State v. Hales, 217

• Docket Nº: No. 217
• Citation: 122 S.E.2d 768, 256 N.C. 27
• Case Date: December 13, 1961
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina

Page 768

122 S.E.2d 768 256 N.C. 27, 90 A.L.R.2d 804 STATE,
v.
Marie HALES. No. 217 Supreme Court of North Carolina. Dec. 13, 1961

T. W. Bruton, Atty. Gen., and Harry W. McGalliard, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

Lucas, Rand & Rose, by Z. Hardy Rose, Wilson, for defendant, appellee.

PARKER, Justice.

The warrant charges a violation of G.S. § 14-72.1. The defendant may challenge the constitutionality of this statute by a demurrer, or by a motion to quash the warrant. State v. Glidden Company, 228 N.C. 664, 46 S.E.2d 860; 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 96, pp. 343-344.

G.S. § 14-72.1 reads: 'Whoever, without authority, wilfully conceals the goods or merchandise of any store, not theretofore purchased by such person, while still upon the premises of such store, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars ($100.00), or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment. Such goods or merchandise found concealed upon or about the person and which have not theretofore been purchased by such person shall be prima facie evidence of a willful concealment.'

Article I, Section 17, of the North Carolina Constitution, states: 'No person ought to be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed or exiled, or in any manner deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the law of the land.'

The phrase, 'the law of the land,' used in the above-quoted part of [256 N.C. 30] the State Constitution and 'due process of law' are interchangeable terms. Eason v. Spence, 232 N.C. 579, 61 S.E.2d 717, 721.

The Legislature, unless it is limited by constitutional provisions imposed by the State and Federal Constitutions, has the inherent power to define and punish any act as a crime, because it is indispuredly a part of the police power of the State. The expediency of making any such enactment is a matter of which the Legislature is the proper judge. However, the act of the Legislature declaring what shall constitute a crime must have some substantial relation to the ends sought to be accomplished. State v. Yarboro, 194 N.C. 498, 140 S.E. 216; People v. Belcastro, 356 Ill. 144, 190 N.E. 301, 92 A.L.R. 1223; 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 13; 14 Am.Jur., Criminal Law, Sections 16 and 22; Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure, 1957, Vol. I, Section 16.

In passing upon the constitutionality of this statute there is a presumption that it is constitutional, and it must be so held by the courts, unless it is in conflict

Page 771

with some constitutional provision. State v. Warren, 252 N.C. 690, 114 S.E.2d 660; State v. Lueders, 214 N.C. 558, 200 S.E. 22.

It is within the power of the Legislature to declare an act criminal irrespective of the intent of the doer of the act. The doing of the act expressly inhibited by the statute constitutes the crime. Whether a criminal intent is a necessary element of a statutory offense is a matter of construction to be determined from the language of the statute in view of its manifest purpose and design. State v. Correll, 232 N.C. 696, 62 S.E.2d 82; State v. Lattimore, 201 N.C. 32, 158 S.E. 741; Hunter v. State of Tennessee, 158 Tenn. 63, 12 S.W.2d 361, 61 A.L.R. 1148; Wharton's ibid, Section 17; 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 30; 14 Am.Jur., Criminal Law, 24.

Such legislation eliminating intent as an essential element of a statutory crime 'is enacted and is sustained, for the most part, on grounds of necessity, and is not violative of federal or other constitutional prohibitions.' 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 30, p. 102.

This Court said in the Lattimore case: 'It is true that an act may become criminal only by reason of the intent with which it is done, but the performance of an act which is expressly forbidden by statute may constitute an offense in itself without regard to the question of intent.' [201 N.C. 32, 158 S.E. 742.]

12 Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, Section 629, states: 'The legislature has power to enact provisions, even in criminal actions, that where certain facts have been proved, they shall be prima facie evidence of the main fact in question if the fact proved has some fair relation to, or natural connection with, the main fact. There is no vested right to the rule of evidence that everyone shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty, which prevents the legislature from making[256 N.C. 31] the doing of certain acts prima facie proof of guilt or of some element of guilt.' To the same effect: State v. Barrett, 138 N.C. 630, 50 S.E. 506, 1 L.R.A.,N.S., 626; State v. Dowdy, 145 N.C. 432, 58 S.E. 1002; State v. Hammond, 188 N.C. 602, 125 S.E. 402; State v. Fowler and Brincefield, 205 N.C. 608, 172 S.E. 191; Casey v. U. S., 276 U.S. 413, 48 S.Ct. 373, 72 L.Ed. 632; 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 128(d).

Speaking directly to the point in the Fowler and Brincefield case this Court says [205 N.C. 608, 172 S.E. 192]: 'The defendants assail the...