State v. Groseclose

• Decision Date: 27 June 1946
• Docket Number: 7278
• Citation: 171 P.2d 863,67 Idaho 71
• Parties: STATE v. GROSECLOSE
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

171 P.2d 863

67 Idaho 71

STATE v. GROSECLOSE

No. 7278

Supreme Court of Idaho

June 27, 1946

Appeal from District Court, Second District, Clearwater County; A L. Morgan, Judge.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part, and remanded.

Frank Langley, Atty. Gen., J. R. Smead, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Frank F. Kimble, Pros. Atty., of Orofino, for appellant.

The cardinal principal of statutory construction is to save and uphold and not to destroy. State v. Enking, 59 Idaho 321, 82 P.2d 649; I.C.A. § 70-102; Idaho Gold Dredging Co. v. Balderston, 58 Idaho 692, 78 P.2d 105; People v. Kennedy, 21 Cal.App.2d 185, 69 P.2d 224; People v. Smith, 36 Cal.App.Supp.2d 748, 92 P.2d 1039.

The controlling factor, when and if a statute requires interpretation, is the legislative intent as expressed in the statute and the purpose of the law. Gallafent v Tucker, 48 Idaho 240, 281 P. 375; Smallwood v Jeter, 42 Idaho 169, 184, 244 P. 149, 153; Lebrecht v. Union Indemnity Co., 53 Idaho 228, 22 P.2d 1066, 89 A.L.R. 640.

The word "proper" and "proper care" do not have technical meaning and to the average man the use of such words has a definite meaning. Black's Law Dict., 3d. Ed., page 1446; New Century Dict. Vol. 2, page 1408; State v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 177 Ind. 553, 96 N.E. 340, Ann.Cas.1914D, 1284; Vol. 34, Words and Phrases, Perm.Ed., page 345 and Pocket Part; Phillips Sheet & Tin Plate Co. v. Amalgamated Assn. Iron & Steel, D.C., Ohio, 208 F. 335, 343; Will v. Southern Pac. Ry., 18 Cal.2d 468, 116 P.2d 44, 48; Baskin v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 4 Cir., 104 F.2d 531, 533; Bechtler v. Bracken, 218 N.C. 515, 11 S.E.2d 721.

Paul W. Hyatt, of Lewiston, for respondent.

The District Court correctly sustained the demurrer to the complaint by reason of the statute on which the same was based being indefinite and uncertain, and therefore void as repugnant to the "due process" clause of the State and Federal Constitutions. State v. Burns, 53 Idaho 418, 23 P.2d 731; United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 41 S.Ct. 298, 65 L.Ed. 516, 14 A.L.R. 1045; Louisville and N. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 99 Ky. 132, 35 S.W. 129, 33 L.R.A. 209, 59 Am.St.Rep. 457; Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322; United States v. Capital Traction Co., 34 App.D.C. 592, 19 Am.Cas. 68; United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 23 L.Ed. 563.

Putting a defendant on trial without giving him in the information a statement of the facts constituting the offense, but letting him know such facts for the first time on trial, is a denial of due process of law. State v. McMahan, 57 Idaho 240, 250, 65 P.2d 156.

Budge, Justice. Givens, Holden, and Miller, JJ., concur. Ailshie, C. J., did not sit with the court at the hearing nor participate in the decision.

OPINION

Budge, Justice.

Respondent was charged in a criminal complaint in the Probate Court of Clearwater County with a misdemeanor, the charging part being as follows:

"* * * who then and there being and between the said 2d day of January or thereabouts and the 30th day of January, 1945 and in the vicinity of Ahsahka, within said county, an unincorporated community and as the owner, driver or possessor of cattle did permit the same to be at large in a lane, street, square or lot in the vicinity of the unincorporated village of Ahsahka without proper care and attention contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute in such case made and provided." (emphasis supplied)

Respondent demurred to the complaint upon the following grounds:

"I. That the facts stated in said complaint do not constitute a public offense. * * *

"III. That if said complaint purports to charge the defendant with an offense under Section 17-4209, I.C.A., that such statute is void for uncertainty * * * and is also unconstitutional and void under the provisions of Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho State Constitution, and Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, * * * and said statute is also void under Article I of Section 1 of the Idaho Constitution, * * *"

The probate court overruled the demurrer, whereupon the cause was tried to the court without a jury, resulting in respondent's conviction. From the judgment entered, respondent appealed to the district court. From the record it appears that the district court sustained the demurrer to the complaint on the 30th day of August, 1945, granting the State ten days to amend the complaint. No amended complaint was filed within the time granted, whereupon the court entered the following order:

"The above entitled matter having been presented to the Court upon the demurrer of the defendant on the grounds of the unconstitutionality and indefiniteness of the statute of Idaho, Sec. 17-4209, I.C.A., under which the action was brought, and no amended complaint having been filed:

"Now therefore it is ordered, adjudged and decreed That the action of the State of Idaho against Marion Groseclose for violation of Sec. 17-4209, I.C.A. be and the same is hereby dismissed on the grounds of indefiniteness of the statute. There is hereby granted to the plaintiff an exception to the said ruling." (Emphasis supplied.)

