State v. Haddad

Decision Date10 December 1951
Docket NumberNo. 40508,40508
Citation221 La. 337,59 So.2d 411
PartiesSTATE v. HADDAD.
CourtLouisiana Supreme Court

Booth, Lockard & Jack, Shreveport, for relator.

Bolivar E. Kemp, Jr., Atty. Gen., M. E. Culligan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Edwin L. Blewer, Dist. Atty., John A. Richardson, Asst. Dist. Atty., Shreveport, for respondent.

HAWTHORNE, Justice.

Defendant-relator, Dickie Haddad, was charged in a bill of information with the crime of receiving stolen things, denounced by Article 69 of the Louisiana Criminal Code, Act No. 43 of 1942, LSA-R.S. 14:69. The bill of information described the property which the defendant received as a 'Wizard' automobile battery having a value of $19.91, which had been stolen from Mr. and Mrs. A. Taylor, Jr., as owners thereof. The lower court adjudged the defendant to be guilty and sentenced him to jail for a period of 60 days. After conviction and sentence he applied for, and was granted, writs, and the case is now before us under our supervisory jurisdiction.

During the latter part of the year 1950, the accused was engaged in the operation of a restaurant known as the 'Sweet Shop', located in that part of Shreveport known as the Broadmoor section. While engaged in this business he became acquainted and friendly with a number of high school, teen-age boys ranging from 16 to 19 years old, who frequented and 'hung out' at his place of business. These boys were subsequently apprehended by the authorities and charged with a series of thefts and burglaries, to which they confessed. The juveniles in the group were adjudged by the juvenile court to be juvenile delinquents and committed to the Louisiana Training Institute for indefinite periods of time. Those who were not juveniles were given varying terms in the parish jail. Two members of this gang of young thieves, Gallagher and Dwyer, testified at the trial of the defendant Haddad, admitting the theft of an automobile battery and the sale of it to the defendant herein. These two young men also testified as to their participation in other thefts and burglaries and the sale of the property stolen as a result thereof to the defendant Haddad. Other members of the group or gang also testified of their own participation in numerous thefts and the sale of the property so stolen to the defendant. All of these sales and deliveries were made after the date of the offense charged.

Defendant's first bill of exception was reserved to the denial of the trial judge of his prayer for oyer of wire recordings of certain statements in the possession of the district attorney, made by the witnesses Gallagher and Dwyer and other witnesses, and also of such a statement made by the defendant himself. This bill also recites that during the progress of the trial counsel for defendant again requested and was denied the production and inspection of these statements.

Defendant-relator does not contend that his statement was a confession or admission of which he would be entitled to a pre-trial inspection under the holding of this court in State v. Dorsey, 207 La. 928, 22 So.2d 273. According to the per curiam of the trial judge, the State informed the district court that the statement made by the defendant was neither a confession nor an admission, and that the prosecution did not expect to offer the statement in evidence for any purpose, and it was never offered by the State. Likewise the statements of the other witnesses were never offered by the State, although these witnesses were called by the State, testified during the trial of the case, and were cross-examined by the defendant.

In his per curiam to this bill the trial judge informs us: 'The court refused the request of the attorney for the accused for inspection of wire or record recorded statements furnished the District Attorney by Gallagher and Dwyer, for the reason that the statements were not made by the accused and for the further reason that both Gallagher and Dwyer were called by the State and cross-examined at length by the attorney for the accused. The court refused the request for the production for inspection of the wire recorded statement of the defendant, for the reason that the District Attorney stated that it was not an admission or a confession but a statement given voluntarily by the accused and that he did not intend to offer said statement as part of the State's case. In presenting the State's case he did not offer to use said statement or refer to said statement in any manner.' (Italics ours.)

As was the case in State v. Simpson, 216 La. 212, 43 So.2d 585, this is another effort on the part of a defendant in a criminal case to extend the holding of this court in State v. Dorsey, supra, that an accused is entitled to a pre-trial inspection of his written admission or confession, so as to include any statement of the defendant although neither a confession nor an admission as well as any written statement made by any witness in the case other than the defendant.

