State v. Grimshaw

• Decision Date: 17 December 1935
• Docket Number: 1940
• Citation: State v. Grimshaw, 49 Wyo. 192, 53 P.2d 13 (Wyo. 1935)
• Parties: STATE v. GRIMSHAW
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

53 P.2d 13

49 Wyo. 192

STATE v. GRIMSHAW

No. 1940

Supreme Court of Wyoming

December 17, 1935

RESERVED QUESTIONS from the District Court, Sheridan CountyJAMES H. BURGESS, Judge.

W. C Grimshaw was charged by information with violating a Motor Vehicle Act, and the case was certified by the district court on reserved constitutional questions to the Supreme Court.

For the defendant there was a brief and an oral argument by H. Glenn Kinsley, of Sheridan.

Chapter 65 of the Laws of 1935 declares its purpose to be: (1) The promotion of the safety of the highways, and (2) The collection of compensatory fees for use of the highways.The Act also defines a contract motor carrier; it exempts certain carriers and declares all motor carriers in transportation on the highways to affect and be vested with a public interest and delegates to the Public Service Commission power to supervise and regulate all such motor carriers.The defendant is not a common carrier but is a contract carrier.The statute purports to make a distinction between common carriers, contract carriers and private carriers.Other features of the Act will be discussed hereafter.The Act is similar to Chapter 98 of the Laws of 1927, a portion of which was held to be unconstitutional.Weaver v Commission,40 Wyo. 462.A mere declaration by a legislature that a business is affected with a public interest is not conclusive of the question whether its attempted regulation on that ground is justified.Wolff Packing Company v. Court,262 U.S. 522;Tyson & Bro. v. Banton,273 U.S. 418;Michigan Pub. Utilities Comm. v. Duke,266 U.S. 570;Frost v. R. R. Comm.,271 U.S. 583;10 C. J. 37;Purple Truck Company v. Campbell, (Ore.)250 P. 213.The bonding feature is invalid as to contract and private carriers.State v. Smith, (Ariz.)252 P. 1011;Mooney v. Tuckerman, (R. I.)144 A. 891.Such provisions are in violation of Sections 2,6,7and33 of Article I of the Wyoming Constitution, and in violation of the XIV Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.56 A. L. R. 1056;81 A. L. R. 1415;49 A. L. R. 1203;62 A. L. R. 52; 68 A. L. R. 200 and 80 A. L. R. 574.A criminal prosecution cannot be maintained under a statute that fails to describe an offense.State v. Read Company,33 Wyo. 387.A discriminatory statute was held to be void in Smith v. Cahoon,233 U.S. 553.Quaker Company v. Commonwealth,277 U.S. 389.Sections 4,10,40,56,61,63,65and66 of Chapter 65 of the Laws of 1935 contain provisions that are in violation of defendant's constitutional rights.SeeArticle I, Sections 6,7,9and33;Article II, Section 1 and Article III, Section 1 of the Wyoming Constitution.Schechter Corporation v. U.S.55 S.Ct. 837;Panama Refining Company v. Ryan,293 U.S. 388.Said sections violate Article I, Section 5 of the Wyoming Constitution prohibiting imprisonment for debt.Burnam v. Commonwealth, (Ky.)15 S.W.2d 256;Ward v. Commonwealth,15 S.W.2d 276;Frost v. Commission,171 U.S. 583.Defendant's demurrer should be sustained.

For the plaintiff there was a brief by Ray E. Lee, Attorney General; Thomas F. Shea, Deputy Attorney General; William C. Snow, Assistant Attorney General, all of Cheyenne, and W. W. Tipton, Assistant Attorney General of Laramie, and oral argument by Mr. Shea.

