State v. Haidet, 2009 Ohio 205 (Ohio App. 1/20/2009), 2008CA00180.
Citation | 2009 Ohio 205 |
Decision Date | 20 January 2009 |
Docket Number | No. 2008CA00180.,2008CA00180. |
Parties | State of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Scott Haidet, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | United States Court of Appeals (Ohio) |
Appeal from the Canton Municipal Court, Case No. 2008CRB3067.
Affirmed.
Joseph Martuccio, Canton Law Director, Canton, OH 44702, Gabriel Wildman, 218 Cleveland Avenue, 7th Floor, Canton, OH 44702, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Jeffry Serra, 220 Market Avenue, SW, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J., Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J., Hon. John W. Wise, J.
{¶1} On June 10, 2008, appellant, Scott Haidet, was charged with possession of marijuana in violation of R.C. 2925.11. Said charge arose following an investigation by City of Canton police officers after observing appellant make an illegal u-turn and exhibit erratic driving behaviors.
{¶2} On July 11, 2008, appellant filed a motion to suppress, claiming an illegal stop and search of his person and his vehicle. A hearing was held on July 17, 2008. By judgment entry filed July 31, 2008, the trial court denied the motion.
{¶3} On August 1, 2008, appellant pled no contest to the charge. By judgment entry filed August 8, 2008, the trial court found appellant guilty, fined him $100, and suspended his driver's license for six months.
{¶4} Appellant filed an appeal and this matter is now before this court for consideration. Assignment of error is as follows:
I
{¶5} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS AS THE ARRESTING OFFICER DID NOT HAVE SPECIFIC AND ARTICULABLE FACTS JUSTIFYING A WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF THE APPELLANT'S VEHICLE."
I
{¶6} Appellant claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We disagree.
{¶7} There are three methods of challenging on appeal a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress. First, an appellant may challenge the trial court's findings of fact. In reviewing a challenge of this nature, an appellate court must determine whether said findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence. State v. Fanning (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 19; State v. Klein (1991), 73 Ohio App.3d 485; State v. Guysinger (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 592. Second, an appellant may argue the trial court failed to apply the appropriate test or correct law to the findings of fact. In that case, an appellate court can reverse the trial court for committing an error of law. State v. Williams (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 37. Finally, assuming the trial court's findings of fact are not against the manifest weight of the evidence and it has properly identified the law to be applied, an appellant may argue the trial court has incorrectly decided the ultimate or final issue raised in the motion to suppress. When reviewing this type of claim, an appellate court must independently determine, without deference to the trial court's conclusion, whether the facts meet the appropriate legal standard in any given case. State v. Curry (1994), 95 Ohio App.3d 93; State v. Claytor (1993), 85 Ohio App.3d 623; Guysinger. As the United States Supreme Court held in Ornelas v. U.S. (1996), 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1663, "...as a general matter determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de novo on appeal."
{¶8} In Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 22, the United States Supreme Court determined that "a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest." However, for the propriety of a brief investigatory stop pursuant to Terry, the police officer involved "must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Id. at 21. Such an investigatory stop "must be viewed in the light of the totality of the surrounding circumstances" presented to the police officer. State v. Freeman (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 291, paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶9} In denying appellant's motion to suppress, the trial court specifically found the following:
{¶10} Judgment Entry filed July 31, 2008.
{¶11} On June 10, 2008, at approximately 2:30 a.m., Officer Zachary Taylor and his partner, Officer Michael Volpy, observed appellant make an illegal u-turn. T. at 6. The officers followed the vehicle and observed "erratic driving behavior." T. at 8. Once he stopped, appellant exited his vehicle and told the officers he was at the location to visit a friend, Mark Weigand. T. at 9-10. Upon investigation, the occupants of the residence denied knowing appellant or Mr. Weigand. T. at 10. Appellant was patted down and placed in the back of the cruiser T. at 11. During the pat down, appellant was Id.
{¶12} Officer Taylor testified they were going to issue a traffic citation for the illegal u-turn and release appellant. T. at 12. However, Officer Taylor thought a "Terry pat down" on appellant's vehicle was warranted:
{¶14} Appellant refused to give the officers consent to search his vehicle, and claimed the keys were locked inside the car. T. at 13. Officer Taylor knew from the pat down search that the keys were in appellant's pocket, "which again sets off a red flag that something is not right here." Id. As Officer Taylor spoke with appellant about the keys, Officer Taylor observed appellant T. at 13-14. Upon unlocking the vehicle and opening the door, Officer Taylor noticed a "strong smell of raw marijuana." T. at 14.
{¶15} The facts cited by the trial court in making its decision to deny the motion to suppress are present in the record. The gravamen of this case is whether such facts and circumstances warranted the non-consensual search of the vehicle for officer safety reasons.
{¶16} In support of the trial court's...
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