State v. Grindle

• Decision Date: 04 March 2008
• Citation: 2008 ME 38,942 A.2d 673
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. Michael E. GRINDLE.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

942 A.2d 673

2008 ME 38

STATE of Maine v. Michael E. GRINDLE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Submitted On Briefs: January 24, 2008.

Decided: March 4, 2008.

Steven A. Juskewitch, Esq., Ellsworth, ME, for Michael E. Grindle.

Michael E. Povich, Dist. Atty., Carletta M. Bassano, Dep. Dist. Atty., Ellsworth, ME, for State of Maine.

Panel: CLIFFORD, ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, and GORMAN, JJ.

ALEXANDER, J.

[¶ 1] Michael E. Grindle appeals from a judgment of conviction for (1) unlawful possession of heroin (Class C), in violation of 17-A M.R.S. § 1107-A(1)(B)(1) (2007); and (2) unlawful possession of cocaine and/or oxycodone (Class D), in violation of 17-A M.R.S. § 1107-A(1)(C) (2007), entered by the Superior Court (Hancock County, Hjelm, J.) upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of these and two other charges. He argues that (1) the sentencing court's disbelief of his exculpatory testimony and its use of that testimony as an aggravating factor in sentencing violated his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury, Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, and rights under the State's sentencing procedure; and (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the jury verdict of intentional or knowing possession for conviction on the two drug charges.

[¶ 2] Because the evidence in the record, including syringes containing heroin, cocaine, and oxycodone residue seized from Grindle's vehicle, was more than sufficient to support the conviction, see State v. Woo, 2007 ME 151, ¶¶ 5, 20-21, 938 A.2d 13, 14, 17, and the court at sentencing appropriately considered aggravating factors learned at trial, we affirm. We discuss in detail only the sentencing issue.

I. CASE HISTORY

[¶ 3] The record indicates that the following information was before the court at trial and sentencing. On April 25, 2004, at approximately 9:00 A.M., on Surry Road in Ellsworth, Grindle was operating a vehicle without an inspection sticker when he was stopped by an Ellsworth police officer. Grindle did not produce a driver's license and falsely stated that his name was "Michael Brown." The officer performed a Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV) license check on the name "Michael Brown" with the date of birth provided by Grindle and found that Grindle was not who he claimed to be. After further, unproductive discussion with Grindle, the officer called the owner of the vehicle who identified the driver as Michael Grindle. Grindle then admitted his identity.

[¶ 4] The officer checked Grindle's name with the BMV database, learned that his license was revoked, and placed Grindle under arrest. While preparing to inventory the vehicle before it could be towed, the officer asked Grindle if there was anything in the vehicle he should know about that would "cut me or stick me." Grindle indicated that there was nothing in the vehicle that might injure the officer. The officer then began an inventory search on the driver's side of the vehicle. He observed a bulge under the floor mat, lifted the mat, and found a syringe. The syringe needle stuck the officer as he picked it up. Grindle was then transported to the county jail and the vehicle was towed.

[¶ 5] The subsequent search of the vehicle located ten additional syringes at various places in the vehicle, plus associated drug-related items. All the syringes appeared to have been used and to contain residue. The syringes were transported to the Health and Environmental Testing Lab in Augusta. The Lab determined that the syringes contained cocaine, heroin, and oxycodone.

[¶ 6] The Hancock County Grand Jury issued a four-count indictment charging Grindle with unlawful possession of heroin (Class C), unlawful possession of cocaine or oxycodone (Class D), illegal possession of hypodermic apparatuses (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 1111(1) (2007), and operating after habitual offender revocation (Class D), 29-A M.R.S. § 2557(1), (2)(A) (2006).¹ Grindle pleaded not guilty to the charges, and bail was set pending his jury trial.

[¶ 7] While on bail awaiting trial, Grindle was charged with two new offenses, operating after habitual offender revocation (Class C), 29-A M.R.S. § 2557(2)(B) (2006), and violation of condition of release (Class E), 15 M.R.S. § 1092(1)(A) (2007). The new offenses were not tried with the offenses that are the subject of this appeal.

[¶ 8] Grindle testified at his trial. He admitted he was aware that there were syringes in the trunk of his vehicle. He claimed he had taken the syringes from a party where others had been using them and believed that the needles had been "rinsed out" so that there "wasn't enough in it . . . to get a flea high." He said he placed a knapsack with the syringes in his trunk and then forgot about the syringes until he was arrested. He claimed he had no reason to suspect that any drugs remained in the syringes. Grindle's claims, if credited by the jury, might have created a reasonable doubt as to whether Grindle possessed the scheduled drugs intentionally or knowingly, an essential element of each drug offense.

