State v. Hall

• Decision Date: 14 February 1984
• Docket Number: No. 14234,14234
• Citation: State v. Hall, 353 N.W.2d 37 (S.D. 1984)
• Parties: STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Roderick D. HALL, Defendant and Appellant. . Considered on Briefs
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Page 37

353 N.W.2d 37

STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Roderick D. HALL, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 14234.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Considered on Briefs Feb. 14, 1984.

Decided July 3, 1984.

Thomas H. Harmon, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, for plaintiff and appellee; Mark V. Meierhenry, Atty. Gen., Pierre, on brief.

David L. Braun of Gors & Braun, Pierre, for defendant and appellant.

MORGAN, Justice.

This appeal is from a conviction for driving or being in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol in violation of SDCL 32-23-1(2). The appellant and defendant in this case, Roderick D. Hall (Hall), bases his appeal on two contentions. First, Hall asserts that the trial court committed prejudicial error by admitting into evidence incriminating statements obtained prior to a reading of the Miranda warning. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Second, Hall contends the trial court committed prejudicial error by refusing to give Hall's proposed jury instructions. We affirm.

Shortly after three o'clock a.m. on January 16, 1983, a South Dakota Highway Patrol Officer (Officer) came upon a silver Buick Regal (Buick) parked in the middle of a main street intersection in Harrold, South Dakota. A short time before, he had noticed the same vehicle parked in front of a bar a block away. The Officer noticed that the Buick was not running and its lights were off. He parked behind the Buick and as he approached on foot he observed Hall sitting in the front seat behind the steering wheel, slumped over to the right halfway between a vertical and horizontal position. The Officer attempted to open the car doors and found them locked. He then knocked on the window to get Hall's attention. When Hall awoke, he grabbed the shift lever, either to pull himself up straight or in an attempt to put the car in gear; Hall and the Officer contradict each other on this point. The Officer asked Hall to open the door or the window and Hall had some difficulty. The Officer observed that the key was already in the ignition and he testified at the suppression hearing that "first, he (Hall) tried to put the car in gear, .... then tried to roll down the window and couldn't get the window rolled down, I guess the car had electric windows, and he was trying to roll them down without turning the ignition on. Finally, turned the ignition switch on and got the window rolled down and I talked to him then."

As the Officer checked Hall's driver's license he made a number of observations regarding Hall's condition: (1) Hall appeared uncoordinated, mixed up and confused, (2) Hall's eyes appeared glassy and bloodshot, (3) Hall's speech was slurred, and (4) the Officer detected the odor of alcohol. The Officer testified at the suppression hearing that, based on his observations, he suspected that Hall was under the influence of alcohol and Hall was not free to leave from this point in the investigation onward. In an attempt to find out why the car was parked in the middle of the street, the Officer asked Hall what the problem was. The Officer testified that Hall was still in the vehicle at the time he asked Hall this question and that Hall's response implied that he had driven the car from in front of the bar down Main Street one block to the middle of the intersection to make a U-turn in preparation for heading home.

It was apparently at this point that the Officer asked Hall to accompany him to the patrol car and observed that Hall staggered as he walked. Once inside the patrol car, the Officer turned on a tape recorder, without informing Hall of its presence, and asked him to perform a series of verbal sobriety tests. Hall either refused or failed each test. Hall was then asked to blow into the Portable Breath Tester. He refused and became belligerent. At that point, the Officer arrested Hall for DWI, handcuffed him and left the scene. When he reached the highway on the way out of town the Officer stopped, read Hall the Miranda warning and continued on to Pierre. At the Hughes County Jail, Hall's booking procedure was video taped, again without his knowledge or consent.

A suppression hearing was held pursuant to Hall's motion to suppress his incriminating statements, the recordings made in the arresting officer's car, and the video tape recordings taken during Hall's booking procedure. A second motion hearing was held one day before trial to consider Hall's motion in limine in which he requested the court to enter pretrial orders prohibiting the State from presenting evidence regarding: (1) his refusal to submit to chemical sobriety tests and from mentioning chemical or blood tests in any manner, (2) his refusal to submit to certain field sobriety tests, including the Portable Breath Test, and (3) precluding any comment by the State on these tests. Hall also moved that the trial court suppress: (1) all incriminating statements he made while he was in custody but was unadvised of his Miranda rights, (2) all evidence regarding audio tape or video tape recorded evidence, and (3) all evidence of Hall's prior criminal record.

