State v. Habib

• Decision Date: 27 April 1894
• Citation: 18 R.I. 568,30 A. 462
• Parties: STATE v. HABIB.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

30 A. 462

18 R.I. 568

STATE

v. HABIB.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

April 27, 1894.

Peter Habib was convicted of receiving stolen goods, and moves for new trial. Denied.

Robert W. Burbank, Arty. Gen., for the State.

Charles Acton Ives and Michael Callahan, for defendant.

TILLINGHAST, J. The first ground upon which the defendant bases his petition for a new trial is that it was not proved by competent evidence at the trial to the jury that the corporation named in the indictment —the E. Read Goodridge Manufacturing Company, the owner of the stolen property existed. E. Read Goodridge was called as a witness by the attorney general, and testified, without objection, that he was the treasurer and manager of said company; that it was a corporation created under the laws of New York, and duly organized as such under its charter in the state of New York; and that it elected officers, held meetings transacted business, and made returns under its said charter as a corporation. We think that the evidence offered showed at least prima facie the existence of said corporation. It shows that there was such a corporation de facto, and we think this is sufficient, in the absence of any proof to the contrary. People v. Frank, 28 Cal. 507; People v. Caryl, 12 Wend. 547; Smith v. State, 28 Ind. 321; Calkins v. State, 18 Ohio St 366; Whart. Cr. Ev. (8th Ed.) § 164a; People v. Davis, 21 Wend. 313; People v. Barric, 49 Cal. 342; Johnson v. People, 4 Denio, 364.

The second ground of the petition is that the court erred in admitting the confessions of the defendant The record shows that in a conversation with the defendant while under arrest, upon being charged by the witness Goodridge with receiving the stolen goods, he at first denied the same, then denied the receiving as many as he was charged with having received by Goodridge, and finally admitted that he had received the goods from O'Brien, the person who stole the same, stating fully how he had carried on the business; that the goods had been shipped to his place in Providence by the express company; and that he desired to settle therefor, first offering to pay $250, and then saying that he had $20,000 in the bank, and would settle for any amount witness would name if he could be let off that day. During the conversation, O'Brien, who was present said to the defendant: "It's no use trying to get out of it. They have got us dead. We have all been arrested, and you might as well tell the truth." This confession was not obtained by any promise, threat, or improper inducement, unless it can be said that the language of O'Brien constituted an improper inducement We do not think it did. It practically amounted to a mere suggestion or direction to tell the truth. Moveover, O'Brien was not an officer. The defendant was not in his custody, and, so far as appears, was simply giving expression to his own consciousness of their joint guilt, and of the fact that they had been found out, and therefore they might as well make a clean breast of it. That such a confession is admissible, see Whart Cr. Ev. (8th Ed.) § 647, and cases cited.

The third ground of the petition is that the state failed to prove that the defendant received the stolen goods in the county of Newport, where the indictment was found.¹ The record shows that O'Brien was a shipping clerk in the employ of said corporation in the city of Newport, and that the defendant had a place of business at No. 77 Acorn street, in the city of Providence; that O'Brien stole the goods in question, and, under a previous arrangement between him and the defendant, sent the goods by express to the latter, at his place of business in Providence. In short, then, the case is this: O'Brien stole the goods in question in the county of Newport, and at the request of, and under an arrangement with, the defendant, delivered them to a common carrier in Newport, directed to the defendant, in the city and county of Providence. In this state of the proof, the question is, did the defendant receive said stolen goods in the county of Newport? We think it is clear that he did; for, in the circumstances stated, a delivery to the common carrier (his agent) was, in the eye of the law, a delivery to him; and the defendant having subsequently obtained actual possession of the goods from the common carrier, as the proof shows, the transaction as between him and O'Brien was precisely the same as if O'Brien had delivered the goods to him in person at Newport See Mack v. Lee, 13 R. I. 293; Benj. Sales, § 409, and cases...