State v. Guzman
| Decision Date | 13 January 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 14450,14450 |
| Citation | 1984 NMSC 16,676 P.2d 1321,100 N.M. 756 |
| Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael Anthony GUZMAN, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
Michael Anthony Guzman (Guzman) was convicted of murder in the first degree for which he received a sentence of death. Guzman was also convicted of attempted first degree murder for which he received nine years imprisonment; criminal sexual penetration in the second degree for which he received nine years; two counts of kidnapping for which he received eighteen years for each count; and tampering with evidence for which he received eighteen months. Guzman appeals. We affirm.
The issues on appeal are:
I. Whether NMSA 1978, UJI Crim. 39.33 (Repl.Pamp.1982) improperly permits the jury to consider aggravating circumstances not specified by statute when the jury is told to "consider both the defendant and the crime" in weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
II. Whether NMSA 1978, Subsection 31-20A-5(B) (Repl.Pamp.1981) was improperly expanded into two separate aggravating circumstances.
III. Whether evidence supports a finding that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances, thereby preventing imposition of the death penalty.
IV. Whether a psychopharmacologist, in stating his opinion, may testify concerning facts given to him by Guzman.
V. Whether Guzman's sentence of death is excessive and/or disproportionate under the circumstances.
VI. Whether Guzman's sentence of death was imposed by the jury under the influence of passion and prejudice.
VII. Whether expert witnesses should have been permitted to state their opinions that Guzman should not be given the death penalty because of his mental impairment.
VIII. Whether the trial judge had authority to modify the jury's determination of Guzman's death sentence; and if so, whether it erred in not doing so.
IX. Whether NMSA 1978, Subsection 31-20A-6(H) (Repl.Pamp.1981), which specifies that cooperation with authorities is a mitigating circumstance, is constitutional.
According to the trial testimony of Colleen Bush (Bush), on April 5, 1981, at approximately 9:00 p.m., after spending the evening studying, Bush and Julie Jackson (Jackson) walked to a restaurant located across from the University of New Mexico for some coffee. At approximately 11:30 p.m., Bush and Jackson left the restaurant to return to Bush's apartment. While walking to the apartment a man, later determined to be Guzman, walked toward Bush and Jackson. After he passed them, Guzman turned and put his arms around their necks. Guzman first placed a knife to Jackson's neck. He then placed the knife against Bush's neck.
Guzman forced Bush and Jackson into his car and then drove around for awhile. During the time Guzman was driving, he kept saying that he was lonely and wanted someone to talk to. Guzman eventually stopped the car in an arroyo and said, "O.K., ladies, the fun's over." Guzman brandished the knife, told Jackson to take off her clothes, and said, "If you don't do it your friend is going to get hurt really bad." At that time, Guzman held the knife to Bush's chest. Guzman also told Bush that he had a gun and that he was going to shoot her. Jackson took off her clothes and threw them to the back seat.
Next, Guzman ordered Bush to the back of his car and forced her to get in the trunk. Bush got out of the trunk by punching through the canvas and crawling into the back seat. She then jumped out of the car and started running. Guzman chased and caught her. Guzman then stabbed Bush in the back, chest, and neck a number of times. Guzman stated, "All my problems are because of you Anglos." Bush asked him to leave her alone so that she could die in peace. Guzman left for a few minutes and then came back and started stabbing her again in the chest and neck. Bush played dead, and Guzman left in his car. Later, Bush crawled to the highway. Someone in a passing vehicle eventually stopped to aid her.
The doctor who treated Bush testified that she had multiple stab and slash wounds, many close to vital organs.
Later that morning, Jackson's nude body was found. The autopsy showed that Jackson died from a stab wound to her chest that penetrated her heart. There was also evidence of sexual intercourse.
Guzman later turned himself in to the authorities.
Guzman argues that UJI Crim. 39.33 is unconstitutional because it permits the jury to consider aggravating circumstances not permitted by NMSA 1978, Section 31-20A-5 (Repl.Pamp.1981), and because it permits the death penalty to be imposed in an arbitrary manner which is not rationally reviewable.
The pertinent part of UJI Crim. 39.33 states:
If you have unanimously agreed on a finding that * * * [one or more of the aggravating circumstances charged were] present, you must then consider the penalty to be imposed in this case. In determining the penalty to be imposed, you must consider all of the evidence admitted during this sentencing proceeding and the evidence admitted during the trial in which the defendant was found guilty of murder. You must then consider whether there are any mitigating circumstances.
If you find there are mitigating circumstances, you must then weigh the mitigating circumstances against * * * [one or more aggravating circumstances] you have found in this case. After weighing the aggravating circumstances and the mitigating circumstances, weighing them against each other, and considering both the defendant and the crime, you shall determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
Guzman argues that this phrase, "considering both the defendant and the crime" (which is directly from NMSA 1978, Subsection 31-20A-2(B) (Repl.Pamp.1981)), allows the jury to consider "the defendant and the crime" as an aggravating circumstance that is not specified by our death penalty statute.
