State v. Groos

• Decision Date: 06 January 1930
• Citation: 148 A. 350,110 Conn. 403
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. GROOS.

148 A. 350

110 Conn. 403

STATE v. GROOS.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

January 6, 1930

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; Alfred C. Baldwin Judge.

John Groos, alias John Grotski, alias Julian Yalkowsky, was convicted of theft, and he appeals. Error, and new trial ordered.

The state offered evidence that on March 20, 1929, the defendant accosted Mrs. Rebecca Spivak on a street in New Haven claiming to be a stranger in the city, and inquired of her where he might find Russian and Polish people. While he was engaged in conversation with her, another man, also a stranger to Mrs. Spivak, approached them and greeted her by name. The two men conversed in her presence, and the accused stated he had no money, offered to sell a Russian gold piece to the other man, and the latter paid him $2 therefor. Then as Mrs. Spivak was about to leave, the defendant produced a box containing nineteen glass imitation stones which he represented to be valuable diamonds, worth $750 each, but stated that he would sell them all for $2,500. The other man appeared anxious to purchase them, and asked Mrs. Spivak to " go into the deal" with him. Upon her declining to do so, he asked her if she had money, and on ascertaining that she had $1,000, asked her to lend him this sum, saying that he had two or three hundred dollars with him, but would have to draw from bank the amount necessary to close the deal, and that he would repay her the same evening and " give her a good present," and in the meantime she could hold the diamonds as security. Mrs. Spivak and the two men then went to a bank where she withdrew $983, handed it to the other man, and received the worthless stones. Neither of the men were thereafter seen by her until, five days later, she twice identified the defendant from a lineup of men at police headquarters.

The accused claimed that he had no part in the transaction, that the identification by Mrs. Spivak was unfair, uncertain, and unreliable, and offered evidence that, at the time of the occurrence and during the entire day, he was in a restaurant to which he had gone in the morning to deliver a suit of clothes which he had cleaned and pressed for the proprietor.

William Gitlitz and Joseph Weiner, both of New Haven, for appellant.

Samuel E. Hoyt, State's Atty., and Abraham S. Ullman, Asst. State's Atty., both of New Haven, for the State.

Argued before WHEELER, C.J., and MALTBIE, HAINES, HINMAN, and BANKS, JJ.

HINMAN, J. (after stating the facts as above).

The defendant appeals from the refusal of the trial court to set aside the verdict. As to this, we cannot find that the verdict is so palpably against the evidence as to warrant us in setting it aside. The question is not whether this court, upon the evidence as it appears in the record, would come to the same conclusion as did the jury, but whether that conclusion is manifestly unreasonable under all the circumstances--one which no jury, acting fairly and reasonably, could reach on the evidence before it. State v. Chin Lung, 106 Conn. 701, 704, 139 A. 91; Brooks' Appeal, 68 Conn. 294, 296, 36 A. 47. It is quite apparent that the weight and effect of the testimony, especially that of Mrs. Spivak upon which the state's case principally depended, and which was given under evident disadvantages and through an interpreter, may not be truly reflected or measured by perusal of the printed record, and without the opportunity of personal observation enjoyed by the jury and by the trial court, whose denial of the motion to set aside the verdict is entitled to corresponding weight; and we cannot hold that the jury were precluded reasonably either from accepting the identification of the defendant by the victim or from disbelieving and rejecting the evidence offered in support of his alibi.

Notwithstanding objection and exception, the state was permitted to introduce as an exhibit (C) a roll made up of a genuine $20 bill and a $1 bill on the outside, and numerous pieces of paper bearing superficial resemblance to paper money, which was found on the person of the accused upon his arrest on March 25th, and this ruling is assigned as error. The purpose of the offer was stated, variously, as constituting part of the plan of the fraudulent transaction, as tending to corroborate the testimony that the defendant engaged in it, as showing his character, to show the business he was engaged in, and to corroborate the testimony of Mrs. Spivak as to conversations with the accused and as to his conduct. The exhibit appears to have been admitted on the ground last mentioned. Our determination as to the correctness of the ruling must be based upon Part III of the finding, which relates thereto; we cannot resort to the printed record of the testimony for this purpose. Rules of this court, § 6, Practice Book 1922, p. 307; Friedler v. Hekeler, 96 Conn. 29, 34, 112 A. 651; Kelly v. Waterbury, 108 Conn. 205, 208, 143 A. 96. It does not appear from this finding that any such roll was displayed by either of the men at any time during the transaction with Mrs. Spivak, or that it was mentioned in any conversation between her and the defendant, nor is there suggested any other basis for regarding its possession by the defendant as relevant to any issue in the case.

Evidence as to articles found in the possession of an accused person subsequent to the time of the commission of a crime for which he is being tried is admissible only if it tends to establish a fact in issue or to corroborate other direct evidence in the case; otherwise the law does not sanction the admission of evidence that the defendant possessed even instruments or articles adapted to the commission of other crimes. State v. Chapman, 103 Conn. 453, 480, 130 A. 899; State v. Ferrone, 97 Conn. 258, 116 A. 336; Commonwealth v. Williams, 56 Mass. (2 Cush.) 582; Commonwealth v. Wilson, 56 Mass. (2 Cush.) 590; Commonwealth v. Choate, 105 Mass. 451; People v. Smilie, 118 A.D. 611, 103 N.Y.S. 348; People v. Geary, 297 Ill. 608, 131 N.E. 97; People v. Martin, 13 Cal.App. 96, 108 P. 1034; People v. Gilman, 43 Cal.App. 451, 185 P. 310; Nichols v. Commonwealth, 91 Va. 741, 21 S.E. 364; Sorenson v. United States (C. C. A.) 168 F. 785, 794; 1 Bishop's Criminal Procedure, § 211; 16 Corpus Juris, p. 546. The reason is analogous to that applicable to evidence of other crimes committed by a defendant but unrelated to the offense under investigation. " They were collateral to the issue to be tried. No notice was given by the indictment of the purpose of the government to introduce proof of them. They afforded no legal presumption or inference as to the particular crime charged. * * * Proof of them only tended to prejudice the defendants with the jurors, to draw their minds away from the real issue." Sorenson v. United States, supra, 168 F. p. 794. See, also, State v. Gilligan, 92 Conn. 526, 530, 103 A. 649. However depraved or vicious a defendant may be, whatever his mental tendency to commit other crimes, or whatever implements adapted thereto he possesses, he is entitled to be tried only for the crime charged against him and upon the issues presented by his plea of not guilty, and only such evidence as is relevant thereto should be admitted. The admissibility of articles found in a defendant's possession depends upon their being connected with, or traced to, the crime charged. Sorenson v. United States, supra; People v. Martin, supra.

The distinction between evidence of this kind which is admissible and that which is not may be illustrated from the cases above cited. In People v. Smilie, a prosecution for grand larceny it was held prejudicial error to admit in evidence rolls of false money found in defendant's trunks some three months after the commission of the crime, on the ground that there was no evidence that these rolls had any connection with the crime charged, although the victim testified that, at the time of the theft, the defendant had a roll, perhaps of money, but gave no description of its contents or appearance. In the Sorenson Case, evidence as to a revolver and other articles found on the defendant upon his arrest, eighteen days after the burglary in question, was held...