State v. Haile-Jones

Decision Date23 February 2018
Docket NumberDOCKET NO. A-5581-15T1
PartiesSTATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. DEVON R. HAILE-JONES, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

Before Judges Nugent and Geiger.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County, Indictment No. 14-04-0506.

Rebecca Gindi, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Rebecca Gindi, of counsel and on the brief).

Timothy P. McCann, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Angelo J. Onofri, Mercer County Prosecutor, attorney; Timothy P. McCann, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant Devon R. Hallie-Jones appeals from his June 8, 2016 conviction and sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm.

I.

We derive the following facts from the evidence presented at trial. During the evening of February 5, 2014, Detective Sarai Cheek of the Trenton Police Department was on duty as a member of the Street Crimes Unit. Cheek was patrolling the Donnelly Homes housing project with her partner, Detective Sam Johnson, in an unmarked police car. In addition to Cheek and Johnson, a second Street Crimes Unit was also patrolling Donnelly Homes.

At approximately 11:13 p.m., Cheek and Johnson observed a tan Buick drive in front of their vehicle. As the car passed, Cheek noticed the driver, later identified as defendant, was not wearing a seatbelt. Cheek also noticed there was a passenger in the vehicle, later identified as co-defendant, Raymond Porter Jr.1

After driving past Cheek and Johnson, the car stopped in the middle of the parking lot. The detectives observed Porter exit the vehicle, stop and look back into the vehicle, then close the door before quickly proceeding to the steps of one of the row homes. After defendant parked, Cheek initiated a motor-vehiclestop, at which time Porter took off running from the steps of the row home.

As the detectives approached the vehicle, Cheek immediately saw a large silver revolver with a black handle in plain view on the passenger's seat. At this time, Cheek notified Johnson there was a gun in the car, Johnson removed defendant from the vehicle, and Cheek removed the handgun. During the stop, defendant remained in the driver's seat until removed from the car and made no gestures toward the gun. Defendant was then arrested. Co-defendant, Porter, was arrested by the other Street Crimes Unit patrolling Donnelly Homes.

On April 29, 2014, a Mercer County Grand Jury charged defendant and Porter with second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1). Defendant does not contest he did not have a permit for the handgun.

Defendant and Porter jointly moved to suppress the handgun. On March 10, 2015, the trial court denied their motion, finding the traffic stop lawful, and the seizure of the handgun permitted under the plain view doctrine. Defendant does not appeal that ruling.

Defendant and Porter were tried jointly. The jury heard testimony from: Cheek, who testified regarding the facts leading to defendant's arrest; Detective Edward J. Burek, Jr., who isassigned to the Ballistics Unit of the Trenton Police Department and testified regarding the evidence intake process and his finding that the gun was operable; Detective William Salhanick, who was assigned to the Street Crimes Unit the evening of the incident and testified regarding Porter's arrest; and Detective Robert J. Paccillo, who testified regarding the detection, collection, and identification of fingerprints. Notably, Paccillo found no identifiable fingerprints on the gun.

Cheek testified the area of the stop was "really well lit," and upon walking up to the car, she "immediately saw a large handgun sitting on the passenger seat." She further testified that although she had a flashlight, she believed she would have been able to see the gun without it. When describing defendant's proximity to the handgun, Cheek noted, "[i]t wasn't far from him. It was within arm's reach, directly next to him in the passenger seat." Cheek also stated defendant made no attempt to move toward the weapon or control it at any point during the stop. The handgun was admitted into evidence.

Defendant and Porter elected not to testify during the trial. After the parties rested, defendant's attorney moved for acquittal, arguing the State did not prove defendant possessed the gun because he made no moves toward it, did not exercise any control over it, and there were no fingerprints on the gun linkingit to him. After considering the evidence presented by the State, the inferences the jury could reach from the evidence, the elements of the offense, and the law regarding constructive possession, the trial judge denied the motion, concluding a reasonable jury could find all three elements of the charge were satisfied by the State beyond a reasonable doubt.

At the conclusion of testimony, the judge provided counsel with proposed jury instructions, giving counsel an opportunity to review the instructions prior to the charge conference. The proposed instructions included interchangeable use of the words "defendant or defendants." During the charge conference, the judge provided his reasoning for this language, stating: "it says, the [d]efendant or [d]efendants because I want the jury, obviously, to understand that they have to decide the evidence as to each of the [d]efendants, individually, so I wanted to, you know, clarify that." Notably, neither attorney objected to the proposed jury charges during the conference.

Because there was more than one defendant, the trial judge instructed the jury:

Ladies and gentlemen, obviously, we have more than one defendant as to each of the charges being tried.
You must return separate verdicts for each defendant as to each of the charges being tried.
In other words, you will have to decide each case individually. Whether the verdicts as to each defendant are the same depends on the evidence and your determination as judges of the facts.

With only minor modifications, the judge used the applicable portions of Model Jury Charge (Criminal), "Unlawful Possession of a Handgun (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b)" (rev. Feb. 26, 2001) (the Model Charge), which included the following:

The word "possess" as used in criminal statutes signifies a knowing, intentional control of a designated thing, accompanied by a knowledge of its character. Thus, a defendant or defendants must know or be aware that he possessed the handgun and a defendant must know what it is that he/they possess or control is a handgun. This possession cannot merely be a passing control that is fleeting or uncertain in its nature.
In other words, to "possess" within the meaning of the law, a defendant or defendants must knowingly procure or receive the handgun possessed or be aware of his/their control thereof for a sufficient period of time to have been able to relinquish control if he/they chose to do so. A person may possess a handgun, even though it is not physically on his person at the time of arrest, if a person had, in fact, at some time prior to his arrest, had control over it.
. . . .
The law recognizes that possession may be constructive or actual. Constructive possession means possession in which the person does not physically have the handgun, but though not physically on one's person, heis aware of the presence of the handgun and is able to and has the intention to exercise control over it.

The judge modified the last paragraph of the Model Charge by adding the phrase, "as to one or both defendants" as indicated below:

If you find that the State has failed to prove any of the elements of a crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt, your verdict must be not guilty as to one or both defendants.
On the other hand, if you are satisfied that the State has proven all of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, your verdict must be guilty as to one or both defendants.
[(Emphasis added).]

During their deliberations, the jury presented two questions to the court simultaneously. The first asked, "How long constitutes possession?" The second asked, "What is fleeting?" The judge responded, "Unfortunately, ladies and gentleman, there is nothing more I can add, other than what that paragraph states."

On April 12, 2016, the jury returned a verdict, finding defendant and Porter guilty of second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun. At defendant's sentencing, the State argued for a seven-year term of imprisonment with a three-and-a-half year period of parole ineligibility. Defendant argued the court should impose the lowest sentence possible because this was his firstSuperior Court conviction, he had two dependent children, he was unaware of the presence of the gun, and he cooperated fully with the justice system. Defendant contended he should be sentenced below the statutory requirement to a term of probation. The State would not consent to a Graves Act waiver under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.2. The trial judge asked the prosecutor, "had he pled guilty before trial, . . . would that have been appropriate to ask for some type of Graves Act waiver from the criminal presiding judge?" The prosecutor responded, "[i]t certainly would have been a possibility." The court replied, "we're way beyond that stage."

Defendant had not led a law-abiding life. He was adjudicated delinquent, placed on probation, and then violated probation. As an adult, he was convicted of an ordinance violation and contempt of court for violating a domestic violence restraining order, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(b), for which he was placed on probation.

The judge found aggravating factors three, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3) (risk defendan...

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