UJI Crim. 39.33, in which this phrase appears, is not the instruction that specifies for the jury what alleged aggravated circumstance is relied upon by the State. The jury is clearly told by the other instructions which aggravating circumstance or circumstances must be proved before the jury may even consider the death penalty.
The jury in the present case was given NMSA 1978, UJI Crim. 39.30, 39.31 and 39.33 (Repl.Pamp.1982). Under UJI Crim. 39.30, mitigating circumstances were set forth for the jury to consider on behalf of Guzman. Under UJI Crim. 39.31, the jury was required to make two determinations: first, whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was committed under the aggravating circumstances as charged; and second, whether the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances. State v. Garcia, 99 N.M. 771, 664 P.2d 969, cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 2464, 77 L.Ed.2d 1341 (1983). Once these threshold determinations were made, the jury was instructed under UJI Crim. 39.33, that they must weigh the aggravating circumstances and mitigating circumstances and consider Guzman and the crime in determining whether to sentence him to death or life imprisonment.
Guzman asserts that the language of UJI Crim. 39.33, in effect, allows non-statutory aggravating circumstances to be considered, and that it is therefore unconstitutional. We hold that UJI Crim. 39.33 does not allow the consideration of non-statutory aggravating circumstances. UJI Crim. 39.33 relates to the weighing process, not to the threshold determination of whether an aggravating circumstance exists.
We have previously held that UJI Crim. 39.33 does not allow the death penalty to be imposed in an arbitrary manner which is not rationally reviewable. State v. Cheadle, 100 N.M. ---, --- P.2d ----, 22 SBB 1319 (1983); State v. Garcia. There is no indication that the jury is to consider non-statutory aggravating circumstances. Therefore, we again find no fault with UJI Crim. 39.33.
Guzman asserts that Subsection 31-20A-5(B) was expanded into two separate aggravating circumstances which under NMSA 1978, UJI Crim. 39.13 (Repl.Pamp.1982), should only be one. Subsection 31-20A-5(B) provides as an aggravating circumstance:
[That] the murder was committed with intent to kill in the commission of or attempt to commit kidnaping, criminal sexual contact of a minor or criminal sexual penetration.
At the sentencing phase, the jury was given three separate aggravating circumstances for consideration: Subsection 31-20A-5(B) for the murder of Jackson committed during the commission of kidnaping; Subsection 31-20A-5(B) for the murder of Jackson committed during the commission of criminal sexual penetration; and NMSA 1978, Subsection 31-20A-5(G) (Repl.Pamp.1981) for the murder of Jackson as a witness to a crime or person likely to become a witness to a crime.
The jury unanimously found beyond a reasonable doubt each of these aggravating circumstances, and for each of these aggravating circumstances unanimously agreed that Guzman should be sentenced to death.
Guzman does not allege that the aggravating circumstance charged under Subsection 31-20A-5(G) was improper. Guzman's contention is that the first two aggravating circumstances (murder in commission of kidnaping and murder in commission of criminal sexual penetration) should not have been set forth as two separate aggravating circumstances, but should have been presented to the jury in the alternative.
Guzman claims that under Subsection 31-20A-5(B), the State may select one of the crimes listed or charge in the alternative, but to select two of them increases the number of crimes for which a defendant may be put to death, thereby unconstitutionally...
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State v. Clark
... ... SCRA 1986, 14-7030. There is no indication that the jury is to consider facts and circumstances other than the statutory aggravating circumstances in this weighing process. See State v. Guzman, 100 N.M. 756, 760, 676 P.2d 1321, 1325, cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1256, 104 S.Ct. 3548, 82 L.Ed.2d 851 (1984); see also NMSA 1978, Sec. 31-20A-5 (limiting the aggravating circumstances to be considered by the jury pursuant to Section 31-20A-2 to the listed statutory aggravating circumstances). This ... ...
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State v. Clark
... ... If the sentence is not properly imposed, it is up to the New Mexico Supreme Court to review the sentence. This Court, not the trial judge, automatically reviews the jury's decision to impose the death penalty ... State v. Guzman, 100 N.M. 756, 763, 676 P.2d 1321, 1328 (1984) ... This Court has previously held that this restriction upon the trial judge does not deny a defendant in a capital case due process and equal protection of the law. State v. Cheadle, 102 N.M. 743, 744, 700 P.2d 646, 647 (1985) ... Section 31-20A-3 ... ...
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... ... In Henderson, there was no evidence that the defendant "intended to kill his victim during the commission of a kidnapping." Id. However, we were very careful to distinguish our analysis in State v. Guzman, 100 N.M. 756, 676 P.2d 1321 (1984). "[T]he kidnapping and rape in this case, unlike the kidnapping and rape in Guzman, are inseparable." Henderson, 109 N.M. at 661, 789 P.2d at 609. "In Guzman it was obvious that the defendant intended to kill his kidnapped victim during the course of the ... ...
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