[¶ 9] After the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all four counts, the court continued the case for sentencing at Grindle's request. Approximately two weeks prior to sentencing, Grindle pleaded guilty to the two new charges, which were then considered for sentencing along with the four charges upon which the jury had returned the guilty verdict.

[¶ 10] At sentencing, the court discussed the fact that Grindle lied to the officer about his identity and placed the officer at risk by not telling him about the syringes when he searched the vehicle. As a result, the court set Grindle's base sentence for the Class C heroin possession charge at fifteen months. The sentencing court considered Grindle's "longstanding criminal history" and motor vehicle record as aggravating factors.² The court also indicated that it found the subsequent operating after revocation to be an aggravating factor, because Grindle was on bail and thus violated his bail.³ Additionally, the sentencing court considered Grindle's trial testimony to be an aggravating factor, stating, "Mr. Grindle chose to testify in an exculpatory way. The jury rejected that testimony . . . ." The implication of the court's comment was that the court believed that Grindle testified falsely. The court also indicated that it considered several mitigating factors, including development of a stable lifestyle, steady work, assisting his elderly and sick family members, taking responsibility for other crimes he has committed, and his involvement in a drug rehabilitation program.

[¶ 11] The court found the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors and sentenced Grindle to an underlying sentence of thirty months, with all but fifteen months suspended and two years probation on the heroin possession charge. In determining how much of the sentence to suspend, the court indicated it was taking into account the seriousness of the crime and Grindle's "substantial criminal history."⁴ The court imposed concurrent six-month sentences on the two operating after revocation charges, the cocaine/oxycodone possession charge, and the hypodermic apparatus charge, and a concurrent thirty-day sentence on the violation of condition of release charge. A mandatory $1000 fine was imposed on the Class C operating after revocation charge.

[¶ 12] Grindle filed this timely appeal and, pursuant to M.R.App. P. 20, petitioned for review of his sentence on the heroin possession charge. Although Grindle's petition for review of sentence was denied, he maintains his challenge to his sentence in this direct appeal.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Standing to Appeal Sentence

[¶ 13] Denial of a request to appeal a sentence is "final and subject to no further review." M.R.App. P. 20(f). Defendants are generally not entitled to direct review of a sentence; instead, they must seek review through the sentence review process. State v. Winslow, 2007 ME 124, ¶ 27, 930 A.2d 1080, 1087. A direct appeal is allowed, however, when a defendant asserts that his sentence is illegal and the illegality is apparent on the record. Id.; State v. Briggs, 2003 ME 137, ¶ 4, 837 A.2d 113, 115-16. "On direct appeal, we review only the legality, not the propriety, of a sentence." State v. Hodgkins, 2003 ME 57, ¶ 5 n. 3, 822 A.2d 1187, 1190-91.

[¶ 14] Grindle's appeal is properly before us because he asserts that the court illegally used its belief that he testified falsely as an aggravating factor in setting his sentence, claiming such use violated his constitutional right to testify. On at least three prior occasions, we have considered on direct appeal, as a challenge to the legality of a sentence, a defendant's claim that a sentencing court improperly considered that the defendant testified falsely as an aggravating factor in sentencing. See State v. Duncan, 476 A.2d 191, 191-92 (Me.1984); State v. Hines, 472 A.2d 422, 423 (Me.1984); State v. Plante, 417 A.2d 991, 994-96 (Me.1980); see also State v. Farnham, 479 A.2d 887, 889 (Me.1984) (stating that a defendant's objection to the court's consideration of his exercise of the right to trial as an aggravating factor in sentencing is a challenge to the legality of the sentence that may be heard on direct appeal).

B. Consideration of Trial Events in Sentencing

[¶ 15] Every criminal defendant has a constitutional right to a jury trial, and to testify at that trial, and those rights may be exercised without prejudice to the defendant. We have vacated sentences that we determined were imposed or enhanced as retribution for a defendant exercising his right to trial. In State v. Dansinger, 521 A.2d 685, 690 & n. 7 (Me.1987), we vacated sentences that were imposed after the sentencing court told the defendants that their jury trial had "cost the taxpayers quite a bit of money." In State v. Sutherburg, 402 A.2d 1294, 1296 (Me. 1979), we vacated a sentence because the sentencing court told the defendant that an additional $750 fine...