It is now so firmly established in our jurisprudence that a defendant in a criminal case is not entitled to a pre-trial inspection of written confessions of co-defendants, written statements of witnesses, or police reports in the hands of the sheriff, the police department, or the district attorney that we fail to understand why defense counsel continue to present such arguments to us on appeal. State v. Lee, 173 La. 966, 139 So. 302; State v. Dallao, 187 La. 392, 175 So. 4; State v. Williams, 211 La. 782, 30 So.2d 834; State v. Mattio, 212 La. 284, 31 So.2d 801; State v. Simpson, supra. In State v. Williams, supra, certain statements of the defendant, of which he had been denied pre-trial inspection, but which were neither admissions nor confessions, were actually offered in evidence by the State on the trial of the case. In holding that the defendant was not entitled to a pre-trial inspection of the statements, even under those circumstances, this court said: [211 La. 782, 30 So.2d 835.]

'* * * While certain statements of the defendant with reference to his acts in connection with the alleged crime with which he was charged were offered in evidence during the course of the trial, these were neither admissions nor confessions. They were, instead, a part of the defendant's very acts upon which the charge against him was based and it is the jurisprudence of this state that an accused is not entitled to have the state furnish him, prior to trial, with the evidence upon which it intends to rely for his conviction. This includes evidence that has been reduced to writing by the prosecuting attorney for his convenience.'

We know of no satisfactory or valid reason, and none has ever been advanced, which would compel us to extend our holding in the Dorsey case to include such documents. Furthermore, the withholding of the statement of the defendant himself could afford hom no cause for complaint because he could not possibly have been prejudiced in any way, since the State in presenting its case did not offer the statement in evidence or refer to it in any manner.

We do not think that the trial judge erred, for the reasons set out hereinabove, in denying defendant an inspection of these statements during the progress of the trial. The State's witnesses who had given the statements to the district attorney which the defendant sought to have produced were present in court, testified in the case, and submitted themselves to cross-examination, just as in State v. Vallery, 214 La. 495, 38 So.2d 148, 149, wherein it was stated that '* * * while the prosecuting witness was on the stand on cross-examination, it was developed that he had made a signed statement at the police station on the night of the robbery. The defendant asked for oyer of the statement in possession of the district attorney and it was refused. The court sustained the objection made by the State to the production of the document and the defendant reserved a bill of exception. The significant matter here is that the State did not offer this document in evidence. The prosecuting witness was present in court, he gave his testimony and submitted himself for cross-examination. * * *'

Over the objections of defendant, the State was permitted to offer evidence that the defendant had received stolen goods other than the battery at times subsequent to the offense charged. Bill of Exception No. 2 was reserved to the judge's ruling.

Defendant informs us in his brief that the witness Dwyer, after testifying as to the theft of the battery and the sale of it to the defendant herein, then '* * * proceeded to describe a long series of thefts including lard, potatoes, knives, silverware and whiskey, all of which stolen items he claimed were delivered to the defendant. It was also established by the same witness that the theft and delivery of the stolen items, other than the battery, all occurred subsequent to the offense charged.

'The court also permitted one Grover Carlisle and Maurice Freeman, members of the same gang, to testify as to these subsequent offenses.'

Article 446 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, LSA-R.S. 15:446, provides:

'When knowledge or intent forms an essential part of the inquiry, testimony may be offered of such acts, conduct or declarations of the accused as tned to establish such knowledge or intent and where the offense is one of a system, evidence is admissible to prove the continuity of the offense, and the commission of similar offenses for the purpose of showing guilty knowledge and intent, but not to prove the offense charged.' (Italics ours.)

In the instant case, the offense charged was one of a system, whereby the defendant by a definite scheme, method, and manner received stolen property on numerous occasions from this gang of boys. In other words, he was the fence for the operations of this gang of young thieves. Since the offense was one of a system, the evidence of other...

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29 cases
  • State v. Labat
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Louisiana
    • 2 Julio 1954
    ......Dorsey, 207 La. 928, 22 So.2d 273. See State v. Mattio, 212 La. 284, 31 So.2d 801; State v. Simpson, 216 La. 212, 43 So.2d 585; State v. Haddad, 221 La. 337, 59 So.2d 411. Furthermore, since the State did not offer the confession[226 La. 210] in evidence, the defendant Labat was in no way ......
  • State v. Johnson
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    ...to establish such knowledge or intent and where the offense is one of a system, * * *.'' (Italics ours.) In the case of State v. Haddad, 221 La. 337, 59 So.2d 411, 415, this Court 'The general rule is that evidence of the commission of a crime other than that charged in the indictment is no......
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