State v. Guinotte

• Decision Date: 10 February 1914
• Citation: 165 S.W. 718,257 Mo. 1
• Parties: STATE ex rel. PAXTON v. GUINOTTE, Probate Court Judge.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

165 S.W. 718

257 Mo. 1

STATE ex rel. PAXTON v. GUINOTTE, Probate Court Judge.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

February 10, 1914.

Rehearing Denied April 2, 1914.

INSANE PERSONS (§ 19)—INQUISITIONS—DISMISSAL.

A proceeding, under Rev. St. 1909, § 529, in the nature of the writ inquirendo de lunatico cannot be dismissed by the petitioner, except with the consent of the probate court acting in its discretion for the best interests of the public and the person whose sanity is under inquiry.

In Banc. Certiorari by the State of Missouri, on the relation of John G. Paxton, against Jules Edgar Guinotte, Judge of the Probate Court of Jackson County, Mo., to bring up the record to review a lunacy proceeding. Writ quashed.

This is an original proceeding by certiorari to bring up the record of the probate court of Jackson county in the matter of an inquiry formerly pending in that court touching the sanity of one Jane Eliza Plunket.

Jane Eliza Plunket is the wife of Dr. J. D. Plunket, of Nashville, Tenn. She was the sister of Thomas H. Swope, deceased, and by the will of the latter there was bequeathed to her the sum of $10,000, together with a devise of a half interest in a certain building situate on Main street in Kansas City, Mo. Upon an inquest of lunacy had at Nashville she was adjudged to be a person of unsound mind, and a curator of her property appointed for her. This curator, one Robert Vaughan, a resident of Nashville, had joined with Mrs. Plunket's cotenant in the Kansas City property in making a lease thereof for a term of years to Oppenstein Bros. The latter being, as the petitioner in the insanity proceeding averred, apprehensive touching the validity of a lease of Missouri real estate executed by a foreign curator of one who had been adjudicated a person of unsound mind, Vaughan had his attorney, the relator Paxton herein, to institute in the probate court of Jackson county, of which respondent herein is the judge, an inquiry into the sanity of Mrs. Plunket, pursuant to the provisions of section 529, R. S. 1909. Notice of this proceeding was served on Mrs. Plunket in Nashville, Tenn., whereupon, in response thereto, she came to Kansas City and, procuring counsel, arranged to defend against the proceeding to have her adjudged insane. Relator thereupon went into the probate court and asked leave to dismiss the proceeding, averring his willingness to pay all costs of whatever kind accruing upon the inquiry up to the time of his asking leave to dismiss. Mrs. Plunket resisted relator's efforts to dismiss, and to this end filed in the probate court strenuous suggestions in opposition thereto, which suggestions, being duly considered by the court, were sustained for the reasons set out in the finding and order of the court, which finding and order as they may be pertinent, and are cogent, we subjoin:

"Now on this day, this matter coming on to be heard on the original and supplemental application of John G. Paxton for leave to withdraw the information in writing given to the court, and dismiss this proceeding, and the same, together with the answer and cross-petition under oath of Jane Eliza Plunket filed prior to the filing of said original application praying that the proceeding shall not abate, but that it should be tried, and the objections under oath of the said Jane Eliza Plunket to the granting of such leave, and also her objections to granting the leave requested in such supplemental application, each and all having been by the court seen, heard, and fully considered, the court finds:

"That the information in this matter was filed April 11, 1913, and was set for hearing April 28th. Notice of such information and setting requesting her to be present was served on Jane Eliza Plunket on April 14th.

"That, in answer to this notice, she came here from Nashville, Tenn., and appeared in person on the 28th day of April, the day set for impaneling the jury, and she has since remained here for the purpose of attending the inquiry, and has employed counsel, and in her statement says she has obtained expert medical testimony to be used at the trial, and has incurred large expense.

"That the proceeding has regularly been continued from time to time since that date.

"That she filed on May 19th an answer, under oath, to the written information praying that the proceeding should not abate, but that it should be tried.

"That the original application for leave to dismiss was filed May 24th, and she filed in writing, under oath, objections to the dismissal reciting in detail why such dismissal would result in great hardship and irreparable loss and injury to her.

