State v. Guziak
| Decision Date | 15 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | #29423 |
| Citation | 968 N.W.2d 196 |
| Parties | STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Laura GUZIAK, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
JASON R. RAVNSBORG, Attorney General, NOLAN WELKER, Assistant Attorney General, Pierre, South Dakota, Attorneys for plaintiff and appellee.
MANUEL J. DE CASTRO, JR., Sioux Falls, South Dakota, Attorney for defendant and appellant.
[¶1.] Laura Guziak entered into a plea agreement with the State after she was charged with multiple felony counts related to injuries her infant son sustained while he was in her care. She was also charged for possession of methamphetamine. The plea agreement provided that Guziak would plead guilty to two felonies and the State would recommend a suspended execution of sentence and cap its request for incarceration at 180 days in county jail. At sentencing, the circuit court imposed a penitentiary sentence. Guziak appeals, arguing that the State's comments at sentencing breached its implied obligation of good faith under the terms of the plea agreement. We affirm.
[¶2.] On October 31, 2018, Guziak was arrested for possession of a controlled substance. After Guziak's arrest, her son, J.J., was taken to the Department of Social Services (DSS), where it was discovered that he was malnourished and had multiple injuries including bruises on his body, bone fractures, and a torn tongue. Guziak was initially charged with alternative counts of abuse or cruelty to a minor and alternative counts of aggravated assault. The State also filed a habitual offender information, alleging Guziak had been convicted of two prior felonies.
[¶3.] Guziak and the State entered into a plea agreement in which Guziak would plead guilty to one count of abuse or cruelty to a minor in exchange for the State's recommendation for a suspended execution of sentence. The State agreed it would cap its sentencing recommendation on the child abuse conviction to 180 days in jail. Additionally, the parties agreed that Guziak would plead guilty to one count of possession of a controlled substance in exchange for the State's recommendation of a fully suspended sentence.
[¶4.] At the plea hearing, the circuit court advised Guziak that the plea agreement was an agreement between her and the State, but it explained, "[I]f I deem it appropriate to do something other than the plea agreement, I would give you additional time to talk with [defense counsel] and withdraw your plea."1 Guziak pleaded guilty to both counts, and the parties presented a factual basis to support the plea. The circuit court accepted Guziak's guilty pleas and ordered a presentencing investigation report (PSI).
[¶5.] Prior to the start of the sentencing hearing, the circuit court informed the parties that, after reviewing the presentence report, it would not "accept the plea agreement." The circuit court advised, "I do want the opportunity to either suspend or impose prison time based upon a number of factors that I reviewed and saw while going through the reports in preparation for sentencing." The court further informed Guziak, "Since I am rejecting the plea agreement in this case, Ms. Guziak does have an opportunity to withdraw her guilty plea and move forward with trial." The circuit court continued the sentencing hearing after Guziak requested a delay of sentencing to discuss her guilty pleas with counsel. Guziak appeared for sentencing one week later, affirmatively maintained her guilty pleas, and asked to proceed with sentencing.
[¶6.] At Guziak's sentencing hearing, defense counsel argued for a suspended sentence with no jail time. Defense counsel stated that Guziak had made positive improvements in her life, obtained employment, maintained sobriety for one year and eight months, and did not violate any of her bond conditions. Counsel also asserted that incarceration would negatively impact the progress that Guziak had made toward rebuilding her life.
[¶7.] The State began its sentencing argument by stating that The State mentioned the plea agreement three other times throughout its argument. For example, the State told the court, Then the State observed that "[c]ertainly she has a history that is egregious and warranting a hefty sentence." The State continued to argue that "the facts are also egregious, and I think there's a punishment component that should also be handed down." The State further reiterated that it had "a very different impression of the things [Guziak's] done up until this point" and that it failed to see the steps backward that Guziak would take if she was incarcerated.
[¶8.] During its argument, the State also highlighted aggravating circumstances, such as Guziak's decade-long struggle with drug use and her "long, long, long criminal history" that created a number of victims. The State argued that Guziak grossly minimized her responsibility for J.J.'s condition and the suffering she caused her infant child. The State noted J.J.'s injuries and the abuse that he suffered as a result of Guziak's conduct. The State asked the circuit court to consider that once J.J. was out of Guziak's custody, he became a "happy, excited little boy" and "did outstandingly well." Guziak did not object to the State's argument.
