State v. Haas

Decision Date31 December 1973
Citation517 P.2d 671,267 Or. 489
PartiesSTATE of Oregon, Petitioner, v. William Robert HAAS, whose true name is William Robert Hass, Respondent.
CourtOregon Supreme Court

Thomas H. Denney, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Lee Johnson, Atty. Gen., and John W. Osburn, Sol. Gen., Salem.

Sam A. McKeen, Klamath Falls, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.

HOLMAN, Justice.

The defendant was convicted pursuant to a jury trial of the crime of first degree burglary. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial 1 because the trial court allowed information obtained by the police in violation of Miranda v. Arizona 2 to be used to impeach defendant's testimony. This court granted review for the sole purpose of determining whether information secured in violation of Miranda rules can be used for impeachment purposes under the circumstances which existed in this case.

Two bicycles were stolen from houses in the Moyina Heights district of Klamath Falls. One was taken from the Lehaman residence and one was taken from the Jackson residence. Defendant was indicted for the burglary of the Lehman residence.

In an In camera hearing the arresting officer testified that after he gave the Miranda warnings, he questioned defendant about the Lehman theft and the defendant responded that two bicycles had been stolen and he did not know which theft the officer was talking about. The officer then requested defendant to accompany him on a further investigation to clear up the matter and defendant agreed. However, on the way to the site of the thefts defendant had some misgivings and indicated he wanted to talk to a lawyer. The arresting officer responded that he could see a lawyer when they got back and proceeded with the investigation, during which defendant pointed out the two houses from which the bicycles had been taken. Pursuant to the disclosures made at the In camera hearing, the trial judge ruled that all references to defendant's activities after his request for a lawyer were barred from introduction in evidence.

Thereafter, defendant took the stand and testified that he had participated in concealing the bicycles when he knew they had been stolen, but he denied having known that they were going to be stolen and the houses from which they were taken. On rebuttal, over objection, the arresting officer was permitted to testify for impeachment purposes that defendant had directed him to both the Lehman and Jackson houses and had identified them as being the ones from which bicycles had been taken.

The question of the use, for impeachment purposes, of information secured in violation of rules similar to those of Miranda was presented to this court in the case of State v. Brewton. 3 In that decision, in which the court was divided four to three, we held that information secured in violation of the rules set forth in Escobedo v. Illinois, 4 Miranda's precursor, could not be used for impeachment purposes. Since this court's decision in Brewton, the Supreme Court of the United States, in Harris v. New York, 5 has faced a similar problem in relation to Miranda rules and has reached a decision contrary to Brewton based upon reasoning similar to the dissenting opinions in Brewton. The rationale of the Harris opinion was that while information secured in violation of the Miranda rules may not be used to incriminate a defendant, neither should such violation be used as a shield for or an invitation to perjury; and, assuming that the exclusionary rule has a deterrent effect on proscribed police conduct, sufficient deterrence flows when the evidence in question is made unavailable to the prosecution in its case it chief. 6

It was for the purpose of deciding whether we wished to overrule Brewton that we took review of this case. However, we now find that it is not necessary to make that determination in deciding this case because whether the reasoning of Brewton or of Harris is used, the opinion of the Court of Appeals must be affirmed and the defendant's conviction reversed.

In Brewton and Harris either insufficient or no warnings were given. In those situations, before questioning begins, the police do not know whether or not they will get incriminating information from the defendant if they give the required warnings. Experience has taught there is a good possibility they will. 7 Therefore, the argument can be made that in such situations it appears likely that police will not take the chance of losing incriminating evidence for their case in chief by not giving adequate warnings. The chance of being able, without sufficient warnings, to use what information they get for impeachment affords insufficient advantage to induce the police to endanger their chance of making a case at all. Therefore, in such circumstances the prophylactic measure of total exclusion may not be necessary because police will not be induced by the more limited use to fail to give the proper warnings.

However, such is not this case. The defendant here was given proper warnings and took them at their word and asked for a lawyer. 8 The police then knew they would most likely get nothing further from defendant if he consulted a lawyer. Therefore, they had nothing to lose and something to gain by violating Miranda if the State is permitted to use such information as was secured by continued interrogation for impeachment purposes. In such a situation, there is no pressure whatsoever to obtain compliance and the prophylactic exclusion of the evidence as dictated by Miranda, Escobedo, and Neely 9 is still required. 10

The opinion of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

HOWELL, Justice (dissenting).

I dissent. I do not see any difference between the situation in this case and one where the police secure information given voluntarily to them but without a prior Miranda warning. In my opinion, the court is presented with a choice between the prophylactic effect of punishing impermissible police conduct by prohibiting the admission of any evidence whether substantive or impeachment, or a license to the defendant to commit perjury. The choice made by the United States Supreme Court was aptly expressed by Mr. Chief Justice Burger in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971):

'* * * The impeachment process here undoubtedly provided valuable aid to the jury in assessing petitioner's credibility, and the benefits of this process should not be lost, in our view, because of the speculative possibility that impermissible police conduct will be encouraged thereby. Assuming that the exclusionary rule has a deterrent effect on proscribed police conduct, sufficient deterrence flows when the evidence in question is made unavailable to the prosecution in its case in...

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10 cases
  • Oregon v. Hass 8212 1452
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • 19 Marzo 1975
    ...ruled inadmissible for the prosecution's case in chief. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1. Pp. 720-724. 267 Or. 489, 517 P.2d 671, Thomas H. Denney, Salem, Or., for petitioner. Sam A. McKeen, Klamath Falls, Or., for respondent. Mr. Justice BLACKMUN delivered the o......
  • State v. Mills
    • United States
    • Oregon Court of Appeals
    • 14 Noviembre 1985
    ...because whether the reasoning of Brewton or of Harris is used, the opinion of the Court of Appeals must be affirmed." State v. Hass, 267 Or. 489, 492, 517 P.2d 671 (1973). On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court, citing Harris, held the statements admissible for impeachment purposes.......
  • State v. Isom
    • United States
    • Oregon Supreme Court
    • 21 Septiembre 1988
    ...under federal law as set forth in Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975) ( reversing sub nom State v. Haas, 267 Or. 489, 517 P.2d 671 (1973)), is of no consequence. We are concerned with interpreting the Oregon Constitution on this issue and are not dependent on ......
  • State v. Keys
    • United States
    • Oregon Court of Appeals
    • 5 Abril 1976
    ...State v. Shadley/Spencer/Rowe, 16 Or.App. 113, 517 P.2d 324 (1973); State v. Haas, 13 Or.App. 368, 510 P.2d 852, Affirmed 267 Or. 489, 517 P.2d 671 (1973), Reversed on other grounds 420 U.S. 714, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1974); State v. Jim/White, 13 Or.App. 201, 508 P.2d 462, Sup.Ct.......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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