It is not the purpose of the Act to regulate the business of the contract carrier, or the use of the highways.Its purpose is to promote the safety of the highways, collect a compensatory fee for the use of the highways, and to provide a sound transportation structure for the people of the state as declared by the legislature.Counsel is not entitled to speculate as to the implied purpose of the Act, in the presence of the express and declared purpose, and in the absence of any foundation composed of facts upon which to place his contention.The intention of the Legislature, as embodied in a statute, is the law, unless in conflict with constitutional provisions.59 C. J. 948, 952;Ex Parte Iratacable, (Nev.)30 P. 284;Barney v. Board, (Mont.)17 P.2d 82.Chapter 98 of the Laws of 1927andWeaver v. Public Service Commission,40 Wyo. 462 have no application here.That Act was held to be constitutional as to common carriers.Salt Creek T. Company v. Commission,37 Wyo. 488.The question in the Weaver case was whether a private carrier could be converted into a common carrier against his will, and that is what the Legislature clearly intended to do in the Act of 1927.The Weaver case and the cases therein cited were decided upon the same statute.It will be noted that the Frost case contains a statement that a private carrier is unconstitutionally deprived of his property without due process of law, by the state requiring him to become a public carrier in order to secure a permit to use the highway for transportation.The Weaver case and the authorities therein cited do not apply to Chapter 65 of the Laws of 1935.Only common motor carriers are required to obtain certificates of public convenience and necessity under the Act of 1935.This is not required of either of the other two classes.The fact that a statute imposes some of the same conditions upon a private contract carrier as are imposed upon common carriers does not render the statute unconstitutional.Riley v. Lawson,143 So. 619.The declared purport of a legislative act must be given consideration.City v. West,164 N.Y. 510;Bushnell v. People, (Colo.)19 P.2d 197;Arnold v. Bond, (Wyo.)34 P.2d 28.The State of Wyoming has constructed at great expense a system of public highways, which are rapidly becoming transportation lines for public carriers and create a volume of traffic greatly endangering human life.Certainly, the State of Wyoming has authority to regulate the use of such highways.A statute requiring carriers to provide public liability and property damage insurance is not void.Continental Banking Company v. Woodring,55 F.2d 347 and cases cited.See alsoSprout v. City of South Bend,153 N.E. 504(Ind.) .The laws require abstract companies, building contractors, collection agencies and many others including real estate brokers to post bonds for the protection of the public.Sections 1-101; 95-201; 24-101 and 97-405, R. S. Nebbia v. People, (N. Y.)291 U.S. 502; 3 A. L. R. 1271;State v. Mohler, (Kans.)158 P. 408;Portland v. Company, (Ore.)146 P. 148;Bowen v. Hannah, (Tenn.)71 S.W.2d 672.The Legislature in making its classification was entitled to consider frequency and character of use, nature of operations and necessity for imposing a tax for the maintenance and reconstruction of highways.Alward v. Johnson,282 U.S. 509;Beckins v. Riley,280 U.S. 80;Conley v. Snook,281 U.S. 66.The similarity between the above cases and our present case is so apparent that further discussion seems unnecessary.An examination of the case of Smith v. Cahoon, cited by defendant, will show its inapplicability to the present case when the terms of our statute are carefully considered, and that is true of the case of Continental Banking Company v. Woodring, supra.Since there is no discrimination in the Wyoming statute, the holding in the case of Smith v. Cahoon is not applicable here.12 C. J. 1152.It is complained that the Act creates a monopoly.The Act merely imposes certain requirements upon those desiring to use the highways of the state.The assertion that the Act appears to be one drawn by or for the benefit of the railroads is equally untenable.No facts are offered to support the contention.The purpose of the Act is declared to be the promotion of the safety of the highways, the collection of a fair compensatory fee for their use and the maintenance of a sound, well-regulated transportation structure for the people of the state.Certainly, its purpose is within the bounds of lawful legislative discretion.Kelley v. Finney,194 N.E. 157;Sproles v. Binford,286 U.S. 374.The prescribed compensatory fees are reasonable.Caccavo v. Kearney,190 N.E. 817.No legislative act should be construed as intended to deny constitutional rights, unless such a conclusion is unavoidable.The public highways belong to the people.Their use for the purpose of gain is special and extraordinary, and may be controlled by proper legislation.The state has not attempted to impose upon private or contract carriers the duties and liabilities of common carriers.The exceptions contained in Section 3 are not such arbitrary exceptions as to render the statute unconstitutional.The Legislature may grant to the Public Service Commission authority to exercise statutory jurisdiction to regulate all motor vehicle carriers for compensation.We believe the foregoing principles are sustained by the authorities cited.

RINER, Justice.KIMBALL, Ch. J., and BLUME, J., concur.

OPINION

RINER, Justice.

This case is a coordinate case with No. 1941, Public Service Commission of Wyoming v. W. C. Grimshaw, this day decided.It involves alleged criminal infractions of the identical legislative Act considered in that case.Certified reserved constitutional questions from the district court of Sheridan County likewise bring the case here to obtain a determination whether certain sections of Chapter 65 of the Session Laws of Wyoming, 1935, transgress specifically enumerated provisions of the Wyoming State Constitution.

The amended information filed in the court aforesaid against the defendant, charges violations of the chapter above mentioned in four counts.In substance these allege The first count--that as a contract carrier, on a designated date, in Sheridan County, the defendant transported goods for another for hire, over the state highways, without obtaining from the Public Service Commission of Wyoming, (hereinafter, for convenience, usually referred to as...