State v. Grossman

Decision Date13 December 2001
Docket NumberNo. C8-00-459.,C8-00-459.
Citation636 N.W.2d 545
PartiesSTATE of Minnesota, Petitioner, Appellant, v. Jay Joseph GROSSMAN, Respondent.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Mike Hatch, Atty. Gen., St Paul, James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Atty., Kathryn M. Keena, Asst. Dakota County Atty., Hastings, for appellant. Robert D. Sicoli, Sarah M. Aho, Thompson, Sicoli & Aho, Ltd., Minneapolis, for respondent.

Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.

OPINION

LANCASTER, Justice.

This case involves application of the United States Supreme Court's holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), to Minnesota's patterned sex offender sentence enhancement statute, Minn.Stat. § 609.108 (2000).

Jay Grossman was convicted of, inter alia, first-degree criminal sexual conduct (fear of imminent great bodily harm) in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(c) (1998), an offense that carries a maximum sentence of 30 years' imprisonment. Minn.Stat. § 609.342, subd. 2 (1998). The sentencing court enhanced Grossman's sentence pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 609.108, subd. 2 (2000), imposing a 40-year sentence after making a series of findings by a preponderance of the evidence. Grossman appealed his sentence, arguing that Minn. Stat. § 609.108, as applied to him, violates Apprendi. The court of appeals accepted Grossman's argument and remanded for imposition of a 30-year sentence. State v. Grossman, 622 N.W.2d 394, 399 (Minn. App.2001). We affirm.

On November 24, 1998, R.C. met a number of her coworkers for happy hour at Al Baker's, a restaurant and bar in Eagan, Minnesota. At some point during the evening, R.C. and one of her coworkers left Al Baker's and went to Moose Country, a restaurant in Lilydale, Minnesota, to attend a birthday party. R.C., feeling that she was too intoxicated to drive, left her car at Al Baker's and rode to Moose Country with her coworker.

The bouncers at Moose Country eventually asked R.C. to leave because they perceived that she was highly intoxicated. R.C. and her coworker left at that time. R.C. wanted to wait outside because she wished to speak with a man who was still inside. After trying for 30-45 minutes to persuade R.C. to ride home with him, her coworker drove home without her.

Meanwhile, Grossman was at Moose Country for a separate birthday celebration. R.C. did not know Grossman or anyone in his party. When Grossman left Moose Country, he saw one or two of his friends talking with R.C. outside. R.C. told them that she was stranded and in need of a ride home. Grossman agreed to give R.C. and a woman in his party a ride home.

Grossman first dropped the other woman off at her apartment in Saint Paul, Minnesota, and then continued on toward Al Baker's, where R.C. planned to pick up her car. When they got close to Al Baker's, R.C. realized that she was still too intoxicated to drive. She requested that Grossman take her to her friends' townhouse nearby. Grossman drove around the area in search of the townhouse and parked his car when R.C. spotted a friend's parked vehicle.

R.C. testified that the next thing she remembered was opening her eyes to find Grossman on top of her, raping her.1 She was lying on her back in a field, naked from the waist down. R.C. tried to scream, at which point Grossman stopped raping her and put his hands over her mouth. She fought back; biting, punching, kicking, and scratching Grossman. He responded by punching her repeatedly in the face, chest, and stomach. Grossman then placed his hands around R.C.'s neck and began to strangle her. R.C. testified that she could not breathe and that Grossman only stopped choking her when she pretended to be dead. According to R.C., Grossman then raped her again and left her lying in the field.

R.C. remained in this position for 30 minutes, waiting to move until she was sure Grossman was gone. When she felt it was safe, R.C. got up and knocked on the doors of two houses in the area. The residents called 911 and the police arrived on the scene shortly thereafter.

Testimony of medical personnel established the extent of R.C.'s injuries, including multiple abrasions; scratches on her chest, abdomen, legs, and inner thighs; bruising to her face, forehead, ear, eyes, jaw, neck, chest, arms, legs, and inner thighs; a fractured left rib; a torn lingular frenelum (the tissue that attaches the tongue to the bottom of the mouth); bloodshot eyes and hemorrhaging around the eyes; irritation of the iris; and chipped teeth. In addition, there was testimony that red spots called "petechiae" observed on R.C.'s face and neck were consistent with her having been strangled.