From which action of the court the State appealed.

Under the assignments of error two questions are raised: (1) Did the court err in sustaining the demurrer to the complaint and dismissing the action? (2) Did the court err in dismissing the action on the ground of indefiniteness of the statute?

We will discuss the assignments in inverse order.

Section 17-4209, I.C.A., was originally sec. 7154, Rev.Codes, and was amended by the legislature in 1909, S.L.1909, p. 175. The intention of the legislature is clearly apparent from an examination of the statutes, supra, having to do with malicious injuries and cruelty to animals.

It is a well known rule of law that all statutes must be liberally construed with a view to accomplishing their aims and purposes and attaining substantial justice. Parsons v. Wrble, 21 Idaho 695, 123 P. 638. In construing legislative acts it is not the business of the court to deal in any subtle refinements, but it is its duty to ascertain, if possible, from a reading of the whole act, and amendments thereto, the purpose and intent of the legislature and give force and effect thereto. Swain v. Fritchman, 21 Idaho 783, 125 P. 319.

The section of the statute, 17-4209, supra, under which this prosecution was had, provides:

"Every owner, driver or possessor of any animal, who shall permit the same to be in any building, inclosure, lane, street, square or lot of any city, county or precinct, without proper care and attention, shall, on conviction, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. * * *"

Just what the words "without proper care and attention" in the statute mean may well cause a difference of opinion, but the mere fact that there may be a difference of opinion as to the meaning of language used in a statute does not render it too vague or uncertain to be enforceable. Idaho Gold Dredging Co. v. Balderston, 58 Idaho 692, 78 P.2d 105. The use by the Legislature of the language "without proper care and attention" negatives "proper care and attention." "'Proper care' being that decree of care which a prudent man would use under like circumstances and charged with a like duty." Bechtler v. Bracken, 218 N.C. 515, 11 S.E.2d 721.

"* * * where the statute either makes an act unlawful or imposes a punishment for its commission, this is sufficient to make the act a crime without any express declaration to that effect." 16 C.J. 68, sec. 29.

Construing the statute in the light of the intention of the legislature, sec. 17-4209, I.C.A., makes it a misdemeanor where any owner, driver or possessor of any animal, who shall permit the same to be in any building, inclosure, lane, street, square, or lot of any city, county or precinct without proper care and attention, and upon conviction deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. The statute make any of the above enumerated unlawful acts a crime, and imposes a punishment.

"'A statute cannot be held void for uncertainty, if any reasonable and practical construction can be given to its language.' * * * 'If the terms of a statute are by fair and reasonable interpretation capable of a meaning consistent with the requirements of the Constitution, the statute will be given that meaning, rather than another in conflict with the Constitution.'" People v. Smith, 36 Cal.App.Supp.2d 748, 92 P.2d 1039, 1041.

"A doubt as to the constitutionality of an act should be resolved in its favor, and to declare it unconstitutional it must clearly appear to be so. (Ingard v. Barker, 27 Idaho 124, 147 P. 293; 25 R.C.L. p. 1000, § 243.) It is the duty of the court to adopt such construction as will sustain the statute, if its language will permit. Where an act is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one of which will uphold its validity, while the other will render it unconstitutional, the former should be adopted." Smallwood v. Jeter, 42 Idaho 169, 182, 244 P. 149, 152.

The statute under consideration was duly enacted to prevent and punish malicious injuries and cruelty to animals, and should not be held so indefinite or uncertain as to render it unconstitutional for the reason that it is susceptible of different constructions, and particularly is this true where, as here, the legislative intent is clearly expressed. As was said in Gallafent v. Tucker, 48 Idaho 240, 244, 281 P. 375, 376, when the intent and purpose of the legislature is determined:

"The rule of interpretation to be followed is that the question is one of legislative intent, 'and the courts will look to the language of the statute, the subject matter of it, the wrong or evil which it seeks to remedy or prevent,...