State v. Griffin

Decision Date16 May 1978
Citation175 Conn. 155,397 A.2d 89
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. Gary GRIFFIN.

Donald D. Dakers, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).

Ernest J. Diette, Jr., Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the briefs, was Arnold Markle, State's Atty., for appellee (state).

Before COTTER, C. J., and LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI, LONGO and HEALEY, JJ.

ARTHUR H. HEALEY, Associate Justice.

On a trial to the jury, the defendant, Griffin, was found guilty as an accomplice in violation of § 53a-8 1 of the General Statutes to the crime of assault in the second degree. General Statutes § 53a-60(a)(2). 2 He took this appeal from the judgment, claiming error in the court's denial of his motion for a mistrial and in its charge to the jury.

The incident involved arose out of circumstances which took place in East Haven on June 30, 1976, when John Sodins was injured by a shotgun fired by Donald Granger. The injury to Sodins occurred outside of an apartment shared by Granger and Griffin. Sodins had knocked on the apartment door after he had learned that Granger was seeking him. Granger stood inside the apartment with a loaded shotgun aimed at the door. He asked Griffin to open the door to Sodins and to stay out of the way. Griffin did so, remaining between the opened door and the inner wall of the apartment. A conversation took place between Granger and Sodins while Griffin remained behind the door. During this conversation with Sodins, Granger fired the shotgun, injuring Sodins in the chest and shoulder. The shotgun had been purchased by Granger earlier that day with money supplied by Griffin and while accompanied by Griffin. After the purchase of the shotgun both Granger and Griffin went to North Madison where each of them practiced firing the weapon. There was evidence that the shotgun had been purchased by Granger to protect himself from Sodins.

After this incident both Granger and Griffin were arrested and charged in separate informations with the crime of assault in the first degree. Shortly before a joint trial, substituted informations were filed charging Granger with assault in the second degree and charging that Griffin "did intentionally aid Donald Granger to engage in conduct which constitutes an assault in the second degree in that . . . Granger, with intent to cause physical injury to one John Sodins, did cause such injury by means of a deadly weapon, to wit: a shotgun, in violation of Sections 53a-60(a)(2) and 53a-8 of the General Statutes."

At the trial Granger testified in his own behalf, maintaining that, although he did fire the shotgun which injured Sodins, he fired it accidentally due to his fear of Sodins. After he testified, Granger pleaded guilty to the information as charged and he did so outside of the presence of the jury. During the recess, Griffin moved for a mistrial on the grounds that Granger's plea to an information charging his intentional injury of Sodins had not only impeached Granger's testimony, to the detriment of Griffin, but also tendered to establish one of the necessary elements of proof of the crime charged against Griffin. The court denied the motion and instructed the jury that Granger was no longer there and that Granger's plea "is not to be considered as any evidence of Mr. Griffin's guilt and is not to be treated by you as any evidence of Mr. Griffin's guilt, nor are you to draw any inference from it." 3

Griffin does not claim that the trial court's instructions regarding Granger's plea were improper either as to form or timeliness. Griffin does argue that, owing to the particular facts of this case, once the jury were informed of the principal defendant's plea of guilty to the substituted information, no amount of curative instructions could repair the damage done to the defendant. At no time did the court instruct the jury that Granger had pleaded guilty to the substituted information.

Griffin argues that State v. DellaCamera, 166 Conn. 557, 353 A.2d 750, does not control on his claim of error on the denial of his motion for mistrial because this case is distinguishable from DellaCamera. We do not agree. In making this claim he argues that, having been charged as an accomplice under § 53a-8 of the General Statutes, then "(a)s such, the state was required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt that he 'intentionally aided' the principal defendant." It is true that the charge of being an accomplice was not involved in DellaCamera and it is also true that the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Griffin "intentionally aided" Granger but these facts hardly make for any valid distinction of this case from DellaCamera.

The defendant then goes on to argue that "(f)urther, an additional element of proof was that the principal defendant had Intended to cause physical injury to the victim," pointing out that, at the trial, Granger testified that he had fired the shotgun accidentally. By this we assume that Griffin contends that if the jury believed Granger's testimony, then Griffin would have been found not guilty. This claim is interrelated with Griffin's statement that for the court "(t)o subsequently inform the jury that the principal defendant (Granger) had pled guilty to an information charging him with intentional injury to the victim tended to establish, by implication, one of the necessary elements of proof against the defendant." The court did not so inform the jury. In advancing this point in attempting to distinguish DellaCamera on his mistrial claim, Griffin is wide of the mark. In DellaCamera one codefendant pleaded guilty during the trial and one of the charges to which he pleaded guilty was that of conspiracy. In that case the trial court specifically told the jury the crimes to which this codefendant had pleaded, gave cautionary instructions, denied the motion for mistrial, and the trial continued against the remaining codefendants. On his appeal to this court, one of the codefendants who had been found guilty of conspiracy argued that, despite the trial court's cautionary instructions, its announcement to the jury of the guilty plea "irreparably prejudiced" the remaining codefendants because the jury were, in effect, being instructed that the pleading codefendant conspired with the remaining codefendants. State v. DellaCamera, supra, 565, 353 A.2d 750. In that case, we held that "(t)he trial court, with its proper cautionary instructions, did not err in explaining to the jury that the absence of Bruton and his counsel was the result of Bruton's guilty plea . . . and, therefore, properly denied the motion for mistrial." Id., 568, 353 A.2d 756. The jury are presumed to follow the court's directions in the absence of a clear indication to the contrary. State v. DellaCamera, supra, 567, 353 A.2d 750; State v. Smith, 156 Conn. 378, 383, 242 A.2d 763; State v. Hunt, 154 Conn. 517, 523, 227 A.2d 69.

