State v. Gullette
Decision Date | 22 December 1964 |
Docket Number | No. CR,CR |
Citation | 209 A.2d 529,3 Conn.Cir.Ct. 153 |
Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. George E. GULLETTE. 2-14185. |
Court | Circuit Court of Connecticut. Connecticut Circuit Court, Appellate Division |
Louis I. Gladstone, Bridgeport, for appellant (defendant).
John D. Ward, Asst. Prosecuting Atty., for appellee (state).
The defendant was found guilty, after a trial before a jury, of an attempt to break and enter with criminal intent, in violation of § 53-77 of the General Statutes. In his appeal, the defendant has assigned nine errors which we shall examine in detail, after first considering what appears to be the principal issue, that is, whether the court should have declared a mistrial when, upon a poll of the jury, one juror signified her verdict as being 'Not Guilty.' The factual situation pertaining to that issue is not in dispute.
The case was tried before a jury of eleven, which procedure, we assume, was by stipulation. After one hour of deliberation, following the court's charge, the jury returned and announced that they were unable to reach a unanimous verdict. The court then instructed the jury in accordance with the approved language in the court's instructions pertaining to a juror's deliberative duties in State v. Smith, 49 Conn. 376, 386, and returned the jury for further consideration. One and one-half hours later, the jury made known, through their foreman, that they had arrived at a verdict, and thereupon they reconvened in open court. The following then took place:
The first nine jurors announced their verdict as 'Guilty.' When the tenth juror was asked the question whether she found the defendant guilty or not guilty, the following took place:
After this instruction to the jury, considerable colloquy ensued between the court and defense counsel, in which objection was made against further consideration of the case by the jury. This discussion took place before the jury. The foreman of the jury then interrupted, stating that when the jury left the deliberating room the verdict was unanimous, and the following took place: The defendant again objected to the procedure and took an exception to the court's adverse ruling. He then moved for a mistrial, and the motion was denied. Four minutes after the jury retired they returned to the courtroom to announce their verdict, which was 'Guilty.' The jury was again polled and each juror announced his verdict to be 'Guilty.' The court then inquired of the jurors: 'Is this your verdict of guilty and so say you all?' The response does not appear, but evidently there was no dissenting voice, otherwise the transcript should disclose it or defense counsel would have objected. The verdict was then ordered accepted and recorded.
The question before us is apparently one of first impression in Connecticut. The decisions we have examined all present a situation where the request to poll the jury had been denied. There is no disagreement as to the rule which prevails in our state, that a defendant in a criminal case is not entitled to an individual poll of the jury as a matter of right. State v. Tucker, 146 Conn. 410, 415, 151 A.2d 876; State v. DiPietro, 120 Conn. 537, 540, 181 A. 716; State v. Hoyt, 47 Conn. 518, 533. Under our practice, the presiding judge has absolute discretionary power to grant or deny a motion for a poll of the individual jurors. State v. Hoyt, supra; note, 49 A.L.R.2d 619, 627. Where the motion is granted, as in this case, the precise question arises as to what action the court is empowered or obliged to take when, after there was an announcement of a unanimous verdict by the foreman, and after the verdict had been accepted and ordered recorded by the presiding judge, an individual juror, on being polled, announced a contrary verdict. Or, to state the question more exactly: Where such an individual announcement is made which is inconsistent with the verdict first stated, is it mandatory on the court to declare a mistrial, or is it within the discretion of the court to have the jury retire for further consideration and for a new announcement of their verdict?
On the question before us there appears to be considerable conflict of authority. In Bruce v. Chestnut Farms-Chevy Chase Dairy, 75 U.S.App.D.C. 192, 126 F.2d 224, 225, the rule is stated as follows: 'There can be no question of the right of a juror, when polled, to dissent from a verdict to which he has agreed in the jury room, and when this happens, the jury should either be discharged or returned to their room for further deliberation.' To the same effect is Solar v. United States, 86 A.2d 538, 541 (D.C.Mun.App.), and Emmert v. State, 127 Ohio St. 235, 237, 187 N.E. 862, 90 A.L.R. 242. In case of such dissent, 'it is generally held that the jury should be sent out to deliberate further although there is also authority to the effect that under such circumstances the court must declare a mistrial.' 50 Am.Jur. 705, Trial § 1019, and cases cited.
In certain other jurisdictions the strict common-law rule appears to be followed and no reconsideration is permitted after the verdict was announced in court and a dissent expressed by one or more jurors after an individual poll. See such cases as Kramer v. Kister, 187 Pa. 227, 40 A. 1008, 44 L.R.A. 432; Commonwealth v. Zierenberg, 133 Pa.Super. 112, 1 A.2d 918; Mattice v. Maryland Casualty Co., D.C. Wash., 5 F.2d 233; Commonwealth v. Lemley, 158 Pa.Super. 125, 44 A.2d 317. In each of these cases, it was declared generally, as a guiding principle, that a verdict obtained upon a reconsideration, after lack of unanimity appeared when the verdict was first announced, would be likely to subject such verdict to suspicion of coercion or improper influences, and that the integrity of the verdict as well as the preservation of secrecy in jury deliberations required that a mistrial be directed and a new trial ordered.
Although our Supreme Court of Errors has not decided the particular question before us, it may be said fairly that the import of our state decisions dealing with irregularities affecting verdicts and jury deliberations would seem to indicate that in such situations the common law is not strictly followed. That would certainly be the case where no prejudice is shown to the losing party and no advantage indicated in favor of the...
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