In his testimony at trial, Grossman admitted that he severely beat R.C. and caused her injuries. He denied, however, that he raped R.C. and stated that he never intended to kill her.

The jury returned guilty verdicts on six counts: attempted second-degree murder in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2000); first-degree assault (great bodily harm) in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.221, subd. 1 (2000); third-degree assault (substantial bodily harm) in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.223, subd. 1 (2000); first-degree criminal sexual conduct (fear of imminent great bodily harm) in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(c); first-degree criminal sexual conduct (force or coercion) in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(e)(i); and first-degree criminal sexual conduct (mentally impaired, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless) in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(e)(ii).

At the sentencing hearing, the court entered convictions for attempted second-degree murder and first-degree criminal sexual conduct (fear of imminent great bodily harm) and then proceeded to sentence Grossman for first-degree criminal sexual conduct. The court began by noting that "violation of [Minn.Stat. § 609.342] carries with it a penalty of not more than 30 years in prison, a fine of $40,000.00 or both, unless you are determined by this court to be a patterned sex offender [under Minn. Stat. § 609.108], in which case the penalty is not more than 40 years in prison."

The sentencing court, based upon its review of a court-ordered psychological and psychosexual evaluation, found that Grossman qualified as a patterned sex offender. The sentencing court also made the following findings pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609.108: that Grossman's crime was motivated by sexual impulses and was part of a predatory pattern of behavior that had criminal sexual conduct as its goal; that he is a significant danger to the public; that he needs long-term treatment or supervision beyond the presumptive term of imprisonment and supervised release; and that the record was "filled with aggravating circumstances." After making these findings, the court sentenced Grossman to 40 years' imprisonment under Minn.Stat. § 609.108, subd. 2.

Grossman appealed his sentence, claiming that the 40-year prison term violates due process. Grossman, 622 N.W.2d at 395. Specifically, he argued that Minn. Stat. § 609.108, as applied to him, runs afoul of Apprendi, in which the Court held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt," 530 U.S. at 490,120 S.Ct. 2348. Grossman, 622 N.W.2d at 395.

The court of appeals agreed and "remanded [Grossman's sentence] for imposition of the statutory maximum sentence of 30 years under Minn.Stat. § 609.342, subd. 2 (1998)." Grossman, 622 N.W.2d at 399. The court of appeals determined that Minn.Stat. § 609.108, subd. 2, authorized the sentencing court to impose an enhanced sentence based on its findings concerning three factual issues. Grossman, 622 N.W.2d at 398. However, the court of appeals read Apprendi to require that all such findings be made by a jury based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Grossman, 622 N.W.2d at 399. We granted the state's petition for review and now affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

This court reviews the constitutionality of a statute de novo. State v. Wolf, 605 N.W.2d 381, 386 (Minn.2000); State v. Chambers, 589 N.W.2d 466, 479 (Minn.1999). Statutes are presumed constitutional. Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711, 714 (Minn.1999); Chambers, 589 N.W.2d at 479. A party challenging a statute on constitutional grounds must demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the statute violates a provision of the constitution. Wolf, 605 N.W.2d at 386; Boutin, 591 N.W.2d at 714.

Grossman argues that Minn.Stat. § 609.108, as applied to him, violates the rule of due process announced by the Court in Apprendi. In Apprendi, the defendant was charged under New Jersey law with second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose. 530 U.S. at 469, 120 S.Ct. 2348. The charges stemmed from his firing several gunshots into the home of an African-American family that had recently moved into a previously all-white neighborhood. Id. A New Jersey statute set the range of penalties for a second-degree offense at 5 to 10 years. Id. at 470, 120 S.Ct. 2348. A separate hate crime statute established an enhanced sentencing range of 10 to 20 years if the trial court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant's offense was committed with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of, inter alia, race. Id. at 468-69, 120 S.Ct. 2348.

Apprendi pleaded guilty to the second-degree possession charge. Id. at 469, 120 S.Ct. 2348. The sentencing court then held an evidentiary hearing, concluded by a preponderance of the evidence that Apprendi's crime "was motivated by racial bias," and sentenced him under the hate crime statute to an enhanced term of 12 years. Id. at 470-71, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Apprendi appealed, arguing "that the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution requires that the finding of bias upon which his...

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