State v. Guynn

Citation459 P.3d 900,302 Or.App. 78
Decision Date29 January 2020
Docket NumberA165616
Parties STATE of Oregon, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Ellen M. GUYNN, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon

Jason E. Thompson, Salem, argued the cause for appellant. Also on the brief was Ferder Casebeer French & Thompson LLP.

Adam Holbrook, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.

Before Lagesen, Presiding Judge, and DeVore, Judge, and James, Judge.

LAGESEN, P. J.

While driving along a three-mile stretch of Highway 18, defendant repeatedly followed the car in front of her at a distance of only six feet. For that conduct, she was found guilty of "following too closely" in violation of ORS 811.485 (1)(a). On appeal, defendant contends that, when that statute is properly construed, the evidence is not sufficient to show that her conduct violated it. We disagree and, therefore, affirm.

In a traffic violation case, we review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence by examining the evidence "in the light most favorable to the state to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the violation had been proved by a preponderance of the evidence." State v. Bainbridge , 230 Or. App. 500, 502, 216 P.3d 338 (2009) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). To the extent that the issue of evidentiary sufficiency turns on a question of statutory interpretation, that is a question of law that we review for legal error. State v. Ritter , 280 Or. App. 281, 285-86, 380 P.3d 1160 (2016).

ORS 811.485(1)(a) states that "[a] person commits the offense of following too closely" if the person "[d]rives a motor vehicle so as to follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of the vehicles and the traffic upon, and condition of, the highway." The provision has been a part of the Oregon law, with minor variations, since 1931, when Oregon adopted it from the Uniform Vehicle Code. See Or. Laws 1931, ch. 360, § 31.1 In the nearly 90 years since its enactment, the Oregon Supreme Court has had occasion to apply the statute frequently, interpreting it in the process. As the court has explained, the statute means that a driver has the duty to not follow the preceding car so closely so as to create an "unreasonable risk" to others under the driving conditions present. Garland v. Wilcox , 220 Or. 325, 336, 348 P.2d 1091 (1960). The duty extends "not only to those in the car which is being followed too closely, but to others as well, including the occupants of oncoming cars." Id . ; see also Rough v. Lamb , 240 Or. 240, 245, 401 P.2d 10 (1965) ("We think the driver of the lead vehicle owes a duty to following vehicles not to follow a vehicle ahead of him so closely that if he has to stop suddenly he cannot give the vehicles behind a proper signal.").2

It is true that, in interpreting the statute over the years, the court has employed a much more cursory analysis than that which we have become used to as a result of PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries , 317 Or. 606, 859 P.2d 1143 (1993). That, however, does not mean that those prior interpretations are not authoritative. See Mastriano v. Board of Parole , 342 Or. 684, 691-92, 159 P.3d 1151 (2007) (explaining that "a decision of [the Supreme Court] interpreting a statute can be neither discounted nor disregarded merely because it predates PGE "). More to the point, those prior interpretations remain binding on this court and the trial courts.

Applying that standard here, when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the state, it is sufficient to permit a finding that defendant followed the car in front of her "more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of the vehicles and the traffic upon, and condition of, the highway," in violation of ORS 811.485(1)(a). That is, it allows for the finding that defendant was driving in such proximity to the car in front of her so as to give rise to an unreasonable risk of collision under the driving conditions confronted. Defendant drove within half a car-length of the car in front of her while traveling at 55-to-60-miles-per-hour speeds. Defendant would stay half a car-length from the other vehicle for roughly five seconds at a time, then back off to within two car-lengths. Defendant drove in that manner for roughly three miles before the deputy, who followed her for that distance, pulled...

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2 cases
  • State ex rel. Maney v. Hsu
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Oregon
    • 27 Enero 2021
    ...its interpretation of ORS 163.105 (1977) should be overruled. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law. State v. Guynn , 302 Or. App. 78, 79, 459 P.3d 900 (2020). But regarding the meaning of a statute that has already been interpreted by this court, a party arguing that the cou......
  • Harsch Inv. Props. Mgmt., LLC v. Schnitzer (In re Schnitzer)
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Oregon
    • 29 Enero 2020
    ...to a single prevailing party, and would not, as permitted by ORS 20.077, be awarded on a claim-by-claim 302 Or.App. 7 basis.4 In other 459 P.3d 900 words, even if more than one party prevailed on issues, only the predominately prevailing party would be entitled to fees.The question then bec......

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