State v. Halford
| Decision Date | 21 September 1898 |
| Docket Number | 919 |
| Citation | 17 Utah 475,54 P. 819 |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE v. JOSEPH W. HALFORD |
Appeal from district court, first district; C. H. Hart, Judge.
Joseph W. Halford was convicted of rape, and appeals.
Reversed.
B. H Jones and Moyle, Zane & Costigan, for appellant:
The law is well settled that before a conviction can be had for rape it must appear that the woman raped resisted with all her strength. It must be a bona fide resistance, not a pretence of reluctance. There must be some evidence of struggle if the woman has her senses, and if not overpowered or completely terrified. The fact that a woman, who has had such a frightful outrage perpetrated against her chastity, makes no complaint, is always cogent proof that no rape was committed. The law is stated to be that if the woman was in her senses unless she was overpowered by fear, or terrorized by display of force, she must have resisted to the extent of her ability. 32 Cent. Law Jour. 103, by Chief Justice Maxwell of Nebraska; see also Miller v. United States, 164 U.S 644; State v. McCune, 16 Utah 170.
The proof made in this case does not meet the law. It would be a travesty on criminal justice to permit such a conviction to stand. If it can stand, the law of rape will receive a new and hitherto unheard of development. At most, on the woman's own statement, an act of sexual intercourse took place. She had been importuned, she denied the favor; the man persisted, she coyly pushed him away with one hand, then she accommodated herself to an erect position and without a struggle submitted, and never thought of rape until her husband taxed her with an act of infidelity.
As bearing upon the question, we submit the following cases: Curby v. Territory, 42 P. 953; Rhea v. State, 175 W. Rep. 931; Whittaker v. State, 50 Wis. 518; People v. Dohring, 59 N.Y. 374; Tittle v. State, 38 S.W. 202.
On the motion for a new trial, the evidence that was produced at the hearing was made all the stronger by the affidavits, which showed that the defendant was not present in West Portage, in corroboration of his own testimony, and showed further how close the corral was to the house, and the nature of the fence against which she claimed to have been held. So, taking the unsatisfactory nature of the evidence with the additional evidence shown on the motion for a new trial, it seems plain that the new trial ought to have been granted by the lower court.
In conclusion, we submit that the evidence, being all in, so far as the prosecution was concerned, and the prosecutrix's own testimony not showing rape, the defendant ought now to be discharged without the expense of a new trial. This was done in the case of Curby v. Territory, 42 P. 953.
A. C. Bishop, Attorney General, for the State.
In a criminal case, proof to a moral certainty is not required, and all that is necessary is that all reasonable doubt of guilt be removed. Territory v. Barth, 15 P. 673; Territory v. Clanton, 20 P. 94.
The evidence in this case, at best, is conflicting, and may be said to be not very strong, as tending to support the verdict, and yet, I contend that there is a substantial conflict, and that in such a case, the rule laid down by this court in several cases, is to the effect, that where there is a conflict in the evidence, and it does not appear that the jury labored under a mistake in considering their verdict, or that they were actuated by any improper motive, a new trial should not be granted. This doctrine was announced in the case of People v. Chalmers, 5 Utah 201; and adhered to in People v. Peacock, 5 Utah 237 U. S.; v. Harris, 5 Utah 436.
Nor will the verdict of "guilty" be set aside if the evidence substantially supports it.
There must be an absence of evidence against the defendant, or substantial preponderance in his favor. People v. Clawson, 2 Utah 502; People v. Swasey, 6 Utah 93; U. S. v. Brown, 6 Utah 115; People v. Biddlecome, 3 Utah 208.
The defendant was convicted of the crime of rape. The errors upon which the defendant relies for a reversal of the judgment are that the evidence was wholly insufficient to support the verdict of conviction, and that the court erred in not instructing the jury to acquit the defendant.
It appears from the testimony that the defendant was married to a sister of the prosecutrix. The parties were well acquainted with each other, and the prosecutrix lived in defendant's family prior to her marriage. The prosecuting witness, among other things, testified, in substance: That defendant came to her house on May 27, 1897, about sundown. That he ate supper with her husband, and then went to the corral. That he soon called, and asked where the clevis pin was. She says: I went out where he was. My attention was called to the fact that the clevis pin was lost. I stooped down to pick up the pin, and he stooped down, and put his arm around my shoulder, and says, 'Let's have some.' I said 'No, sir; I am not a woman of that kind.' Then he had me with my back against the fence, and he held me there with his knees between mine, and he raised my clothes with his other hand, and got what he wanted. My clothes were soiled. After this I went to the house. Before I went to the house defendant said if I told on him he would swear against my word, and make me not a true woman, and that my husband would leave me. Defendant followed me to the house and sat on the steps after I had entered it. My husband was in the house when I returned. My husband told the defendant that he had better come in and go to bed; that the bed was made down. The defendant said, 'No; he guessed he'd better go home.' I told him that he had better go home, or somewhere else, 'the dirty dog.'" It appears the defendant accepted the husband's invitation, and stayed at his house that night, and went away in the morning. It appears also that prosecutrix's husband had been sick during the summer, and that she had taken care of him night and day for two months previous, and was worn out and weak, and that she had been sick all the summer before the act. She also states that he forced the side of her body against the poles of the fence, and that his right arm was around her; that the fence left a greenish color on the back of her dress, and her dress sleeve was torn, as appeared in court; that she stated the fact of her ravishment to her friends afterwards, in presence of defendant, and at his request, and he did not deny it, but admitted it; that defendant said he would do anything in his power to have it settled, but did not want to go to the bishop. He refused to go before the bishop, and said he would be a fool to go before him. She says: That both parties were standing up, the defendant being in front of her holding her fast. That defendant came to her house often as a friend, and chopped wood and helped them, as her husband was sick. She also states That she did all she could with...
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