[¶9.] The circuit court sentenced Guziak to twelve years in the state penitentiary with eight years suspended on the child abuse conviction; and imposed a concurrent five-year sentence on the possession of a controlled substance conviction with the sentence fully suspended. Guziak appeals, raising one issue: whether the State's sentencing argument violated the plea agreement.2
I. Whether, under plain error review, the State breached the plea agreement resulting in prejudice to Guziak's substantial rights.
[¶10.] To preserve a claim for appeal that the prosecution breached the terms of a plea agreement, a defendant must make a timely objection at sentencing. State v. Jones , 2012 S.D. 7, ¶ 7, 810 N.W.2d 202, 205 (citing Puckett v. United States , 556 U.S. 129, 142–43, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1433, 173 L. Ed. 2d 266 (2009) ). Here, Guziak did not raise any issue to the circuit court concerning the State's sentencing argument. This Court reviews unpreserved issues for plain error. Jones , 2012 S.D. 7, ¶ 8, 810 N.W.2d at 205 (citation omitted). See also State v. Olvera , 2012 S.D. 84, ¶ 7, 824 N.W.2d 112, 114. "To demonstrate plain error, [the appellant] must establish that there was: ‘(1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) affecting substantial rights; and only then may we exercise our discretion to notice the error if (4) it seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.’ " Jones , 2012 S.D. 7, ¶ 14, 810 N.W.2d at 206 (quoting State v. Beck , 2010 S.D. 52, ¶ 11, 785 N.W.2d 288, 293 ). "We invoke our discretion under the plain error rule cautiously and only in ‘exceptional circumstances.’ " Id. (quoting State v. Bowker , 2008 S.D. 61, ¶ 46, 754 N.W.2d 56, 70 ).
[¶11.] Guziak argues that the State breached its implied obligation of good faith under the plea agreement by arguing for a harsher sentence than the cap set forth in the agreement. Guziak argues that the State's sentencing argument, taken as a whole, encouraged the circuit court to disregard the State's recommendation of a suspended execution of sentence and impose a prison sentence. The State responds that it did not breach the plea agreement because its sentencing argument was brief, it asked for a suspended execution of sentence at least three times, and it did not ask the court to impose a period of incarceration beyond that provided for in the plea agreement.
[¶12.] We apply ordinary principles of contract law to determine whether the State breached a plea agreement. State v. Slotsky , 2016 S.D. 54, ¶ 5, 883 N.W.2d 738, 740. "We use a ‘straight-forward interpretation’ of the State's promise when examining whether a breach occurred." Baldridge v. Weber , 2008 S.D. 14, ¶ 30, 746 N.W.2d 12, 19 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Bracht , 1997 S.D. 136, ¶ 9, 573 N.W.2d 176, 179 ). Further, "[l]ike all contracts, plea agreements include an implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing." Slotsky , 2016 S.D. 54, ¶ 5, 883 N.W.2d at 740 (quoting State v. Morrison , 2008 S.D. 116, ¶ 5, 759 N.W.2d 118, 120 ).
[¶13.] Guziak does not claim that the State breached the express terms of the plea agreement. However, she contends that the State's sentencing argument constitutes a breach of the implied obligation of good faith under the plea agreement because "[t]he State's ‘rhetoric was not rhetorical,’ and instead [amounted] to a ‘transparent effort to influence the severity of the defendant's sentence,’ without fulfilling its end of the bargain." Morrison , 2008 S.D. 116, ¶ 11, 759 N.W.2d at 122 (quoting Vanden Hoek v. Weber , 2006 S.D. 102, ¶ 23, 724 N.W.2d 858, 864 ). "[O]nce an accused agrees to plead guilty in reliance upon a prosecutor's promise to perform a future act, the accused's due process rights demand fulfillment of the bargain." State v. Waldner , 2005 S.D. 11, ¶ 13, 692 N.W.2d 187, 191 (quoting Wisconsin v. Williams , 249 Wis.2d 492, 637 N.W.2d 733, 744 (2002) ). The State must fulfill its obligations under the express terms of the plea agreement and its implied obligation of good faith. See Morrison , 2008 S.D. 116, ¶ 11, 759 N.W.2d at 121–22.
[¶14.] For example, in Morrison , we determined that the State had failed to meet its implied obligation of good faith during sentencing when it voiced its discomfort and remorse with a suspended...
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