State v. Haberski

Decision Date17 August 1982
Citation449 A.2d 373
PartiesSTATE of Maine v. Steven HABERSKI.
CourtMaine Supreme Court

Charles K. Leadbetter (orally), Pasquale J. Perrino, Jr., Asst. Attys. Gen., Augusta, for plaintiff.

Hall, DeSanctis & Schultz, Julio DeSanctis (orally), Richard W. Hall, Bangor, for defendant.

Before McKUSICK, C. J., and GODFREY, NICHOLS, CARTER, VIOLETTE and WATHEN, JJ.

ROBERTS, Justice.

Following a jury trial in Superior Court, Penobscot County, Steven Haberski was convicted of murder, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 201(1)(A). On appeal, Haberski claims that (1) the Superior Court erred when it denied his motions to challenge the members of the grand jury on the grounds of prejudicial pretrial publicity, (2) the trial court erred when it refused his motion for a mistrial following an improper comment by the prosecutor, and (3) there was insufficient evidence to support the murder verdict. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

I. FACTS

The victim, Kirk Haberski, was Haberski's second wife. Haberski and his wife resided in Bangor with his two children from a prior marriage. Haberski testified that he was a dealer in antiques. He returned to his home in Bangor from a business trip on Saturday, May 17, 1980. From Saturday until Tuesday, the day he killed the victim, Haberski continuously ingested large amounts of cocaine. During that period he slept approximately two hours. Haberski testified that on Tuesday, May 20, believing that (1) his wife Kirk was having an affair, (2) someone was going to attempt to kill him, and (3) his children were sexually abused, he left Bangor with his family by car to drive to his parents' home in Connecticut. Haberski testified that as they left Bangor he was "scared for [his] life" and that his wife told him that she was the only one who could save him now. Haberski also testified that his wife then told him that she had sexually abused his son, Jason. On the highway Haberski threw his wallet and Kirk's pocketbook out the window of the car. Haberski's bizarre behavior resulted in an argument between him and his wife regarding who should drive the car. Haberski eventually stopped the car on a dirt road in Carmel. He dragged his wife, who was screaming, into the woods, pushed her to the ground and pulled a gun from his pocket. He repeatedly hit his wife with the gun which discharged on several occasions.

The state medical examiner testified that Kirk Haberski's death was caused by "bullet wounds of the head, neck and chest and the lacerations of the scalp with hemorrhage and bruising of the brain." The victim's body had a total of approximately thirty injuries. She had been shot three times.

A witness whose house was immediately adjacent to the scene of the killing testified she heard a woman screaming, heard two shots, five or ten minutes later heard a third shot, then watched Haberski's car leave the scene. Haberski drove off, stopped, pushed his children out of the car, and began to drive back toward Bangor. As he drove toward Bangor Haberski was met by an unmarked police car which gave chase and pursued him at high speed until Haberski crashed his car in the outskirts of the city.

Other testimony at trial would have allowed a jury to rationally find that Haberski had previously beaten his wife, and that he had previously told a friend that his marriage to the victim was not working and he was going to "get rid" of the victim. In addition, there was testimony that after the killing Haberski had commented that he "forgot the shovel" the day he killed the victim, that the victim deserved it, and that he had been known to do unusual things before and make them work.

II. GRAND JURY

The above described killing did not go unnoticed by the news media. In fact, the culmination of the high speed chase into Bangor which ended with Haberski's arrest was filmed by a local television station. In addition to being used as a news item, the film was also shown to the jury during Haberski's trial. The killing was also the subject of various newspaper articles published in the Bangor area.

On June 2, 1980, a regularly scheduled session of the grand jury sitting in Penobscot County was to commence receiving evidence. Early on the morning of June 2, 1980, Haberski filed twenty-one motions in the Superior Court. Twenty of these motions sought to challenge named members of the grand jury. The twenty-first motion was entitled "Motion to Challenge Name Unknown to Defendant a Member of the Grand Jury." All twenty-one motions relied upon identical grounds, to wit:

that said Grand Juror possesses a state of mind which is predisposed to the Defendant's guilt, that said mental predisposition exists as a result of the massive amount of publicity in this matter and that such mental state prevents said Grand Juror from acting impartially, all as set out in the affidavit attached hereto and incorporated by reference herein.

In pertinent part, the affidavit attached to the motions stated:

That since the occurrence of the crime for which our client stands charged there has been an extraordinary amount of media coverage of said Defendant ...

That said media coverage has been pervasive in all forms of media: Newspaper, television and radio That said publicity has been adverse to said Defendant and presumes Defendant's guilt ...

That any person being exposed to said publicity would be influenced by it ...

That on information and belief the members of the Grand Jury have been exposed to said adverse media coverage and have been adversely effected by same ...

That on information and belief the members of the Grand Jury have formed a belief as to the guilt of the Defendant.

