State v. Hall

• Decision Date: 18 October 1978
• Docket Number: No. 4239-PR,4239-PR
• Citation: State v. Hall, 586 P.2d 1266, 120 Ariz. 454 (Ariz. 1978)
• Parties: STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Charles Farrell HALL, Appellant.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Page 1266

586 P.2d 1266

120 Ariz. 454

STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Charles Farrell HALL, Appellant.

No. 4239-PR.

Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc.

Oct. 18, 1978.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 21, 1978.

Bruce E. Babbitt, former Atty. Gen., John A. LaSota, Jr., Atty. Gen., by William J. Schafer, III, and R. Wayne Ford, Asst. Attys. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee.

Ross P. Lee, Maricopa County Public Defender, by Joel M. Glynn, Deputy Public Defender, Phoenix, for appellant.

HAYS, Justice.

This is an appeal by Charles Farrell Hall from his conviction and sentencing under A.R.S. §§ 13-641 and 13-643(B) for robbery committed while armed with a gun. We affirm. The opinion of the Court of Appeals, 120 Ariz. 476, 586 P.2d 1288 (App.1978) is vacated. The first issue before us is whether a confession by Hall was voluntary and thus admissible at trial.

At the outset of Hall's trial, the state asked for a voluntariness hearing to determine the admissibility of a confession made by Hall to a police officer. Testimony at the hearing established the facts necessary for a determination of this issue.

Following his arrest, at 2:41 A.M., Hall was given the Miranda warnings. He was then returned to the scene of the crime where he was identified by the robbery victim. Subsequently, he was transported to the station. There, at about 3:45 A.M., he was again given the Miranda warnings and interviewed by Officer Watson. He denied involvement in the robbery. At about 4:53 A.M., Detective Bryant gave Hall the Miranda warnings and interviewed him. Hall again denied involvement. Several statements made by Detective Bryant at this time form the basis of Hall's argument that his subsequent confession was involuntary. The statements contained the following ideas: if Hall cooperated with the police and confessed, "it would possibly have an effect on the sentencing"; and if he were truthful and cooperated, "all this is taken into consideration normally when the judge and the presentence investigator determine the sentencing. . . . They notify us and ask us our opinion."

However, the detective also told Hall that armed robbery was punishable by "five to life" and carried a five-year mandatory sentence. He also told Hall that no deals would be made because of the serious nature of the offense. Detective Bryant then left. At about 5:00 A.M., Officer Watson returned. After giving Hall the Miranda warnings once more and after Hall indicated he understood his constitutional rights, the officer again began to question Hall. He again denied involvement. The interview then focused on the gun thrown away by Hall after the robbery. After the officer voiced his concern that a child might find the gun and hurt himself, Hall said, "the gun didn't have any bullets." He stopped a minute and said, "(w)ell, you got me anyway." He then confessed his commission of the robbery. Officer Watson then informed Detective Bryant that Hall had changed his mind and had made a partial statement. Detective Bryant then talked with Hall again and received a complete statement. The interview terminated at about 6:50 A.M. Based on all these facts, the trial court found that there had been no inducements in obtaining the confession and that Hall had given the statements voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.

In Arizona, confessions are prima facie involuntary and the burden is on the state to show they are voluntary. State v. Arnett, 119 Ariz. 38, 579 P.2d 542 (1978). Such showing must be by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Knapp, 114 Ariz. 531, 562 P.2d 704 (1977). Once the trial court finds that the confession is voluntary, such finding will not be upset on appeal absent clear and manifest error. State v. Jordan, 114 Ariz. 452, 561 P.2d 1224 (1976). We find no such clear and manifest error.

In determining the voluntariness of a confession, the trial court must look to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession and decide whether the will of the defendant has been overborne. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); State v. Knapp, 114 Ariz. 531, 562 P.2d 704 (1977). The circumstances of this case support the trial court's finding that the confession was voluntary.

The record shows that Hall was given the Miranda warnings four times and that he indicated he understood them. It shows that he voluntarily submitted to interrogation. It shows that the period of actual interrogation was less than three hours and was not continuous during that period. When he confessed he had been in custody for only about four hours. He repeatedly denied involvement in the crime even though he had been personally identified by the clerk he had robbed. Even after the conversation with Detective Bryant, during which the alleged promises were made, he still refused to admit any involvement. Only later, in the presence of another officer, did he decide to talk. When he decided to talk, his statement was in response to the officer's concern for a youth who might find the gun and be hurt by it. He did not complain of any physical deprivations of any kind nor did he ask that interrogation cease.

The only facts in the record which even tend to show the confession was involuntary are the alleged promises made by Detective Bryant that: if Hall were "truthful," and cooperated, "all this is taken into consideration normally when the judge and the pre-sentence investigator determine the sentence . . . . They notify us and ask us our opinion"; and if he cooperated with the police and confessed "it would probably have an effect on the sentencing." Each of these statements, when taken out of context, might appear to be a promise that a...