State v. Hadley

• Decision Date: 28 March 1925
• Docket Number: 4162
• Citation: 65 Utah 109,234 P. 940
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. HADLEY

234 P. 940

65 Utah 109

STATE v. HADLEY

No. 4162

Supreme Court of Utah

March 28, 1925

Appeal from District Court, Second District, Weber County; George S Barker, Judge.

Lorenzo Hadley, was convicted of statutory rape, and he appeals.

AFFIRMED.

Chez &amp Douglas, of Ogden, for appellant.

Harvey H. Cluff, Atty. Gen., and L. A. Miner, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

GIDEONC. J. THURMAN, FRICK, CHERRY, and STRAUP, JJ., concur.

OPINION

GIDEON, C. J.

The appellant was convicted of a felony.The information charged him with having had carnal knowledge of the body of a female under the age of 18 years and of the age of 15 years.Motion for new trial was denied.From the judgment of conviction, this appeal is prosecuted.

Complaint is made, by the assignment of errors, that the verdict is not supported by any sufficient competent evidence; that the court erred in certain instructions given to the jury, and in refusing other requests made by appellant.Error is also assigned on the ruling of the court in admitting certain evidence over appellant's objection.The theories of the defense, as stated in counsel's brief, are:

"First.Insanity of defendant at the time of the alleged offense, as shown by the opening statement by Mr. Chez, and supported by the testimony of the doctors and laymen, and that the plaintiff failed to offer any testimony rebutting defendant's insanity.

"Second.That the alleged offense on November 5, 1923, was not a completed act, in that penetration did not occur at that time, and that the first completed offense proven by plaintiff's testimony, and by which plaintiff is bound, occurred some 5 years prior, and that prosecutrix was 11 years old at that time, and hence the offense does not fall within the statute of carnal knowledge."

We will first consider the second theory or claim of appellant.We have no difficulty in concluding that there is sufficient competent evidence in the record to support a finding by the jury that the act complained of was a completed offense.It would serve no good purpose to recite in this opinion all the details of the testimony bearing upon that particular question.It is sufficient to say that the language of the prosecuting witness, in describing the conduct of appellant at the time the offense is alleged to have been committed, has no other meaning than the commission of the offense charged, and that it was a completed act.The appellant also admitted his guilt to the arresting officers and to others.

As to the first proposition above stated: By section 5848, subd. 16, Comp. Laws Utah 1917, the words "Insane person" are defined as including idiots, lunatics, distracted persons, and persons of unsound mind.Section 7915 of the same compilation, in enumerating persons capable of committing crimes, includes all persons except "* * * idiots, lunatics and insane persons."Section 7909 of the Code among other things, provides:

"* * * All persons are of sound mind who are neither idiots, nor lunatics, nor affected with insanity."

The appellant was 72 years of age, resided in Weber county, had raised a family, and, so far as the testimony discloses, had until recent years borne a good reputation in that community.The chief defense relied on was that of insanity.Several witnesses testified for the defense.Four of these witnesses were physicians.Two physicians had made a personal examination of the appellant a few days prior to the trial.These two physicians had known appellant for a quarter of a century.They had not, however, been intimately associated with him, and had known little of his life during the past 10 years.They were called into the case a few days before the hearing.They separately interviewed the defendant, made physical examination, took his blood pressure, and discussed with him the commission of the offense, with which he was charged.These physicians gave it as their judgment that the appellant, was not mentally sound, in this: That he was suffering from senile dementia, and was unable to appreciate or know the enormity of the offense with which he is charged.However, on cross-examination, when asked by the prosecuting attorney what their judgment would be if it was made to appear that appellant at different times had cautioned the prosecutrix against saying anything about their relationship, and advised her that he would have to go to jail if it became known, they stated that such language would indicate that appellant either understood and appreciated that his conduct was wrong, and that he had been guilty of an offense, or at least that he had a fear of punishment.

Appellant's son testified to certain peculiar conduct or acts of appellant during the year immediately preceding the date of the alleged offense.The son's testimony, however, when analyzed, is not very conclusive as establishing the insanity of appellant.Two additional physicians, neither of whom personally knew the defendant, in answer to hypothetical questions, gave their views as to appellant's mental condition.These physicians agreed that the facts stated in the hypothetical question indicated senile dementia.

It is earnestly insisted by counsel for appellant that this case is controlled by the opinion of this court in State v. Brown, 36 Utah 46, 102 P. 641, 24 L.R.A. (N. S.) 545.If the testimony introduced in this case on the part of appellant to support insanity, or lack of mental ability to appreciate right and wrong, was as convincing as it was in the Brown Case, then counsel's contention should prevail.An examination of that opinion will, however, disclose that the testimony indicating insanity then under consideration by the court was much stronger and much more conclusive as to the mental condition of the defendant than in the present case.Whatever may be the rule of law elsewhere, it is established in this jurisdiction by the opinion in the Brown Case, in harmony with the great weight of authority, that any one charged with an offense is presumed to be sane, and that it is incumbent upon the defendant to rebut that presumption before the defense of insanity can be submitted to a jury.

It is also determined in the Brown Case that, when testimony has been introduced to overcome the presumption of sanity, the burden shifts, and it is incumbent upon the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was sane at the time of the commission of the offense.It is, however, recognized in the opinion in that case that not in every case in which proof is offered by the defendant as to his sanity is it incumbent upon the state to rebut such evidence by proof tending to show the sanity before a conviction can be had.In the course of the opinion it is said:

"There, no doubt, may be instances where the evidence offered by the defendant upon the question of his sanity is so weak and inconclusive that the state may well insist upon the presumption of sanity, and thus need not offer any evidence in rebuttal of defendant's evidence upon the question."

We are not to be understood as holding or intimating that the testimony that was adduced by the defense in this case should be or ought to be classed as weak or inconclusive; but in our judgment, the testimony respecting the insanity of the appellant is not so positive or conclusive that it can be said as matter of law that the jury, in returning a verdict of guilty, acted...