State v. Grubb

• Decision Date: 26 September 2019
• Docket Number: No. A-1-CA-35499,A-1-CA-35499
• Parties: STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSEPH A. GRUBB, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSEPH A. GRUBB, Defendant-Appellant.

No. A-1-CA-35499

COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

September 26, 2019

This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished decisions. Electronic decisions may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official version filed by the Court of Appeals.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OTERO COUNTY

James Waylon Counts, District Judge

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General

Eran S. Sharon, Assistant Attorney General

Santa Fe, NM

for Appellee

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender

Aja Oishi, Assistant Appellate Defender

Santa Fe, NM

for Appellant

MEMORANDUM OPINION

M. ZAMORA, Chief Judge.

{1} Defendant, Joseph A. Grubb, appeals his convictions, arguing that his speedy trial right was violated and that the district court improperly denied him presentence confinement credit. Defendant also raises several arguments under State v. Franklin, 1967-NMSC-151, 78 N.M. 127, 428 P.2d 982, and State v. Boyer, 1985-NMCA-029, 103 N.M. 655, 712 P.2d 1. We conclude that Defendant's speedy trial rights were not violated and affirm his conviction. We further conclude that Defendant is entitled to more presentence confinement credit than he received at his sentencing, and that one of his Franklin/Boyer arguments—that there was insufficient evidence to support his enhancement as a habitual offender—is meritorious. We therefore reverse and remand for entry of judgment and sentence consistent with this opinion. Defendant's remaining Franklin/Boyer arguments are without merit.

BACKGROUND

{2} While on probation for a prior 2008 conviction, Defendant was arrested on March 24, 2011, after officers discovered heroin on his person. A grand jury indicted Defendant for trafficking a controlled substance with intent to distribute, tampering with evidence, and resisting, evading, or obstructing an officer. Defendant posted bond on July 8, 2011, and was released. When he failed to appear for trial on February 16, 2012, the district court issued a bench warrant and revoked his bond.

{3} On January 19, 2013, more than a year after Defendant failed to turn himself into the detention center, he was arrested and booked on new charges under his half-brother's name, Deciderio Nieto. On February 7, 2013, the same day that Defendant bonded out on those new charges, he was arrested again. This time, Defendant provided his real name, but the arresting officer did not believe him and again arrested and booked Defendant as Deciderio Nieto. The surety for Defendant's bond in this case filed a motion in district court on March 1, 2013, seeking exoneration of the bond and alerting the district court to Defendant's presence in the Lea County Detention Center under the name Deciderio Nieto. The district court granted that motion on April 5, 2013.

{4} On September 15, 2014, the State sent a request for detainers to the jail where Defendant was incarcerated as Deciderio Nieto. Litigation in this case resumed in earnest on October 16, 2014, and Defendant received a jury trial on August 13, 2015. Defendant was convicted, and the district court sentenced him to one year and six months incarceration each for possession and tampering, with those counts to run consecutively, as well as 364 days of incarceration for resisting, evading, or obstructing an officer, with that count running consecutively to the other two. In addition, the district court enhanced both Defendant's felony convictions by four years based on two prior convictions. In total, the district court sentenced Defendant to eleven years and 364 days incarceration, less 276 days presentence confinement credit, plus one year parole. Defendant appeals.

DISCUSSION

{5} We begin by assessing Defendant's speedy trial claim. We then address Defendant's argument that the district court erroneously denied him presentence confinement credit. Finally, we address Defendant's Franklin/Boyer arguments.

I. Speedy Trial

{6} A criminal defendant has the right to a speedy trial, "guaranteed by both the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 14 of the NewMexico Constitution." State v. Spearman, 2012-NMSC-023, ¶ 16, 283 P.3d 272. Our courts have rejected an inflexible, bright-line approach to analyzing a speedy trial claim in favor of a sometimes "amorphous, slippery, and necessarily relative" approach that considers each factor on a case-by-case basis. State v. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 11-14, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). When considering whether a defendant has been deprived of his right to a speedy trial, we use the four-factor test set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972), which balances "the length of delay, the reason for delay, the defendant's assertion of the right to a speedy trial, and the prejudice to the defendant." State v. Ochoa, 2017-NMSC-031, ¶ 4, 406 P.3d 505. "We defer to the district court's factual findings in considering a speedy trial claim, but weigh each factor de novo." Id.

