State v. Gutierrez-Perez
| Decision Date | 29 April 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 20120455.,20120455. |
| Citation | 2014 UT 11,337 P.3d 205 |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Utah, Appellee, v. Gabriel GUTIERREZ–PEREZ, Appellant. |
Sean D. Reyes, Att'y Gen., Jeffrey S. Gray, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for appellee.
David L. Crowley, Joseph Jardine, Farmington, for appellant.
INTRODUCTION
¶ 1 Gabriel Gutierrez–Perez (Defendant) pled guilty to criminally negligent automobile homicide and driving under the influence of alcohol. Before making this plea, he reserved his right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained through a blood draw. Defendant contends that the affidavit submitted by law enforcement in order to obtain the warrant to draw his blood was not supported by an oath or affirmation, as required by both the United States and Utah constitutions. Accordingly, he argues in this appeal that the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress because the warrant was unconstitutional.
¶ 2 We disagree. The district court was correct when it concluded that the warrant application was supported by an affirmation, thereby satisfying the “Oath or affirmation” requirements of both the United States and Utah constitutions. We therefore affirm the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress.
¶ 3 On May 22, 2011, Defendant was involved in a multi-vehicle automobile accident after he failed to stop at a red light. Several people were injured and one person died as a result of the accident. Following the accident, Defendant fled the scene but was soon captured by the police. He admitted to the police officers on the scene that he had been drinking alcohol, and again, while he was being transported to the hospital, admitted to the officers that he had been drinking throughout the night prior to the accident.
¶ 4 The investigating officer remotely applied for and obtained a warrant to draw Defendant's blood by logging onto the Utah Criminal Justice Information System and applying for an eWarrant. The eWarrant application included a screen labeled “Affidavit Submission for eWarrant” and included the statement: “By submitting this affidavit, I declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing is true and correct.” The officer applying for the warrant electronically submitted the eWarrant application, and the on-call judge found probable cause to believe that Defendant's blood contained evidence that he had been driving while under the influence of alcohol and issued the eWarrant.
¶ 5 After obtaining the eWarrant, the police executed it and drew Defendant's blood two separate times, the second being about one hour after the first. Three days later, using the same eWarrant system, the police obtained another warrant to obtain blood samples that were drawn at the hospital on the day of the accident. The results from a test of Defendant's blood indicated that his blood alcohol level at the time of the blood draw was 0.11.
¶ 6 Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained by these warrants on the ground that they were unconstitutional since they were not supported by an oath or affirmation, as required by both the Utah and United States constitutions. The district court denied the motion. Defendant eventually pled guilty to criminally negligent automobile homicide and driving under the influence of alcohol, but reserved his right to challenge the district court's decision to deny his motion to suppress on appeal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to section 78A–3–102(3)(b) of the Utah Code.
¶ 7 The issue in this case is whether the district court properly concluded that Utah's eWarrant application satisfies the constitutional “Oath or affirmation” requirement. “The district court's ruling on a motion to suppress is reviewed for correctness, including its application of the law to the facts.”1
¶ 8 This case involves a single issue: whether the procedure used to obtain the warrants to draw Defendant's blood—Utah's eWarrant system—meets the constitutional requirement that a warrant issue only upon probable cause supported by an “Oath or affirmation.”2 The State concedes that the eWarrant application does not include an oath, but argues that it is nevertheless constitutionally sufficient because it is supported by an affirmation. Defendant, on the other hand, argues that the eWarrant application is unconstitutional because it incorporates neither an oath nor an affirmation. Defendant advances a number of arguments in support of this conclusion. First, he argues that we have already set forth the requirements for a valid oath or affirmation in Mickelsen v. Craigco, Inc.3 and that the affirmation at issue in this case clearly does not comply with those requirements. Second, he argues that because the eWarrant application incorporates language from the Utah statute governing “unsworn declarations,” we must therefore construe it as an unsworn declaration instead of an oath or affirmation. Third and finally, he argues that the eWarrant application does not qualify as an affirmation because it does not explicitly state that the affiant may be subject to prosecution for perjury if he makes a false statement.
¶ 9 We are not persuaded by any of these arguments. Instead, we conclude that, given the original understanding of what constitutes an “affirmation” at common law and at the time of our nation's founding, the language used in the eWarrant application is sufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirement that the warrant be issued upon Oath or affirmation. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress.
Throughout his opening brief, Defendant repeatedly contends that the eWarrant application fails to meet this standard. Specifically, he argues that because (1) the affidavit was not signed in the presence of a notary or another person who was authorized to take oaths; and (2) because there was no jurat affixed to the officer's affidavit, it is therefore not a proper written oath or affirmation. Defendant also contends that the eWarrant application was improper because the officer applying for the warrant never spoke with the magistrate and was not verbally administered an oath for either warrant application that he submitted.6
¶ 11 We do not agree with this reading of Mickelsen and instead conclude that the requirements set forth in Mickelsen are inapplicable to this case. Contrary to Defendant's argument, the three requirements set forth in Mickelsen do not establish a standard for valid “oaths or affirmations.” On the contrary, those requirements were clearly set forth in order to establish a rule for a valid verification.7 Indeed, the first requirement set forth is that “there must be a correct written oath or affirmation.”8 But if this really is the first requirement for a valid oath or affirmation, as Defendant contends, then Defendant's proposed standard is circular, since in order to have a valid oath or affirmation you would first have to obtain a valid oath or affirmation. Accordingly, we reject Defendant's reading of Mickelsen and conclude that it is inapplicable here.
¶ 12 Defendant next points out that the language used in the eWarrant application is taken directly from section 78B–5–705 of the Utah Code, which is entitled “Unsworn declaration in lieu of affidavit.” That section states as follows:
Defendant then argues that because the language of the eWarrant application appears to be taken directly from section 78B–5–705 and because that section is entitled “Unsworn declaration in lieu of affidavit,” the statement that the officer submitted to the magistrate must be interpreted as an unsworn declaration and not as an oath or affirmation.
¶ 13 We reject this argument because it assumes that the eWarrant application must be interpreted as an “unsworn declaration” simply because its language is the same or similar to the language identified in a statute entitled “Unsworn declaration in lieu of affidavit.” Such a conclusion would be too hasty, however, because neither the United States nor the Utah constitution explicitly address the question of what constitutes a valid oath or affirmation,...
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