State v. Grover

• Decision Date: 11 April 1902
• Citation: 52 A. 757,96 Me. 363
• Parties: STATE v. GROVER.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

52 A. 757

96 Me. 363

STATE

v. GROVER.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

April 11, 1902.

(Official.)

Exceptions from supreme judicial court, Cumberland county.

Cleveland Grover was indicted, tried, and found guilty, under Rev. St. Me. c. 119, § 1, for willfully and maliciously setting fire to the dwelling house of another, with intent to burn and burning the same, in the nighttime. The defendant took exceptions to the rulings of the presiding justice in admitting the testimony of two witnesses as to a confession made to them by the respondent, on the ground that the confessions were obtained by inducements or threats, and were therefore not voluntary. Overruled.

Argued before WISWELL, C. J., and EMERY, WHITEHOUSE, STROUT, and PEABODY, JJ.

R. T. Whitehouse, Co. Atty., for the State.

W. H. Gulliver, for defendant.

EMERY, J. The exceptions in this case raise the question of the legal admissibility in evidence of extrajudicial confessions by the respondent in a trial for crime. The decided cases upon this question are so numerous and conflicting that it is useless to attempt their consideration. They vary in different jurisdictions, and also from time to time in the same jurisdiction. Hence we shall content ourselves with the statement of a few principles and with few citations.

Confessions by the respondent that he committed the offense for which he is being tried have prima facie some probative force, and hence, as a general rule, are admissible in evidence against him. The value of such evidence is, of course, wholly for the jury. When, however, the confession was made under such circumstances as show that it was extorted from the respondent by some threat, or drawn from him by some promise, and was made to avoid the evil threatened, or to obtain the good promised, rather than from a desire to relieve his conscience or to state the truth, it is regarded by the law as involuntary, and hence not to be used against him. This rule of exclusion was adopted, not because such a confession has no probative force at all, but rather out of tenderness for the respondent, in view of his unfavorable and even dangerous position. In earlier days, when the respondent could not have counsel, and could not testify in his own behalf, the courts were ordinarily and properly quite strict in keeping from the jury evidence of confessions when there was any reasonable doubt of their being voluntary. Since the respondent is now allowed counsel, and is also allowed to testify in explanation of his acts and statements, there is less reason for such restrictions, and more may be left to the juries to the probative force of such confessions.

In this state, in State v. Grant, 22 Me. 171, this court quoted the old rule of exclusion laid down by Warickshall's Case, 1 Leach, 298, and then said, apparently with approval, "This rule appears to have been limited by subsequent cases, so that there must appear to be some fear of personal injury, or hope of personal benefit of a temporal nature, to exclude the confession." In that case the respondent was told that he had better confess, in order to save his brother from jail, but no assurance was given him that he himself would fare any better by confessing. A confession thus made was held admissible. The statement of the rule above quoted from State v. Grant was approved in Com. v. Morey, 1 Gray, 461. In a later case in Maine (State v. Gilman, 51 Me. 206, 223) this court again said concerning the rule of exclusion of statements made by a respondent: "The true test of admissibility in this class of cases is, was the statement offered in evidence made voluntarily,—without compulsion? If this proposition be answered in the affirmative, then the statement is clearly admissible in principle; but, if not voluntary,—if obtained by any degree of coercion,—then it must be rejected." In 1 Greenl. Ev. 219, it is said: "The material inquiry, therefore, is whether the confession has been obtained by the influence of hope or fear applied by a third person to the prisoner's mind."

To make a confession voluntary in the legal sense, it is not necessary that it should be volunteered, or made without request or interrogatory. It is voluntary, though made in answer to questions or even solicitations, if it be made from the free, unrestrained will of the respondent. Again, the constraint, to make a confession involuntary, must come from without,—be imposed by some other person, apparently vested with power to punish or reward. Hence if without such outside interference the respondent himself reasons that he had better confess, simply in order to avoid some temporal evil impending over him, or to obtain some temporal personal good, his confession is still voluntary; being from his unconstrained will. The foregoing we think is a sufficient exposition of the law of this state applicable to this case.

But the...