It has been said that "(a)s applied to a criminal trial, denial of due process is the failure to observe that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice. In order to declare a denial of it we (the United States Supreme Court) must find that the absence of that fairness fatally infected the trial; the acts complained of must be of such quality as necessarily prevent(s) a fair trial." Lisenba v. People of State of California, 314 U.S. 219, 236, 62 S.Ct. 280, 290, 86 L.Ed. 166, rehearing denied, 315 U.S. 826, 62 S.Ct. 620, 86 L.Ed. 1222. Although the defendant claims a denial of due process in the trial court's denial of his motion for mistrial, that claim is without merit.

The next issue is framed by Griffin as follows: "Did the Court err when, in the trial of the remaining Defendant charged with assault 2nd Degree, in violation of Sections § 53a-60(a)(2) and 53a-8 of the Connecticut General Statutes, it denied the Defendant's Requests to Charge or failed to charge Sua Sponte that the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt, not only that the remaining Defendant intended to aid in the assault, but that the principal Defendant intended to cause physical injury to the victim." At the outset, we are confronted with a problem which the record, the briefs, the file and arguments before us have not resolved. Griffin's counsel maintained that a request to charge on the elements of the offense 4 was considered and rejected by the court. It does appear that some confusion over this point arose out of a colloquy between the court and defense counsel during the charge. 5 There are two problems in evaluating this claim of error. We cannot find from the record that a request to charge was filed as required by the rules of practice; Practice Book § 251; and it is clear that no exception was taken to the claimed error in the charge as required. Practice Book § 249. We have stressed the importance of adherence to these rules. State v. Gerak, 169 Conn. 309, 316-17, 363 A.2d 114; State v. Malley, 167 Conn. 379, 382-83, 355 A.2d 292; State v. Van Valkenburg, 160 Conn. 171, 174, 276 A.2d 888.

Despite the lack of a properly filed request to charge and the failure to take an exception, Griffin, nevertheless, urges us to consider this claim. He argues that the claim, which basically is that the court failed to charge the jury on an essential element of the crime charged, should be considered, as it advances a fundamental constitutional error. We will consider and decide this claim.

Griffin, by his plea of not guilty, put in issue every essential element of the crime charged. Roe v. United States, 287 F.2d 435 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 824, 82 S.Ct. 43, 7 L.Ed.2d 29; 21 Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 467; 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 454. With that, the burden rested upon the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused, i. e., to prove each material element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508; State...

To continue reading

Request your trial
54 cases
  • State v. Johnson
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 28 d2 Junho d2 1983
    ...every element of the crime charged. The burden was on the state to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Griffin, 175 Conn. 155, 162, 397 A.2d 89 (1978). And, as noted before, the state was entitled to introduce such legally competent evidence. State v. Howard, supra, 187 C......
  • State v. Binet
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 10 d2 Abril d2 1984
    ...219, 236, 62 S.Ct. 280 , 86 L.Ed. 166 [1941], rehearing denied, 315 U.S. 826, 62 S.Ct. 620, 86 L.Ed. 1222 [1942]." State v. Griffin, 175 Conn. 155, 160, 397 A.2d 89 (1978). There is error, the judgment is set aside and a new trial is In this opinion PETERS and GRILLO, JJ., concurred. PARSKE......
  • State v. Fernandez
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 10 d2 Dezembro d2 1985
    ...each essential element of the crime charged. In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); see State v. Griffin, 175 Conn. 155, 162, 397 A.2d 89 (1978). General Statutes §§ 53a-119 and 53a-123 define larceny in the second degree, of which the defendant was convicted, as......
  • State v. Gabriel
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 13 d2 Março d2 1984
    ...421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975); State v. Anonymous, 179 Conn. 516, 519, 427 A.2d 403 (1980); State v. Griffin, 175 Conn. 155, 162, 397 A.2d 89 (1978); 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence (13th Ed.) § 10. It cannot be considered harmless error for a jury "to find an accused guil......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT