State v. Halford
| Decision Date | 04 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | 2020 KA 0585 |
| Citation | 327 So.3d 1004 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. Michael HALFORD |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
Cynthia K. Meyer Louisiana Appellate Project New Orleans, LA Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant Michael Halford
Michael Halford Angola, LA In proper person
Scott M. Perrilloux, District Attorney, Richard McShan, Brett Sommer, Assistant District Attorneys, Greensburg, LA, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee State of Louisiana
BEFORE: McCLENDON, WELCH, AND LANIER, JJ.
The defendant, Michael Lynn Halford, was charged by grand jury indictment with first degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:30. He pled not guilty. The defendant filed a motion in limine to prohibit the use of a statement and/or testimony of Jessica Raymond based on spousal privilege. After a pretrial hearing, the trial court found that no spousal privilege existed. The defendant did not testify at trial. After a trial by jury, the defendant was found guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment at hard labor, to be served without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.1
The defendant now appeals, assigning as error in a counseled brief the trial court's denial of challenges for cause of several prospective jurors and the trial court's ruling on the motion in limine. The defendant filed a pro se brief raising sufficiency of the evidence and supplementing the arguments raised in the counseled brief. For the following reasons, we affirm the conviction and sentence.
On August 7, 2012, Rhonda Morris, a postal worker in Greensburg, Louisiana, approached the driveway of John Nelson Hornsby (the victim) while on her mail route, and observed that his house had completely burned down. She further noticed that the driver's door of the victim's truck was ajar. She walked around to the front of the truck and saw the victim's body lying in the grass. Ms. Morris called the St. Helena Parish Sheriff's Office (SHPSO) and waited for an ambulance and the police to arrive.
Officers responded to the scene, and when they arrived, Deputy Micah Woodard spoke to Ms. Morris as the other officers began to check and secure the scene. Patrick Lane of the Louisiana State Police Crime Lab (crime lab) also arrived at the scene, took video footage, and collected evidentiary items and samples. SHPSO detectives Laurie Sibley and Gary Cannon arrived at the scene at approximately 10:00 a.m. Detective Cannon photographed the scene, including the victim, a maul or sledgehammer located near the victim's body, and the left front tire of the victim's truck, which had blood and gray hair on it matching the victim's hair color.
Detectives Sibley and Cannon questioned neighbors in the area and learned that noises, including loud popping and dogs, were heard that morning from about 4:00 a.m. to about 6:00 or 6:30 a.m. The detectives further attended the victim's autopsy, collected swabs and fingernail clippings taken from the victim, and sent the items to the crime lab for testing. After the SHPSO received verbal communication of the crime lab results showing the defendant's DNA was located under the victim's fingernails, a warrant for the defendant's arrest was obtained and executed.
Jessica Raymond, the defendant's wife at the time of the offense, visited the defendant in jail after his arrest.2 Ms. Raymond testified at trial that, prior to the jail visit, she suspected that the defendant had committed the murder. She further testified that she held a conversation with the defendant during the jail visit in an attempt to elicit a confession and that the defendant, in response, confirmed that he killed the victim. The defendant then instructed Ms. Raymond to hide evidence of the crime for him.
In assignment of error number one of his pro se brief, the defendant argues that the State failed to meet its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every essential element of the offense. Noting that the defendant had regularly been in and around the victim's residence prior to his death to do various errands for him, the defendant argues that the State failed to prove the significance of DNA and fingerprint evidence obtained. The defendant also contends that there was no evidence to support the State's theory that he was present when the victim was murdered. He contends that the video footage shown at trial only proved that he was at a convenience store at 3:55 a.m., five minutes before the approximate time of the victim's murder. In that regard, he further contends that there was no actual determination of the distance between the store and the victim's residence and/or how long it would have taken him to drive from one location to the other.
The defendant further notes that no one witnessed him commit the murder. He argues that "the mere presence of [his] DNA being under fingernails on the victim's left-hand ... in no way links him to the murder." He further argues that the presence of his fingerprint on a revolver only shows that at some point in time, he had touched the gun, possibly while in the presence of the victim. The defendant contends that the State erroneously placed high reliability on Ms. Raymond's "questionable" allegation that he confessed to the murder. He concludes that the State's evidence at the most shows that he may have been involved in a theft or burglary. Thus, he argues that the conviction should be reversed.
A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand, as it violates due process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV ; La. Const. art. I, § 2. In reviewing claims challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, this court must consider whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). See also La. Code Crim. P. art. 821(B) ; State v. Ordodi , 2006-0207 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So.2d 654, 660. The Jackson standard of review, incorporated in Article 821(B), is an objective standard for testing the overall evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt. When analyzing circumstantial evidence, La. R.S. 15:438 provides that the fact finder must be satisfied the overall evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. State v. Patorno , 2001-2585 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/21/02), 822 So.2d 141, 144.
When the key issue is the defendant's identity as the perpetrator, rather than whether the crime was committed, the State is required to negate any reasonable probability of misidentification. It is the fact finder who weighs the respective credibility of each witness, and this court will generally not second-guess those determinations. State v. Hughes , 2005-0992 (La. 11/29/06), 943 So.2d 1047, 1051 ; State v. Davis , 2001-3033 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/21/02), 822 So.2d 161, 163-64.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:30(A)(5), in pertinent part, provides that "[f]irst degree murder is the killing of a human being ... [w]hen the offender has the specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon a victim who is ... sixty-five years of age or older." Specific criminal intent is that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act. La. R.S. 14:10(1). Though intent is a question of fact, it need not be proven as a fact. It may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction. Specific intent may be proven by direct evidence, such as statements by a defendant, or by inference from circumstantial evidence, such as a defendant's actions or facts depicting the circumstances. Specific intent is an ultimate legal conclusion to be resolved by the fact finder.
State v. Coleman , 2017-1045 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/13/18), 249 So.3d 872, 877, writ denied, 2018-0830 (La. 2/18/19), 263 So.3d 1155. Specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm may be inferred from the extent and severity of the victim's injuries. State v. Thomas , 2019-0409 (La. App. 1st Cir. 10/25/19), 289 So.3d 1030, 1038, writ granted in part on other grounds, 2019-01819 (La. 6/22/20), 297 So.3d 727. Conversely, a defendant's confession is direct evidence, for it is an acknowledgment of guilt for which no inference need be drawn. State v. Landry , 2019-0486 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/21/20), 297 So.3d 8, 15. See also La. R.S. 15:449 ; State v. Brown , 2013-0560 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/30/14), 2014 WL 2711808, at *4, writ denied, 2014-1418 (La. 9/18/15), 177 So.3d 1066.
The autopsy of the victim was performed by Dr. Dana Trosclair, who was accepted as an expert in forensic pathology. Dr. Trosclair testified that the victim suffered multiple blunt force injuries consisting of lacerations, abrasions, and contusions on his face, head, and arms. She further confirmed that some of the lacerations on the victim's head were consistent with the use of a large hammer in inflicting the injuries. She also testified that the victim suffered a contusion to the left side of his face and skull, consistent with being rolled over by the tire of a vehicle. The victim also had defensive wounds on his arms and fractured ribs on his left side. The victim's cause of death was multiple blunt force injuries to the head and chest. Dr. Trosclair further testified that the victim had thermal injuries to the left side of his body, particularly his legs, but those injuries were sustained postmortem (after death), revealing that he was already deceased at the time of the fire.
After his arrest, the defendant was read his rights and did not admit to committing the offense. However, the defendant informed the police that on the day in question, he left home during the early morning hours to buy cigarettes from a convenience store located across the street...
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