State v. Haas, 8586

• Decision Date: 18 March 1943
• Docket Number: 8586
• Citation: 69 S.D. 204,8 N.W.2d 569
• Parties: STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Respondent, v. CLIFFORD HAAS, aka Clifford Hayes, Appellant.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

69 SD 204, 8 NW2d 569 (1943)

STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Respondent v. CLIFFORD HAAS, aka Clifford Hayes,

Appellant.

South Dakota Supreme Court

Appeal from Circuit Court, Grant County, SD

Hon. Howard Babcock, Judge.

#8586—Motion denied

Eugene C. Mahoney, Hugh S. Gamble, Sioux Falls, SD

Attorneys for Appellant.

Leo A. Ternmey, Atty. Gen., Pierre, SD

Frank S. Tait, State’s Atty., of Milbank, SD

Attorneys for Respondent.

Opinion filed March 18, 1943

PER CURIAM.

The defendant was charged with murder. In the due course of the proceedings had below in which defendant refused and did not have the aid of counsel, plea of guilty was entered and the death sentence imposed. On the day before the lapse of the period within which an appeal to this court is permitted voluntary counsel appeared in his behalf, perfected an appeal to this court and lodged a motion which seeks to have the cause remanded to the trial court for the purpose of presenting a motion praying that the judgment below be vacated and that the defendant be permitted to withdraw his plea of guilty for the purpose of entering a different plea. The reason advanced to justify this extraordinary procedure is that the defendant, at the time of refusing the aid of counsel and at the time he entered his plea, was without sufficient power of mind and understanding to make an intelligent choice and decision.

We do not deem it necessary to review the showing made in support of the motion. Suffice it to say that as a result of that showing this court is left in doubt as to the competency of the defendant at the time in question to make the described important decision involving his life and liberty.

The motion does not, in our opinion, involve an issue of mere judicial discretion in ruling on a motion for a change of plea pursuant to SDC 34.3522. The point suggested is that the judgment below lacks validity for want of due process of law under the provisions of the Fourteenth Article of Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and § 2, Article VI of the Constitution of South Dakota. See Patton v. United States, 281 US 276, 50 SCt 253, 74 LEd 854, 70 ALR 263; Powell v. Alabama, 287 US 45, 53 SCt 55, 77 LEd 158, 84 ALR 527; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 US 458, 58 SCt 1019, 82 LEd 1461; Betts v. Brady, 316 US 455, 62 SCt 1252, 86 LEd 1595; Adams v. United States, 317 US 269, 63 SCt 236, 87 LEd 268.

The measure of protection afforded one charged with crime in a state court by the Fourteenth Amendment is indicated by pertinent pronouncements of the Supreme Court of the United States. “As applied to a criminal trial, denial of due process is the failure to observe that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice. In order to declare a denial of it we must find that the absence of that fairness fatally infected the trial; the acts complained of must be of such quality as necessarily prevent a fair trial.” Lisenba v. California, 314 US 219, 62 SCt 280, 290, 86 LEd 166. “... in a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble-mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law.” Powell v. Alabama, supra, [287 US 45, 53 SCt 65, 77 LEd 158, 84 ALR 527]. “As we have said, the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the conviction and incarceration of one whose trial is offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right, and while want of counsel in a particular case may result in a conviction lacking in such fundamental fairness, we cannot say that the amendment embodies an...