State v. Hall-George
| Citation | 247 A.3d 659,203 Conn.App. 219 |
| Decision Date | 09 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | AC 42574 |
| Court | Appellate Court of Connecticut |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Caleb T. HALL-GEORGE |
Adele V. Patterson, senior assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).
Timothy J. Sugrue, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Brian W. Preleski, state's attorney, and Robert Mullins, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
Alvord, Prescott and Suarez, Js.
The defendant, Caleb T. Hall-George, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a jury trial, of robbery in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-135 (a) (1) (B). The defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he threatened the use of what he represented by his words and conduct to be a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, as required by § 53a-135 (a) (1) (B). We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
On the basis of the evidence presented at trial, the jury reasonably could have found the following facts. At approximately 4:10 p.m. on April 28, 2017, the defendant entered a branch of Farmington Bank in New Britain. The defendant was dressed in dark, baggy clothing, including a sweatshirt with the hood pulled over his head. The defendant is approximately five feet, seven inches tall, and had a skinny build. The defendant remained in the lobby of the bank for approximately one hour, during which time he went to a workstation in the middle of the bank, where he picked up a pen and a piece of paper. He then sat in a guest chair with a magazine or brochure in his lap on which he began writing. While in the bank, during which time his activities were recorded by bank surveillance cameras, he occasionally held to his ear what appeared to be a cell phone.
Shortly after 5 p.m., the defendant approached the teller station at which Jessica Martinez, a bank supervisor, was working. The counter at the teller station was slightly taller than the defendant's waist, and rising from either side of the station were dividers about the same height as the defendant's shoulders. The dividers supported a piece of glass that separated Martinez and the defendant. The defendant positioned his head such that
he was hovering over this glass during his interaction with Martinez.
Martinez asked the defendant how she could assist him. The defendant then passed a withdrawal ticket to Martinez and mumbled, "give me all the money and no one will get hurt." The front side of the withdrawal ticket had "4-28-17" handwritten on the date line, "Anthony Springer" handwritten on the name line, and "Anthony" handwritten on the signature line. On the back side of the withdrawal ticket was a handwritten note, which stated: Martinez, acting under the belief that "something could possibly happen" if she did not comply with the defendant's demands, gave the defendant $613 in currency. The defendant left the bank at 5:05 p.m. The police were called and arrived at the bank approximately three minutes later.
James Wozniak, an officer for the New Britain Police Department, arrived at the bank, where he found Martinez, who "appeared in shock and was emotional, crying." A state forensic laboratory analyzed the defendant's note and found both latent fingerprints and DNA on it. Analysis of the evidence supported a finding that one fingerprint matched the defendant's right index finger and two other fingerprints matched his right middle finger. The DNA found on the note was determined to be consistent with that of the defendant.
The fingerprint analysis led the police to the defendant, and they attempted to locate him at an address in Willimantic. Ivette Santiago, who was dating the defendant at the time of the robbery, lived at this address and was there when the police arrived. Two New Britain police officers spoke with Santiago, who provided the police with two cell phone numbers that she had used to communicate with the defendant. Santiago
identified the cell phone number that the defendant used to contact her around the time of the robbery. The police then obtained cell phone records for this phone number after executing a search warrant. These phone records showed that at 4:40 and 5:06 p.m. on the date of the robbery, the defendant's phone accessed a cellular antenna that was mounted on a New Britain church steeple that "[pointed] right toward the Broad Street area where the bank [was]" located.
The defendant was arrested on October 19, 2017. On August 22, 2018, by way of a two count, long form information, the state charged the defendant with one count of robbery in the second degree in violation of § 53a-135 (a) (1) (B) and one count of robbery in the second degree in violation of § 53a-135 (a) (2) (B). The case was tried to a jury over the course of four days, starting on September 24, 2018. The state rested on September 27, 2018, the third day of trial. Immediately thereafter, the defendant orally moved for a judgment of acquittal.1 The court denied the motion. The defendant then rested without presenting evidence. On September 28, 2018, the court held a charging conference on the record, followed by the closing arguments of counsel. The court then delivered the charge, and the jurors began to deliberate. Later that day, the jury returned guilty verdicts as to both counts.
On October 2, 2018, the defendant filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal after the verdict pursuant to Practice Book § 42-51, asserting that the jury did not hear sufficient evidence to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crimes with which he was charged. On October 4, 2018, the defendant filed an amended motion for a judgment of acquittal after the verdict, which contained the same arguments. The court denied both motions on December 3, 2018.
On December 3, 2018, the court sentenced the defendant to a period of seven years of incarceration on each of the two counts. Immediately after sentencing, the trial court noted that "[o]ne of those counts [had] to be dismissed because you can't be guilty of the two counts of that one single act." Accordingly, the court concluded that "[t]he second count [was] dismissed pursuant to case law ...."2 This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.
The defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he threatened the use of what he represented by his words and conduct to be a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, as was required by § 53a-135 (a) (1) (B). We disagree.
"We begin our analysis by setting forth the well settled standard of review applicable to a sufficiency of
the evidence claim, wherein we apply a two part test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [jury] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt .... This court cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the jury if there is sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. ...
is allowed only to do the former. ... However, [t]he line between permissible inference and impermissible speculation is not always easy to discern. When we infer, we derive a conclusion from proven facts because such considerations as experience, or history, or science have demonstrated that there is a likely correlation between those facts and the conclusion. If that correlation is sufficiently compelling, the inference is reasonable. But if the correlation between the facts and the conclusion is slight, or if a different conclusion is more closely correlated with the facts than the chosen conclusion, the inference is less reasonable. At some point, the link between the facts and the conclusion becomes so tenuous that we call it speculation. When that point is reached is, frankly, a matter of judgment. ...
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...(noting that no clear line of demarcation exists between permissible inference and impermissible speculation); State v. Hall-George , 203 Conn. App. 219, 226, 247 A.3d 659 (line between permissible inferences and impermissible speculation not always easy to discern), cert. denied, 336 Conn.......
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State v. Hall-George
...Sugrue, assistant state's attorney, in opposition.The defendant's petition for certification to appeal from the Appellate Court, 203 Conn. App. 219, 247 A.3d 659, is ...