After reviewing the evidence and arguments presented at the suppression hearings, the trial judge adopted relevant findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court concluded among other things that Hall's initial statements to the officer before he entered the patrol car, and during the earliest stages of the investigation, were not the result of a custodial interrogation and were freely and voluntarily made. The trial court denied all motions to suppress with the proviso that "to the extent the audio and video recordings include statements by the defendant either referring to a refusal of the chemical test or which are the result of custodial interrogation prior to the advising of Miranda rights, those statements shall be removed from the tapes before the tapes may be submitted to the jury." When a trial court has made a finding on whether or not a particular statement was voluntarily given, that finding is binding on this court unless it is clearly erroneous. State v. Williamson, 349 N.W.2d 645 (1984); State v. Hintz, 318 N.W.2d 915 (S.D.1982); State v. DuBois, 286 N.W.2d 801 (S.D.1979); State v. Lyons, 269 N.W.2d 124 (S.D.1978). See State v. Williamson, 342 N.W.2d 15 (S.D.1983). Moreover, the evidence must be considered in a light most favorable to support a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress. State v. Kiehn, 86 S.D. 549, 199 N.W.2d 594 (1972).

The first issue considered on this appeal is whether the trial court committed prejudicial error by admitting into evidence incriminating statements Hall made before the Miranda warning was given.

The law is clear that any suspect taken into custody or deprived of his freedom in any significant way must be informed of his constitutional rights. Miranda, supra, cited in DuBois, supra. The trial court in this case properly excluded any recorded incriminating statements made prior to the Miranda warning. The law is also settled, however, that in the absence of a custodial situation Miranda warnings are not required prior to commencing an interrogation. DuBois, supra, citing Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977); State v. Roadifer, 346 N.W.2d 438, 439 (S.D.1984). Law enforcement officers do not have to give Miranda warnings to every person routinely questioned during the course of an investigation. DuBois, supra.

The test for determining whether Miranda warnings are necessary is whether the person questioned is in custody or deprived of the freedom to leave. State v. Bruske, 288 N.W.2d 319 (S.D.1980) citing Oregon v. Mathiason, supra. See also State v. Bartunek, 323 N.W.2d 121 (S.D.1982) (an appellant is not entitled to Miranda warnings before being asked whether he was the driver of a vehicle involved in a one-car accident).

This court looks to various criteria to distinguish custodial from noncustodial interrogations and to determine whether Miranda warnings must be given, including: (1) probable cause to arrest, (2) subjective intent or perception of the defendant, (3) the focus of the investigation, (4) the nature of the interrogator, (5) the nature of the suspect, (6) the time and place of the interrogation, (7) the nature of the interrogation and (8) the purpose of the interrogation. State v. Branch, 298 N.W.2d 173 (S.D.1980).

When the officer approached the Buick and got Hall's attention he was merely investigating into the reason for the car's presence in the middle of the intersection. His first question was, "what is the problem?" Hall's incriminating statement, that he had come down to the intersection to make a U-Turn, from which the Officer inferred that Hall had driven the car, was made in response to a reasonable investigatory question. As the trial judge stated at the suppression hearing, the question was "nothing more than good police procedure."

The original obvious offense was traffic-related. This court has implied that even in custodial interrogations statements are not prejudicial unless the nature of the officer's question is directed to secure an admission or confession. Branch, supra. The Officer's question was appropriate and oriented toward a legitimate purpose; he wanted to know what problem resulted in the car's presence in the intersection so that it could be cleared. Considering the relevant factors of this case, it appears: first, that when the Officer approached the car, aroused Hall, observed him struggle to open the window and asked what the problem was, there was not yet sufficient probable cause for arrest. Hall's condition could have resulted from some physical malady other than intoxication. Second, the Officer's knowledge or belief that Hall was not free to leave, prior to his initial...