State v. Hall
Citation | 321 Md. 178,582 A.2d 507 |
Decision Date | 01 September 1990 |
Docket Number | No. 2,2 |
Parties | STATE of Maryland v. Michael D. HALL. , |
Court | Court of Appeals of Maryland |
Gary E. Bair, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., on brief), Baltimore, for petitioner.
Jose Felipe Anderson, Asst. Public Defender (Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender, on brief), Baltimore, for respondent.
Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, McAULIFFE and CHASANOW, JJ.
At issue in this case is whether the petitioner, Michael Hall, knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a trial by jury.
Hall was charged by criminal information in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County with (1) unlawful stabbing, (2) assault, (3) battery, (4) carrying a dangerous weapon openly with the intent to injure, (5) assault, (6) battery, and (7) malicious destruction. On October 11, 1988, he pleaded not guilty and elected to be tried by the court by executing the following form:
Subsequently, on January 29, 1989, Hall appeared in court with counsel. The docket entries showed that, at that time, Hall waived his right to a jury trial and pleaded guilty to counts 3, 4 and 7, pursuant to an agreement with the State. The docket entries further reflect that, upon examination by the court (Truitt, J.), Hall stated that "he feels that he was coerced by the police to make statements"; that the court thereupon refused to accept the plea agreement; and the plea was withdrawn and the case scheduled for trial.
At the trial on February 9, 1989, before evidence was adduced, the court (Simpson, J.) engaged in the following colloquy with Hall:
Hall was convicted of the charges against him. On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, he argued that the judgments should be reversed because he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to a jury trial. The intermediate appellate court agreed; it concluded "that the trial court erred in proceeding to try appellant without first having made a more complete on-the-record determination that he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial." It found the colloquy between the trial judge and Hall insufficient to demonstrate that Hall acted voluntarily, or that he understood the right he was waiving. The court said
In so holding, the Court of Special Appeals made no mention of Hall's written pretrial waiver of his right to a jury trial. Upon the State's petition, we granted certiorari.
Maryland Rule 4-246 governs the waiver of a jury trial in the circuit court. It provides, in subparagraph (b):
The State contends that the Court of Special Appeals erred in determining that Hall's waiver of a jury trial was not "knowingly and voluntarily" entered in compliance with the rule. Hall maintains that the intermediate appellate court should be affirmed because the waiver inquiry conducted by the court was insufficient to satisfy the requirements of the rule. Hall points out that the court asked no questions concerning his mental condition at the time of the waiver, or whether the waiver was the result of compulsion from any source. Moreover, Hall avers that the court did not ask him whether he understood the nature of the waiver inquiry; that it never advised him how the jury would be selected; or how it would be drawn from the county voting rolls; or that he could assist in selecting the persons to serve on the jury.
Rule 4-246 was adopted in 1984. It was patterned after revised Rule 735, which was in effect from January 8, 1982 to July 1, 1984 and which, unlike its immediate predecessor bearing the same number, did not require either a written waiver of a jury trial or a recitation by the trial court to the accused of a fixed litany concerning the precise contours of the jury trial right. See Martinez v. State, 309 Md. 124, 132, n. 7, 522 A.2d 950 (1987). In considering the requirements of Rule 4-246(b), we said in Martinez that before the accused may elect a court trial, "a waiver inquiry must be conducted on the record in open court [and] [t]he questioner must examine the defendant, for only he can waive his right to a jury trial." 309 Md. at 133, 522 A.2d 950 (emphasis in original). In Stewart v. State, 319 Md. 81, 90, 570 A.2d 1229 (1990), we recognized that the right may be voluntarily waived by a knowing, intelligent act done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. In other words, as we observed in Martinez, 309 Md. at 133, 522 A.2d 950,...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Bell v. State
...513 A.2d 314 (1986). Maryland Rule 4-246, which was adopted in 1984, governs the procedure for jury trial waivers. State v. Hall, 321 Md. 178, 182, 582 A.2d 507 (1990). It derives from the version of Rule 735 that was implemented in January 1982. Id. An earlier version of Rule 735, which wa......
-
Dedo v. State
...if the right has been properly abandoned. Tibbs, 323 Md. at 31, 590 A.2d 550; Martinez, 309 Md. at 134, 522 A.2d 950. In State v. Hall, 321 Md. 178, 582 A.2d 507 (1990), the defendant was advised of his right to a jury trial "where twelve people would hear the evidence," all of whom would h......
-
Aguilera v. State Of Md., 313
...constituting the waiver is the product of a free and deliberate choice, rather than based on duress or coercion. See State v. Hall, 321 Md. 178, 182, 582 A.2d 507 (1990); Martinez v. State, 309 Md. 124, 133, 522 A.2d 950 (1987). Where the waiver of a constitutional right is the result of an......
-
Abeokuto v. State
...and without duress or coercion) and knowingly his or her right to be tried by a jury. Md. Rule 4-246(b); State v. Hall, 321 Md. 178, 182-83, 582 A.2d 507, 509-10 (1990); Martinez v. State, 309 Md. 124, 133-34, 522 A.2d 950, 955 (1987) (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.......