"That it is not disputed that she is the owner of real estate on Main street in Kansas City, Mo., of the value of more than $100,000, and renting for more than $6,000 a year, which is not in the lawful possession of any responsible person, and that all the statements in the information, as well as in the answer and in the written objections, with the exception of the statement that she is of unsound mind and incapable of managing her affairs, are undisputed, and, being made under oath, are in this ruling accepted as true.

"That this is a special statutory proceeding in which the Constitution and statutes vest the jurisdiction in the probate court, and the right to dismiss rests in the discretion of the court, and should not be granted when it would work a hardship or injury to a person of alleged unsound mind, and that person demands a trial.

"That it is not claimed that there has been and there has not been any changes in the facts since the proceeding was begun as to the necessity of a guardian, and, considering the statements under oath contained in the information and in the answer and objections of the said Jane Eliza Plunket, great injustice would be done her by dismissing the proceedings.

"That the supplemental application this day filed to withdraw the information given in writing to the court, and to dismiss the proceeding, is in substance the same as the original application, and the objections of the said Jane Eliza Plunket to the granting of the leave requested in said supplemental application are the same in substance as her objections to granting the leave requested in the original application.

"That the application and supplemental application for leave of court to withdraw the information and dismiss this proceeding are, for the reasons shown in the information, and in the answer and cross-petition to the information, and in the written objections to the granting of such leave, therefore denied.

"The matter of costs is in the discretion of the court, and, if John G. Paxton, the informant objects to further proceedings herein, he should not be taxed with costs of such further proceedings regardless of the final determination of this proceeding. It is further ordered by the court that this case be set for hearing on June 19, 1913, at 10 o'clock a. m."

Thereafter the probate court proceeded with the inquiry before a jury, apparently in the usual way prescribed by statute. This jury, after a hearing, returned its verdict finding Mrs. Plunket to be a person of sound mind, and an order of the probate court was entered accordingly.

This proceeding is brought here to test the legal correctness of this action of the probate court. Upon application made to us by said John G. Paxton, as relator, we issued a preliminary rule to respondent Judge Jules E. Guinotte, judge of the probate court of Jackson county, requiring him to send up to us a full and true transcript of all pleas and proceedings and the record in said inquiry, and to show cause why the judgment of the probate court in the behalf aforesaid should not be quashed and for naught held. Respondent duly made return, denying that his action as judge of the probate court was unlawful, and, complying fully with our further order, sent up to us the transcript of all pleas and proceedings.

In passing it is but fair to say that Mrs. Plunket, upon an inquiry touching her sanity, had at an indefinite date in the year 1911 before the chancery court at Nashville, in Davidson county, Tenn., having jurisdiction in that behalf, was found by a jury to be sane. This finding was set aside by the judge of the court holding the inquest, and a finding by the court entered that she was a person of unsound mind. This latter finding was affirmed upon appeal, and said Robert Vaughan, who was by the probate court of Tennessee appointed curator of her property (she had no guardian of her person), has since been acting in that capacity, and, as we state above, executed the lease of her Missouri property.

In the Tennessee inquiry many witnesses were called, 107, it is said, in all, and some 1,600 pages of testimony were taken. It is only fair, though concededly not pertinent, to say that Mrs. Plunket made profert to relator of the use of this evidence, offering to waive any objections to its competency, and to permit relator, in whose possession, as petitioner in the insanity proceeding, a copy of all this testimony was, to offer the whole of it.

Cowherd, Ingraham, Durham & Morse and Clark & Houts, all of Kansas City, for relator. Rozzelle, Vineyard & Thacher, of Kansas City, for respondent.

FARIS, J. (after stating the facts as above).

It will appear from the statement of facts that there is but one question in this case, which is: May a proceeding under our statute in the nature of the writ inquirendo de lunatico be dismissed at will by him who brings it? Has the petitioner under the statute so far the absolute control of the proceeding as that, regardless of the objections of the person whose sanity is under inquiry, and of the discretion of the probate court, he has the absolute right to dismiss it at any stage of the proceeding upon the payment of the costs accrued? This is the concrete case before us. If such petitioner has the absolute and arbitrary right to quit at will, then the writ herein...