State v. Gulledge, 21641

Citation277 S.C. 368,287 S.E.2d 488
Decision Date16 February 1982
Docket NumberNo. 21641,21641
PartiesThe STATE, Respondent, v. Charles GULLEDGE, Appellant.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of South Carolina

John C. Lindsay, of Lindsay & Lindsay, Bennettsville, and Henry Hammer, of Hammer & Bernstein, Columbia, for appellant.

Atty. Gen., Daniel R. McLeod and Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Brian P. Gibbes, Columbia, and Sol., J. DuPre Miller, Chesterfield, for respondent.

GREGORY, Justice:

Appellant was indicted for assault and battery with intent to kill in the shooting of highway patrolman Frank Murphy when Murphy attempted to arrest him for speeding and driving under the influence. The jury found appellant guilty of assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature and the trial judge imposed a nine year sentence. We reverse and remand for a new trial.

During voir dire, at defense counsel's request, the trial judge asked if any potential jurors were related by blood or marriage to present or former police or law enforcement officers. Defense counsel conceded that relationship alone would not automatically disqualify a juror. Eight potential jurors responded affirmatively. The record does not reveal if any of those jurors were struck by the defense; however, the defense did not exercise all its peremptory strikes.

Near the end of trial, and out of the jury's presence, defense counsel called Chesterfield County Deputy Sheriff James Brock. Brock testified that juror Zudie Walters was married to his wife's half-brother. He further testified that he went to the crime scene, but took no part in the investigation. However, appellant had been placed in Brock's custody, and Brock was in the courtroom throughout the trial. Because juror Zudie Walters had not responded affirmatively on voir dire, defense counsel moved for a mistrial. The court denied the motion. We find that under the facts of this case, the denial constituted reversible error.

It is fundamental that a defendant is entitled to a trial by an impartial jury. South Carolina Constitution, Article 1, Section 14; United States Constitution, Amendment VI. The trial judge has the duty to assure himself that every juror is unbiased, fair and impartial. State v. Britt, 237 S.C. 293, 117 S.E.2d 379 (1960); State v. Holland, 261 S.C. 488, 201 S.E.2d 118 (1973).

Solely because a juror is related by blood or marriage to a police officer or deputy sheriff does not automatically disqualify the juror under Section 14-7-1020 of the 1976 South Carolina Code. State v. Cook, 204 S.C. 295, 28 S.E.2d 842 (1944); State v. Pitts, 256 S.C. 420, 182 S.E.2d 738 (1971). However, the juror may be prejudiced biased, or interested in the action for some other reason, such as a relationship with counsel, Crosby v. Southeast Zayre, Inc., 274 S.C. 519, 265 S.E.2d 517 (1980) and, depending upon the facts and circumstances, subject to challenge for cause or the exercise of a peremptory challenge.

Through the judge, parties "have a right to question jurors on their voir dire examination not only for the purpose of showing grounds for a challenge for cause, but also, within reasonable limits, to elicit such facts as will enable them intelligently to exercise their right of peremptory challenge...." 50 C.J.S. Juries, § 279, Peremptory Challenge, p. 1066.

Where the trial judge grants counsel's request that the judge ask a particular question on voir dire, counsel is entitled to a truthful answer to the question.

In the case of Photostat Corporation v. Ball, 338 F.2d 783 (CA 10 1964) it was held reversible error to fail to grant a new trial where jurors did not respond to voir dire questions:

Necessarily, it is expected and required that jurors in their answers shall be completely truthful and that they shall disclose, upon a general question, any matters which might tend to...

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24 cases
  • State v. Kelly
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • June 29, 1998
    ...by the Court, challenged for cause by counsel or stricken through the exercise of peremptory challenge. State v. Gulledge, 277 S.C. 368, 371, 287 S.E.2d 488, 490 (1982) (quoting Photostat Corp. v. Ball, 338 F.2d 783 (10th Cir.1964)); see also 47 Am.Jur.2d Jury §§ 195, 208-09 (1995). "[A new......
  • State v. Jones
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • April 4, 1988
    ...his fundamental right to a fair and impartial jury. Cf. State v. Hardee, 279 S.C. 409, 308 S.E.2d 521 (1983); State v. Gulledge, 277 S.C. 368, 287 S.E.2d 488 (1982). See also Haley v. Blue Ridge Transfer Co., Inc., 802 F.2d 1532 (4th II. SOLICITOR'S ARGUMENT Second, I hold the view that it ......
  • The State v. Burgess
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • January 28, 2011
    ...supreme court stated: “The trial judge has the duty to assure himself that every juror is unbiased, fair and impartial.” 277 S.C. 368, 370, 287 S.E.2d 488, 489 (1982) (emphasis added). Moreover, after the juror in the case before us initially testified he could be fair and impartial, the ju......
  • Long v. NORRIS & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • September 25, 2000
    ...Counsel's Right to Truthful Answers From Jurors During Voir Dire The leading case in South Carolina on this issue is State v. Gulledge, 277 S.C. 368, 287 S.E.2d 488 (1982). Gulledge Necessarily, it is expected and required that jurors in their answers shall be completely truthful and that t......
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