A. Length of Delay

{7} The length of delay in a speedy trial case is both a threshold question and a factor to be weighed with the other Barker factors. State v. Serros, 2016-NMSC-008, ¶ 22, 366 P.3d 1121. The speedy trial right attaches when the defendant becomes an "accused," meaning either at the time of arrest or upon issuance of a charging document. Salandre v. State, 1991-NMSC-016, ¶ 13, 111 N.M. 422, 806 P.2d 562. The timeframe for bringing a case to trial depends on the complexity of the case: "twelve months for simple cases, fifteen months for intermediate cases, and eighteen months for complex cases." Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 2. These guidelines for bringing a case to trial do not dispose of the claim, but instead prompt further analysis of the remaining factors. Ochoa, 2017-NMSC-031, ¶¶ 13-14. We defer to the district court's finding regarding the complexity of a case where that determination is supported by the number of charges and the nature of the allegations. Id. ¶ 14; State v. Rojo, 1999-NMSC-001, ¶ 52, 126 N.M. 438, 971 P.2d 829 (stating that the district court is in the best position to determine the complexity of a case because of its familiarity with the factual circumstances, contested issues, available evidence, judicial machinery, and "reasonable expectations for the discharge of law enforcement and prosecutorial responsibilities" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

{8} Defendant was arrested in this case on March 24, 2011, and his trial commenced August 13, 2015, resulting in a case pending against Defendant for approximately four years and five months. In the district court, the parties stipulated that this case is a simple one, and they agree on appeal that this Court should give deference to that stipulation. We see no reason to conclude otherwise. As such, the delay in this case far exceeds the presumptively prejudicial period of twelve months, warranting a full Barker analysis. The length of delay prong of the Barker test weighs heavily against the State because it took more than four years for Defendant to receive a trial in his simple case. See Serros, 2016-NMSC-008, ¶ 24 (deeming delay of over fifty one months "extraordinary," and weighing it "heavily in [the d]efendant's favor"); State v. Gallegos, 2016-NMCA-076, ¶ 8, 387 P.3d 296 (weighing delay of two-and-a-half years in simple case heavily against the state).

B. Reason for Delay

{9} When evaluating the reason for delay under the second Barker factor, our courts have recognized four types of delay: deliberate delay, negligent or administrative delay, neutral delay, and defense delay. Serros, 2016-NMSC-008, ¶ 29. A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense is weighted heavily against the government, while negligent or administrative delay weighs less heavily, but still slightly, against the State. See id. ("As the length of delay increases, negligent or administrative delay weighs more heavily against the [s]tate."); Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 25-26, 29 (stating that the extent to which negligent delay is weighed against the state depends on the length of delay, and explaining that the longer the delay, the more heavily it is weighed). "[N]eutral delay, . . . justified by a valid reason, does not weigh against either party[, and] delays initiated by [the] defense [are] generally weigh[ed] against the defendant." Ochoa, 2017-NMSC-031, ¶ 18.

{10} This case was subject to six trial settings over the course of litigation. The time that passed between Defendant's arrest on March 24, 2011, and the first trial setting on August 18, 2011, was the result of the case progressing in a normal fashion. See Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 27 (recognizing that some pretrial delay is inevitable and justifiable). Accordingly, we weigh that time period neutrally. See Gallegos, 2016-NMCA-076, ¶ 11 (weighing neutrally a period of delay where the case was "proceeding more or less normally").

{11} Defendant sought and obtained a continuance of the first trial setting, and shortly thereafter, the district court entered a stipulated order continuing the second trial setting based on the same grounds as Defendant's first continuance. The district court rescheduled trial for February 16, 2012. Defendant failed to appear for the February 16, 2012 trial, and approximately a year later, on February 26, 2013, Defendant was identified as the individual incarcerated as Deciderio Nieto in another case.¹ This approximately eighteen-month delay between the first trial setting and Defendant's reappearance on February 26, 2013, weighs against Defendant. See State v. Estrada, 2016-NMCA-066, ¶ 55, 377 P.3d 476 (acknowledging that confusion over the defendant's location was a cause for delay and affirming the district court's decision attributing...