, p. 693, Acts 1905, § 10-4219, Burns' 1942 Repl. It does not violate § 19, art. 4 of the Indiana Constitution.

1(b). § 23, art. 1 of the Indiana Constitution provides as follows: 'The General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.'

It will be noted that the section of the statute questioned does not directly grant any privilege or immunity to any one. It merely provides that male persons who commit certain acts shall be punished. The corollary naturally follows that in that section of the statute, at least, no punishment is provided for females committing the same offenses. However, § 471 of the same act, § 10-4220 Burns' 1942 Repl. provides as follows: 'Any female who frequents or lives in a house or houses of ill fame, or associates with women of bad character for chastity, either in public or at a house which men of bad character frequent or visit, or who commits adultery or fornication for hire, shall be deemed a prostitute; and, on conviction, shall be fined not less than five dollars [$5.00] nor more than fifty dollars [$50.00], to which may be added imprisonment in the county jail not less than ten [10] days nor more than thirty [30] days.' Thus it appears that the act not only provides punishment for males but also punishes corresponding offenses that females may commit, with possibly one exception--frequenting or visiting a gambling house or houses. Frequenting a house of ill fame is fully defined in each section. What then, is a house of ill fame? 2 Bouv. Law Dict., Rowle's Third Revision, page 1491, Baldwin's Edition 1934, defines 'ill fame' thus: 'A technical expression, which not only means bad character as generally understood, but applies to every person whatever may be his conduct and character in life, who visits bawdy houses, gaming houses and other places which are of ill fame.' Black's Law Dictionary 3d Ed. p. 916, defines 'ill fame' thus: 'Evil repute; notoriously bad character. Houses of prostitution, gaming houses and other such disorderly places are called 'houses of ill fame', and a person who frequents them is a person of ill fame.' Thus by these authorities it is not improper to classify a gambling house as a 'house of ill fame' and this thought might have been in the mind of the legislature, when it enacted the questioned statute in 1889. At any rate the offense charged reasonably comes under the subtitle 'Offenses Against Chastity and Morality,' and the section title 'Houses of Ill Fame--Associating,' whether it was necessary that it do so or not--a matter we are not required to decide.

In the matter of the classification of objects for the purpose of legislation, the rules have been will stated thus: '* * * It is, of course, competent for the legislature to classify objects of legislation. It has a large discretion in this regard, and if the classification is reasonable, not artificial or arbitrary, and rests upon some substantial difference of situation or circumstances indicating the necessity or propriety of legislation restricted to the class created, it will be up- held. It must have regard to the character of the legislation and the distinctions must bear a proper relation to the classification. * * * However, if these fundamental requirements are present, it has been said that classification need not be scientific, consistent, logical or exact. It is not necessary that the reason for the classification should appear on the face of the legislation. In determining the propriety of the classification the court may resort to facts that are within its judicial knowledge, contemporaneous conditions and situations of peoples, existing state policies, and matters of common knowledge.'

59 C.J.--Statutes--§ 319 pages 732, 733.

See also Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, 1927, 199 Ind. 95, 101, 155 N.E. 465, 50 A.L.R. 1518; Sarlls, City Clerk v. State ex rel., 1929, 201 Ind. 88, 104, 166 N.E. 270, 67 A.L.R. 718; Long v. State, 1910, 175 Ind. 17, 92 N.E. 653.

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