The Superior Court conducted a hearing relating to the above motions. Counsel for the state and defense counsel were both present. At the hearing defense counsel represented to the court that there had been a significant amount of pretrial publicity regarding Mr. Haberski and that such publicity had acted "in such a manner as to arouse in the public mind a sense of [ill] will and vindictiveness ...."

In support of his motion counsel presented the court with five newspaper articles printed by the Bangor Daily News, a newspaper published in Bangor. Exhibit A was a straightforward news article dated May 21, 1980, headlined "Man Is Charged In Killing Of Wife." Accompanying the article was a photograph of Haberski's son peering over the dashboard of a car described as a sheriff's cruiser with the caption "Where's Mommy?" Exhibit B, dated May 22, was an article entitled "Probable Cause Found After Carmel Slaying" with an accompanying photograph of Haberski in the company of a Maine State Police officer captioned "En Route To Arraignment." Exhibit C consisted of four letters to the editor written in response to the caption "Where's Mommy?" in Exhibit A. The first letter labeled the photo "appalling journalism," the second "cruel, unfeeling and in bad taste," the third "cruel and senseless," and the fourth "tabloid journalism." Exhibit D was an article entitled "Oregon Death Probe May Be Reopened." It reported that Haberski's first wife had died of acute narcoticism caused by ingestion of "alcohol, cocaine, codeine and a massive amount of morphine." A doctor in Oregon was quoted as saying authorities there were "always suspicious" of the death of Haberski's first wife. The article contains an innuendo that Haberski and his wives had been involved with drugs. Exhibit E was an article entitled "Oregon Officials Interested In Carmel Slaying."

Defense counsel relied upon this publicity, in addition to other radio and television publicity which he said existed, to argue that the individual members of the grand jury were incapable of acting in an impartial manner. At one point during the hearing defense counsel also moved "that the Court examine the Grand Jurors ... in camera regarding the ... publicity."

In reply the State argued in part that the publicity the defendant relied upon was not so prejudicial that reasonable people exposed to it would tend to be rendered incapable of exercising impartial judgment. Counsel for the State told the court that it was her custom, and her intention in this case, to remind the grand jurors of their obligations, to instruct the jurors that if any had a personal bias which, as a result, would make it impossible for them to render an impartial decision, that person should excuse himself from the subsequent grand jury deliberations and vote. Counsel for the State also stated, "I certainly invite Your Honor to speak to them as well, if you feel that's necessary, but beyond that, it would simply be [an] excessive and unnecessary interference with a perfectly legal and proper proceeding ...."

The Superior Court justice acknowledged that he was aware of the television and radio broadcasts as well as the newspaper coverage but stated that he could not find "anything egregiously prejudicial about the publicity in this case." He accordingly denied Haberski's motion.

Subsequent to the return of a murder indictment Haberski again relied on pretrial publicity as grounds for a motion to dismiss the indictment. After hearing, the Superior Court also denied that motion. No transcript of that hearing has been included with the record on appeal. Haberski does not now argue that the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment was error. Rather, he argues only that the Superior Court erred when it denied his individual motions to challenge the members of the grand jury.

We are aware that issues involving the rights of a defendant as they relate to grand jury proceedings have generated much controversy and few clear principles. See Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 82 S.Ct. 955, 8 L.Ed.2d 98 (1962); Martin v. Beto, 397 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1968); id. (Thornberry, J., concurring); Gorin v. United States, 313 F.2d 641 (1st Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 971, 85 S.Ct. 669, 13...

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8 cases
  • Bundy v. State, 57772
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • June 21, 1984
    ...publicity must be so invidious as to cause vindictive and retributive feelings among the members of the community. State v. Haberski, 449 A.2d 373 (Me.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174, 103 S.Ct. 823, 74 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983). We therefore find Bundy was entitled to neither a temporary restr......
  • State v. Murphy
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • March 28, 1988
    ...opinion as to the guilt of the accused or his interest in the prosecution does not serve to disqualify him from service." State v. Haberski, 449 A.2d 373, 380 (Me.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174, 103 S.Ct. 823, 74 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983); see also Rippy v. Tennessee, 550 S.W.2d 636, 642 (Ten......
  • Jones v. Murdoch
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    • New Mexico Supreme Court
    • January 22, 2009
    ...v. Fisher, 455 F.2d 1101, 1105 (2d Cir.1972) ("[T]he grand jury is not meant to be the private tool of a prosecutor."); State v. Haberski, 449 A.2d 373, 378 (Me. 1982) ("The grand jury does not function as an arm of the prosecution."); In re Nat'l Window Glass Workers, 287 F. 219, 225 (N.D.......
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    ...v. Conner, 434 A.2d 509, 511-12 (Me.1981). Second, the trial justice gave "[p]rompt and appropriate curative instructions." State v. Haberski, 449 A.2d 373 (Me.1982). Third, although the evidence against the defendant was not overwhelming, the evidence of his guilt was substantial. State v.......
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